Taiwanese Employees' Justice Perceptions of Co-Workers' Punitive Events

Abstract

The authors examined justice perceptions of Taiwanese employees in response to co-workers' punitive events (punishment by a superior). They developed a hypothesis based on Chinese indigenous wu-lun principles and the concept of empathy. Results of the study showed that perceived vertical (between superior and subordinate) and horizontal (between subordinates) relationships jointly affected justice perceptions. Respondents who perceived low (negative) leader-member exchange with the superior and high (positive) liking of the punished person showed the lowest justice perceptions. In conclusion, the authors note that comparative analysis of organizational justice is a promising direction for future research.     

德沃金的资源平等论探微

德沃金根据抽象的平等权理论对自由主义的分配正义理论作了新的阐发,提出了资源平等论,这一理论构想包括拍卖模式和虚拟保险市场两个部分,分别解决初始分配和再次分配的平等问题。该理论特别强调个人的自由选择权利。这一理论的完备性还有待进一步检验。     

Liberalism and the Privatised Family: The Legacy of Rousseau

This article argues that the intellectual legacy of Rousseau is at the root of the failure of 20th century egalitarian theorists such as Rawls and Dworkin to engage intellectually with feminist theorists working within the liberal tradition. Through an extended critique of Rousseau’s delineation of the relationship between liberal citizenship and the private family, it argues that the failure of such liberal theorists to take gender hierarchy seriously is a consequence of their attempt to place the private family outside the sphere not only of politics, but also of justice.     

The Duty to Eradicate Global Poverty: Positive or Negative?

In World Poverty and Human Rights, Thomas Pogge argues that the global rich have a duty to eradicate severe poverty in the world. The novelty of Pogges approach is to present this demand as stemming from basic commands which are negative rather than positive in nature: the global rich have an obligation to eradicate the radical poverty of the global poor not because of a norm of beneficence asking them to help those in need when they can at little cost to themselves, but because of their having violated a principle of justice not to unduly harm others by imposing on them a coercive global order that makes their access to the objects of their human right to subsistence insecure. In this paper, I claim that although Pogge is right in arguing that negative duties are crucial in an account of global justice, he is wrong in saying that they are the only ones that are crucial. Harming the global poor by causing their poverty provides a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the global rich to have a duty of justice to assist them. After engaging in a critical analysis of Pogges argument, I conclude by suggesting the need for a robust conception of cosmopolitan solidarity that includes positive duties of assistance which are not mere duties of charity, but enforceable ones of justice.     

Welfare and Wealth, Poverty and Justice in Today’s World

This article argues that there is no sound basis for thinking that we have a general and strong duty to rectify disparities of wealth around the world, apart from the special case where some become wealthy by theft or fraud. The nearest thing we have to a rational morality for all has to be built on the interests of all, and they include substantial freedoms, but not substantial entitlements to others assistance. It is also pointed out that the situation of the worlds poor is not that of victims of disasters, but simply of less-developed technology, which can be repaired by full and free trade relations with others. The true savior of the worlds poor is the businessman, not the missionary. What we do need to do is strike down barriers to commerce, rather than requisition aid.     

Reasonable Partiality Towards Compatriots

Ethical theories normally make room both for global duties to human beings everywhere and special duties to those we are attached to in some way. Such a split-level view requires us to specify the kind of attachment that can ground special duties, and to explain the comparative force of the two kinds of duties in cases of conflict. Special duties are generated within groups that are intrinsically valuable and not inherently unjust, where the duties can be shown to be integral to relationships within the group. Since nations can be shown to meet these conditions, acknowledging special obligations towards compatriots is justified. However for such partiality to be reasonable, it must be balanced against recognition of duties of global justice. These duties include duties to respect human rights and duties of fairness towards non-nationals. Weighing such duties against domestic duties of social justice is not a simple task, and the outcome should depend on the precise specification of the duty at stake. In particular, the duty to respect human rights fragments into four sub-duties whose force when set against local duties is markedly different.     

What We Deserve, and how We Reciprocate

Samuel Scheffler says, “none of the most prominent contemporary versions of philosophical liberalism assigns a significant role to desert at the level of fundamental principle.” To the extent that this is true, the most prominent contemporary versions of philosophical liberalism are mistaken. In particular, there is an aspect of what we do to make ourselves deserving that, although it has not been discussed in the literature, plays a central role in everyday moral life, and for good reason. As with desert, reciprocity inspires skepticism. What Allen Buchanan calls justice as reciprocity implies that duties of justice obtain only among those who can do each other favors. So characterized, justice as reciprocity is at best only a part of justice – a part that is silent on duties between people who have no favors to offer each other. Still, the more modest root idea of reciprocity – the idea that returning favors is at very least a good thing – remains compelling. What can we say on behalf of this root idea? This article is part of a larger work on the elements of justice. Both parts of it begin with and build on James Rachels’ seminal paper “What People Deserve.”     

员工非伦理行为如何招致同事攻击:道义公正视角

通过整合理性判断与道义公正模型,聚焦非伦理行为实施者被同事攻击的现象,提出员工的非伦理行为导致同事道义不公正,进而引发同事的攻击行为。并且,这个过程分别受到伦理领导的正向影响和任务互依性的负向影响。通过分析265组来自浙江省一家大型制造企业一线员工的双点数据,结果表明同事道义不公正在员工非伦理行为与其被同事攻击之间起到了中介作用;伦理领导正向调节了非伦理行为对同事道义不公正的影响,即伦理领导增强了员工非伦理行为对同事道义不公正的正向作用,从而导致同事攻击行为的产生;任务互依性负向调节了同事道义不公正与攻击行为之间的正向关系,并且减弱了同事道义不公正在员工非伦理行为与攻击行为之间的中介作用。研究结果为控制和预防职场非伦理行为提供了理论依据和实践启示。     

进谏行为与组织公民行为的关系研究：诺莫网络视角

进谏行为和组织公民行为等角色外行为研究近年来备受关注。与组织公民行为相比,进谏行为是一个新的构念。本研究探索了进谏行为的构念内涵,并借鉴诺莫网络思路考察了进谏行为与组织公民行为的关系。问卷研究的结果表明：进谏行为能融入组织公民行为构念,领导公平和情感承诺对两者都具有正面影响,而大五中的宜人性维度对两者的影响表现出差异性;从事角色外行为会导致更高的工作满意感。研究证实了进谏行为与组织公民行为构念内涵的相似性及存在的细微差异。     

What determines people’s fairness judgments? Identification and outcomes influence procedural justice evaluations under uncertainty

When the procedures people experience are uncertain, factors unrelated to principles of procedural justice may nevertheless shape procedural justice judgments. This paper investigates two of these factors: an individual’s level of social identification with the group enacting the procedures and the outcomes associated with the procedure. It was predicted and found that high (vs. low) levels of identification promote relatively positive perceptions of procedural justice. It was also predicted and found that desirable (vs. undesirable) outcomes promote relatively positive perceptions of procedural justice. These effects only emerged in the absence of direct information indicating whether procedures were (un)fair. By showing an influence of identification and outcomes on procedural justice judgments under conditions of informational uncertainty, these studies provide important experimental evidence that integrates and extends previous research on justice, identity, and uncertainty to understand subjective evaluations of process fairness.