Information Processing in the Context of Genetic Risk: Implications for Genetic-Risk Communication

Communicating genetic-risk information is fraught with difficulties, and there are no universally accepted guidelines for clinical practice. In this paper, we suggest that information-processing models may offer some guidance for the communication of genetic risk. The paper reviews selected literature from health and social psychology, including defensive reactions to threatening health information, the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) and Self Affirmation Theory. Ultimately, it presents the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM) of information processing as a useful perspective from which to view genetic-risk communication. Through our review of this literature, we identify some of the variables found to influence the systematic or heuristic processing of risk information and note their relevance to genetic counseling contexts. We suggest that systematic information processing is conducive to informed decision-making, as well as improved understanding of risk information. Clinical practice implications derived from our review of these literatures are noted.     

Intuition and The Junctures of Judgment in Decision Procedures for Clinical Ethics

Moral decision procedures such as principlism or casuistry require intuition at certain junctures, as when a principle seems indeterminate, or principles conflict, or we wonder which paradigm case is most relevantly similar to the instant case. However, intuitions are widely thought to lack epistemic justification, and many ethicists urge that such decision procedures dispense with intuition in favor of forms of reasoning that provide discursive justification. I argue that discursive justification does not eliminate or minimize the need for intuition, or constrain our intuitions. However, this is not a problem, for intuitions can be justified in easy or obvious cases, and decision procedures should be understood as heuristic devices for reaching judgments about harder cases that approximate the justified intuitions we would have about cases under ideal conditions, where hard cases become easy. Similarly, the forms of reasoning which provide discursive justification help decision procedures perform this heuristic function not by avoiding intuition, but by making such heuristics more accurate. Nonetheless, it is possible to demand too much justification; many clinical ethicists lack the time and philosophical training to reach the more elaborate levels of discursive justification. We should keep moral decision procedures simple and user-friendly so that they will provide what justification can be achieved under clinical conditions, rather than trying to maximize our epistemic justification out of an overstated concern about intuition.     

决策与推理的双系统——启发式系统和分析系统

近来,在决策与推理的研究中,研究者提出了双系统作用模型：基于直觉的启发式系统和基于理性的分析系统。启发式系统加工速度较快,不占用或占用很少的心理资源,容易受背景相似性、刻板印象的影响;分析系统加工速度慢,占用较多的心理资源,遵从逻辑和规则,而且两个系统有不同进化历史和神经基础。该文根据已有的相关研究,综述了双系统在决策与推理中可能的作用机制、相互关系、个体差异,同时指出了目前研究存在的不足     

Heuristic cognitive diagnosis when the Q‐matrix is unknown

Cognitive diagnosis models of educational test performance rely on a binary Q‐matrix that specifies the associations between individual test items and the cognitive attributes (skills) required to answer those items correctly. Current methods for fitting cognitive diagnosis models to educational test data and assigning examinees to proficiency classes are based on parametric estimation methods such as expectation maximization (EM) and Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) that frequently encounter difficulties in practical applications. In response to these difficulties, non‐parametric classification techniques (cluster analysis) have been proposed as heuristic alternatives to parametric procedures. These non‐parametric classification techniques first aggregate each examinee's test item scores into a profile of attribute sum scores, which then serve as the basis for clustering examinees into proficiency classes. Like the parametric procedures, the non‐parametric classification techniques require that the Q‐matrix underlying a given test be known. Unfortunately, in practice, the Q‐matrix for most tests is not known and must be estimated to specify the associations between items and attributes, risking a misspecified Q‐matrix that may then result in the incorrect classification of examinees. This paper demonstrates that clustering examinees into proficiency classes based on their item scores rather than on their attribute sum‐score profiles does not require knowledge of the Q‐matrix, and results in a more accurate classification of examinees.     

Do Smarter People Employ Better Decision Strategies? The Influence of Intelligence on Adaptive Use of the Recognition Heuristic

Within the adaptive toolbox approach, it has repeatedly been shown that, on average, people tend to adapt their decision strategies to the decision context. Building upon these results, we investigated whether individuals systematically differ in their ability to successfully adapt to the situation when applying the fast‐and‐frugal recognition heuristic (RH). In decisions between recognized and unrecognized choice objects, individuals can base their choices solely on recognition, as predicted by the RH, or they can use further knowledge retrieved from memory. Since intelligence has been conceived as the ability to successfully adapt to different situations, we expected intelligence to influence the degree of adaptive use of the RH. To test this hypothesis, we first re‐analyzed data that referred to a decision domain for which RH‐use is known to perform well. As expected, individual RH‐use increased with general intelligence. Next, we designed an experiment addressing individual RH‐use in two new decision domains, one domain for which RH‐use was less effective than knowledge‐use and another domain for which both strategies were about equally effective. In addition, we tested whether fluid or crystallized intelligence best predicts adaptive use of the RH. RH‐use was found to decrease with fluid but not crystallized intelligence when RH‐use was less effective than use of further knowledge. In contrast, there was no significant association between either type of intelligence and RH‐use when none of the two strategies was optimal. We conclude that adaptive use versus non‐use of the RH is moderated by fluid intelligence. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

对相容和不相容析取关系下析取句与条件句之间推理的比较

研究析取句和条件句之间的推理能检验推理心理学中的主要理论解释。一个实验考察了析取句和条件句中两个基本成分之间的关系(相容析取与不相容析取)和推理方向(由析取句推条件句与由条件句推析取句)对析取句与其等值的条件句之间推理的影响。结果发现,推理方向的影响取决于条件句和析取句中基本成分间的关系,在不相容析取关系下的推理成绩好于在相容析取关系下的推理成绩。现有的推理理论不能解释被试的整体反应模式,作者提出的特殊知识启发式与一般的句法意义对比启发式的竞争能统一解释被试的主导反应模式。     

情感启发式对风险选择的影响

本研究旨在考察情感启发式对风险选择的影响。研究1采用线上和线下结合的方式对687名大学生进行问卷施测,修订并检验中文版情感启发式问卷的信效度,以该问卷测试的风险−收益相关系数作为衡量情感启发式倾向的指标。研究2采用极端被试法,在103名大学生完成问卷后,将风险−收益相关系数绝对值前20%和后20%的被试分为高、低情感启发式组,完成风险选择任务。结果发现：（1）中文版情感启发式问卷具有较好的信度与效度,可以作为情感启发式倾向的测试问卷。（2）风险选择任务激活负性情绪时,相比于低情感启发式倾向,高情感启发式倾向的被试更容易受负性情绪的影响,其风险判断的主观值更高。研究揭示了情感启发式对风险选择的影响,为情感启发式作为个体进行风险判断的重要依据提供了实证支持。     

An Oblique Epistemic Defence of Conceptual Analysis

This article argues, against contemporary experimentalist criticism, that conceptual analysis has epistemic value, with a structure that encourages the development of interesting hypotheses which are of the right form to be valuable in diverse areas of philosophy. The article shows, by analysis of the Gettier programme, that conceptual analysis shares the proofs and refutations form Lakatos identified in mathematics. Upon discovery of a counterexample, this structure aids the search for a replacement hypothesis. The search is guided by heuristics. The heuristics of conceptual analysis are similar to those in other interesting areas of scholarship, and so hypotheses generated by it are of the right form to be applicable to diverse areas. The article shows that the explanationist criterion in epistemology was developed and applied in this way. The epistemic value of conceptual analysis is oblique because it contributes not towards the main purpose of conceptual analysis but towards the reliable development of epistemically valuable hypotheses in philosophy and scholarship.     

内在锚与外在锚对锚定效应及其双加工机制的影响

通过2（外在锚类型：高锚VS低锚）×2（内在锚类型：有VS无）被试间设计,考察不同锚定信息来源：由外部世界提供的外在锚与个体自身内部产生的内在锚信息对锚定效应及其加工机制的影响。结果发现：（1）当内在锚不存在时,外在高低锚组的估计值有显著差异,当内在锚存在时此种差异变得不显著;（2）当内在锚存在时,外在高低锚组被试的答题反应时有显著差异,内在锚与外在锚一致时反应时比不一致时更快,当内在锚不存在时,此种差异变得不显著。实验结果表明,当锚定调整机制与选择通达机制同时存在时,前者更占优势;锚定信息一致性会影响不同加工机制的启动,一致的信息会激活选择通达机制,不一致的信息则会激活锚定调整机制。