Particularism and the Point of Moral Principles

According to radical moral particularists such as Jonathan Dancy, there are no substantive moral principles. And yet, few particularists wish to deny that something very like moral principles do indeed play a significant role in our everyday moral practice. Loathe at dismissing this as mere error on the part of everyday moral agents, particularists have proposed a number of alternative accounts of the practice. The aim of all of these accounts is to make sense of our appeal to general moral truths in both reaching and justifying our particular moral judgments without thereby violating the particularists' stricture against substantive moral principles. In this paper, I argue that the most prominent non-substantive accounts of moral generalities appealed to by radical particularists – the heuristic account and default reasons accounts – fail in this aim.     

启发信息对个体顿悟问题解决影响的眼动研究

本研究以火柴棒算式问题为实验材料,采用2(问题类型:问题A、问题B)×2(启发类型:有、无)×2(认知风格:场独立型、场依存型)×5(兴趣区:第一个加数、加号、第二个加数、等号和结果)实验设计,考察顿悟问题解决时个体的眼动差异。结果发现:相对于场依存型个体,场独立型个体能够更有效地利用启发信息来减小表征变换时的心理加工负荷,进而提高加工效率;启发信息促进问题解决者对问题的表征从数值表征转变到符号表征,从而成功地产生了顿悟。     

Examining the trade‐off between confidence and optimism in future forecasts

Confident business forecasters are seen as more credible and competent (“confidence heuristic”). We explored a boundary condition of this effect by examining how individuals react to the trade‐off between confidence and optimism. Using hypothetical scenarios, we examined this trade‐off from the perspectives of judges (i.e., business owners who hired analysts to make sales predictions) and forecasters (i.e., the analysts hired to make predictions). Participants were assigned to the role of either judges or forecasters and were asked to rate 2 potential forecasts. In the “no trade‐off” condition, the 2 forecasts were aligned in optimism and confidence (the more confident forecast was also more optimistic); in the “trade‐off” condition, the more confident forecast was less optimistic. In Experiment 1, judges were more likely to positively evaluate confident forecasters when confident forecasters were the more (vs. less) optimistic ones. Experiment 2 demonstrated that forecasters were aware of judges' preferences for optimism and strategically relied on methods that resulted in more optimistic (but less reliable) predictions. Experiment 3 directly compared the perspectives of judges and forecasters, revealing that forecasters overestimated judges' preferences for optimism over confidence. The present studies show that forecasters and judges have different views of the trade‐off between confidence and optimism and that forecasters may unnecessarily sacrifice accuracy for optimism.     

The role of the affect heuristic and cancer anxiety in responding to negative information about medical tests

Objective: Little is known about the affective implications of communicating negative information about medical tests. This research explored how affective processes – particularly the Affect Heuristic and cancer anxiety – influence the way in which people respond to such information.

Design: Participants received different types of information about PSA screening for prostate cancer and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans for migraine headaches. This was a 2 (Test harm information: present vs. absent) × 2 (Test benefit information: present vs. absent) × 2 (Test recommendation: present vs. absent) between-participants design.

Outcome Measures: Perceived risk, perceived benefit and general attitudes towards PSA and MRI testing, cancer anxiety, preferences to receive the tests vs. not.

Results: As predicted by the Affect Heuristic, test harm information reduced perceived test benefits. However, information about uncertain test benefit did not increase perceived test risks. Information about the test reduced cancer anxiety, indicating defensive coping. These variables – affect, anxiety, perceived risks and benefits – all uniquely predicted test preferences.

Conclusion: Affective processes play an important role in how people respond to and interpret negative information about medical tests. Information about harms and information about the lack of benefit can both make a test seem less beneficial, and will reduce cancer anxiety as a result.     

世界大学排名比较中的再认启发式和线索推断

针对三种世界大学排名比较任务(综合实力、商业与管理专业、农业与林业专业),用问卷调查了208名大学生并考察其利用再认启发式和额外线索作推断的情况。结果发现:(1)被试在前两种任务中的正确率均超过60%,选择可再认学校的比率及其正确率也较高;(2)比较类别对再认的选择率及其正确率均有显著影响,效应量很大;(3)再认效度较低或无法利用再认时,被试的选择在不同程度上符合外国线索或专长线索的预测;(4)多出一条不利线索时,再认选择率比只有再认线索时有所降低但不低于50%,多出一条有利线索时,再认选择率的变化因线索而异,不一定显著地增加。     

A necessity illusion for modal inferences from conditionals

Three experiments examined how people reason about what is possible or necessary when a conditional is true. Participants were asked to indicate whether it was necessary, possible or impossible for a specific instance to conform to one of the truth-table cases (pq, p¬q, ¬pq and ¬p¬q) (¬ = not), given the truth of the conditional. It was found that most participants, inconsistently, judged the pq case as necessary but the ¬pq or ¬p¬q cases as possible. Logically, these two kinds of judgments are contradictory. Moreover, a true conditional doesn’t imply that a specific instance under the conditional must be pq . Therefore, people demonstrate a necessity illusion for pq cases which contradicts their commitment to the possibility of ¬pq or ¬p¬q cases. Existing accounts of conditionals are unable to explain the contradiction and the necessity illusion. We propose an inference dissociation account and explore the theoretical implications of this necessity illusion.     

顿悟:是进程监控还是表征转换

当前解释顿悟问题解决机制的理论主要有表征转换理论和进程监控理论。进程监控理论主要解释了顿悟问题为什么困难,但事实上它并没有说明顿悟问题为什么会解决,只回答了在什么情况下被试才会寻求其他的方法,而且它把顿悟问题解决的一般过程看成是同常规问题解决方法相同的过程。而表征转换理论主要解释了顿悟是如何获得的——顿悟的获得是由于问题解决者对问题的表征实现了正确的转变,但它并没有解释表征什么时候、怎么样才能转变?顿悟问题的解决经历了三个认知加工阶段,顿悟问题的解决需要在消除定势情况下激活正确的启发信息(线索),并验证了顿悟问题的原型激活和关键启发信息理论假说。     

Herding by attribution of privileged information

We study a situation where agents take extreme actions and how these actions are imitated by others. First, Experiment 1 showed that an expert first mover had an advantage in obtaining herding by others on his investment decision, when compared to a non‐expert first mover. Experiment 2 showed that this advantage only appeared when the first mover's investment was out‐of‐the‐ordinary (in fact, highly aberrant). We obtained the same level of herding in Experiment 3 when the first mover had privileged information, instead of being an expert. Second, Experiment 4 showed that when people observed the same out‐of‐the‐ordinary investment and did not know whether the first mover had privileged information or not, they herded on him as if he had privileged information. In fact, our data revealed that participants thought that the unknown first mover had privileged information. Furthermore, herding was statistically indistinguishable from the condition where observers knew unambiguously that the first mover had privileged information. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.