THE JOHN TEMPLETON FOUNDATION MODEL COURSES IN SCIENCE AND RELIGION

Abstract. In 1994 the John Templeton Foundation Humility Theology Information Center launched a major initiative, the Science-Religion Course Program, to encourage the teaching of high-quality academic courses focusing on the relationship between science and religion. In the first phase of the program, six courses were selected—four from the United States, one from Canada, and one from New Zealand—to serve as models for other academics wishing to initiate their own classes on the science-religion interface. In particular these six model courses will serve as examples for the second phase of the Templeton Foundation program, which will provide financial support for up to 100 courses at universities, colleges, and seminaries around the world. This paper is a report on the pedagogical strategies and methodologies employed in each of the six selected model courses.     

Jungian Psychology, the Body, and the Future

Impressive reaffirmation of Jung's archetypal hypothesis has come from developments in behavioural biology (Tinbergen 1951; Cosmides 1985), psycholinguistics (Chomsky 1965), structural anthropology (Lévi-Strauss 1967), developmental psychology (Bowlby 1969), dream research (Jouvet 1975). neuroscience (MacLean 1976), sociobiology (Wilson 1978), and evolutionary psychiatry (Gardner 1988; Gilbert 1989). A close correspondence exists between Jungian theories of dreaming in human beings and modern biological theories of dreaming in animals. A paradigm shift is under way in the direction of a growing cross-disciplinary awareness that all human sciences are about archetypal manifestations and that these apply as much to the body as to the mind. Jungian psychology must keep abreast of these developments if it is not to be sidelined and superseded by less humane therapeutic philosophies.     

A general linear model for estimating effect size in the presence of publication bias

When the process of publication favors studies with smallp-values, and hence large effect estimates, combined estimates from many studies may be biased. This paper describes a model for estimation of effect size when there is selection based on one-tailedp-values. The model employs the method of maximum likelihood in the context of a mixed (fixed and random) effects general linear model for effect sizes. It offers a test for the presence of publication bias, and corrected estimates of the parameters of the linear model for effect magnitude. The model is illustrated using a well-known data set on the benefits of psychotherapy.Authors' note: The contributions of the authors are considered equal, and the order of authorship was chosen to be reverse-alphabetical.     

Why are there no objective values?

Using the mathematical frameworks of economic preference ranking, subjective probability, and rational learning through empirical evidence, the epistemological implications of teleological ethical intuitionism are pointed out to the extent to which the latter is based on cognitivist and objectivist concepts of value. The notions of objective value and objective norm are critically analysed with reference to epistemological criteria of intersubjectively shared valuative experience. It is concluded that one cannot meaningfully postulate general material theories of morality that could be tested, confirmed or refuted by intersubjective empirical evidence of preferences and values, however loosely the empirical evidence of values may be interpreted. This situation is explained with reference to the ways in which preceived values become systematically influenced by the concomitants of individual valuative experience, but which have nothing to do with contingent subjective interests.     

Implications of college-age narcissism for psychosocial functioning at midlife: Findings from a longitudinal study of women

Positive and negative implications of two types of college-age narcissism on psychosocial functioning at midlife were studied in a longitudinal sample of women. Both types were scored with self-report measures when the women were, on the average, age 21. Throughout the first half of their adult life, high scorers on covert narcissism presented themselves as lacking in confidence and having low morale; high scorers on overt narcissism described themselves as wanting admiration, being independent, and being forceful. Positive outcomes associated with covert narcissism included the development of insight and of a differentiated sense of the self and, in the case of overt narcissism, entailed an involvement in high-status and creative work careers. At midlife, high scorers on covert narcissism experienced negative affect and feelings of being neglected, whereas high scorers on overt narcissism experienced family conflict and problems with impulse control. The personality characteristics associated with both types of narcissism remained stable from the early 20s to early 50s.     

Ethics education in science and engineering: The case of animal research

Conclusion The past one hundred fifty years of debate over the use of animals in research and testing has been characterized mainly byad hominem attacks and on uncritical rejection of the other sides’ arguments. In the classroom, it is important to avoid repeating exercises in public relations and to demand sound scholarship. This paper is a modification of material originally included in the handbook which accompanied the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Seminar “Teaching Ethics in Science and Engineering”, 10–11 February 1993.     

Social epistemology and reflexivity: Two versions of how to be really useful

This essay argues that the really useful character of reflexivity is that it enables a radical critique of representation and its conventional material and rhetorical practices. It is uniquely able to produce paradox and thus disrupt discourses by undermining authorial privilege. Because Fuller's social epistemology is insensitive to its own reflexive implications, and limits itself to normative questions about knowledge policy, it is too limited — and limiting — to provide a context that can nurture reflexivity.     

The relationship between qualitative and quantitative research: Lessons from feminist psychology

The dominant methodological approach in psychological research has involved the use of quantitative methods within a positivist framework. In this article we argue that both qualitative and quantitative methods have their strengths and limitations, depending on the research question under investigation. We examine some of the advantages of qualitative methods, paying particular attention to the value of such methods for feminist researchers. We challenge the positivist assumption that all research should be apolitical and value-free, arguing that the political context in which all research studies take place plays an important role in decisions about the appropriate research methods to use. Despite the value attached to qualitative methods by feminist researchers, there may be projects for which quantitative methods, or a combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques, are more suitable. We draw on examples from our research on the transition from school to the job market for young people, and a study of 16- to 19-year-old first time mothers to illustrate these points, examining the practical implications of our arguments for applied social psychology research.     

Game logic and its applications I

This paper provides a logic framework for investigations of game theoretical problems. We adopt an infinitary extension of classical predicate logic as the base logic of the framework. The reason for an infinitary extension is to express the common knowledge concept explicitly. Depending upon the choice of axioms on the knowledge operators, there is a hierarchy of logics. The limit case is an infinitary predicate extension of modal propositional logic KD4, and is of special interest in applications. In Part I, we develop the basic framework, and show some applications: an epistemic axiomatization of Nash equilibrium and formal undecidability on the playability of a game. To show the formal undecidability, we use a term existence theorem, which will be proved in Part II.The authors thank Hiroakira Ono for helpful discussions and encouragements from the early stage of this research project, and Philippe Mongin, Mitio Takano and a referee of this journal for comments on earlier versions of this paper. The first and second authors are partially supported, respectively, by Tokyo Center of Economic Research and Grant-in-Aids for Scientific Research 04640215, Ministry of Education, Science and Culture.Presented by H. Ono