Do People Order Cues by Retrieval Fluency when Making Probabilistic Inferences?

In multiple‐cue probabilistic inferences, people infer alternatives' unknown values on decision criteria, using alternatives' attributes as cues. Some inferential strategies, like take‐the‐best, assume that people consider relevant cues sequentially in order of decreasing validity. This assumption has been deemed cognitively implausible by some, who suggest memory retrieval principles to guide cue order. We test whether memory‐based inferences are better described by a model considering cues in order of validity or in order of memory retrieval. In an experiment, we manipulated the frequency with which cues appeared in a learning phase, increasing retrieval fluency of cue values related to the more frequently appearing cue. In a subsequent decision phase, participants made a series of two‐alternative decisions based on the learned cue values. We compared two sequential sampling models, which differed in whether cues are sampled in order of subjective cue validity or in order of retrieval fluency. To model retrieval order of cues in the fluency sampling model, we used the declarative memory theory embedded in the ACT‐R cognitive architecture. Most participants' decisions were best described by the model sampling cues in order of memory retrieval. Only a minority of participants were classified as sampling cues by validity. Our result suggests that retrieval fluency is the primary driver of cue order in inferences from memory, irrespective of the cues' validities. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Inducing Thought Processes: Bringing Process Measures and Cognitive Processes Closer Together

The challenge in inferring cognitive processes from observational data is to correctly align overt behavior with its covert cognitive process. To improve our understanding of this overt–covert mapping in the domain of decision making, we collected eye‐movement data during decisions between gamble‐problems. Participants were either free to choose or instructed to use a specific choice strategy (maximizing expected value or a choice heuristic). We found large differences in looking patterns between free and instructed choices. Looking patterns provided no support for the common assumption that attention is equally distributed between outcomes and probabilities, even when participants were instructed to maximize expected value. Eye‐movement data are to some extent ambiguous with respect to underlying cognitive processes. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

篮球运动员对假动作任务的知觉预期优势

进行了三项实验以探讨篮球运动员知觉预期优势的原因,实验一通过对假动作任务和无假动作任务的预期正确率和自信心程度分析发现所有被试在假动作任务中的正确率和自信心程度均小于无假动作任务,假动作任务中运动员在这两个指标上均优于新手且趋势更满足二次曲线。实验二通过多重任务方法比较了点刺激和运动情景刺激条件下有无假动作任务的预期判断,发现假动作任务中运动员在反应时和正确率方面都有显著优势。实验三通过ERP分析发现运动员诱发了较大的N200和P200。据此认为,运动员的知觉预期优势可能主要存在假动作任务中,运动员在预期中采取启发式策略、并且更早编码、注意范围集中且稳定。     

Criterion knowledge: A moderator of using the recognition heuristic?

The recognition heuristic (RH) claims that people base inferences on recognition only. This has been questioned by several studies which found that additional knowledge was influential. However, in some of these studies, participants' additional knowledge might have encompassed criterion knowledge thus rendering any inferential strategy superfluous. The present study was therefore designed to test the effect of criterion knowledge on use or non‐use of the RH. Eighty‐one participants made pair‐wise comparisons with respect to the size of Belgian cities and also provided estimates of the cities' actual size. We found that relative criterion knowledge (i.e., knowledge about the relative position of an object on the criterion dimension) did indeed play some role, but its exclusion left the main critical findings intact, nonetheless. We thus conclude that previous studies conducted in the paradigm of natural recognition should not be generally refuted by the argument of participants possessing criterion knowledge. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Research in person‐centred,experiential and humanistic counselling and psychotherapy: Meeting new challenges

As a result of the programme of research into client‐centred therapy led by Carl Rogers, the humanistic therapies could claim, in the 1950s, to possess a comprehensive evidence base. Over the following decades, however, there was a marked decline in the productivity and influence of research into person‐centred and humanistic therapies. The present paper celebrates the publication of three books that mark a resurgence in research into these approaches, and comments on emerging themes and trends.     

Use of experienced retrieval ease in self and social judgments

People base judgments from memory on both the content of the information they retrieve and the ease they experience in retrieving it (Schwarz, N., Bless, H., Strack, F., Klumpp, G., Rittenauer-Schatka, H., & Simons, A. (1991). Ease of retrieval as information: another look at the availability heuristic. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 195-202). Four studies demonstrate that people rely relatively more on the experienced ease of recall when making judgments about the self compared to judgments about others. This pattern was found for judgments of an “average” (Study 1a) or specific (Study 1b) other. Subjective retrieval ease was less informative when people were relatively less familiar with the specific other person. Providing an alternative explanation for the experienced difficulty of recall affected self, but not social, assessments (Study 2). In addition, the effect generalized to risk judgments about a state of the world; namely, the safety of one’s town (Study 3). A deeper appreciation of when and why people rely on different sources of accessible information when making judgments may help in understanding and reducing social conflict.     

Automatic optimism: Biased use of base rate information for positive and negative events

People generally judge that positive events will occur in their lives and negative events will not, even when both events have the same objective likelihood to occur. In four studies, we examined the possibility that this optimistic bias is the result of people’s automatic affective reactions to future events. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate, in two different contexts, that people are consistently optimistic in their predictions, despite identical base rates for positive and negative events. In Study 2, optimistic bias was not influenced by incentives for motivated reasoning or rewards for accuracy, suggesting that bias was the result of automatic processes. Studies 3 and 4 showed that optimistic bias was more pronounced when predictions were speeded and when participants made predictions after exposure to affectively valenced words. Together, these findings suggest that people optimistically interpret base rates and that this optimism is due to an effortless affective process.     

The recognition heuristic in memory‐based inference: is recognition a non‐compensatory cue?

The recognition heuristic makes the strong claim that probabilistic inferences in which a recognized object is compared to an unrecognized one are made solely on the basis of whether the objects are recognized or not, ignoring all other available cues. This claim has been seriously challenged by a number of studies that have shown a clear effect of additional cue knowledge. In most of these studies, either recognition knowledge was acquired during the experiment, and/or additional cues were provided to participants. However, the recognition heuristic is more likely to be a tool for exploiting natural (rather than induced) recognition when inferences have to be made from memory. In our study on natural recognition and inferences from memory, around 85% of the inferences followed recognition information even when participants had learned three cues that contradicted recognition and when some of the contradictory cues were deemed more valid than recognition. Nevertheless, there were strong individual differences in the use of recognition. Whereas about half of the participants chose the recognized object regardless of the number of conflicting cues—suggestive of the hypothesized noncompensatory processing of recognition—the remaining participants were influenced by the additional knowledge. The former group of participants also tended to give higher estimates of recognition's validity. In addition, we found that the use of recognition for an inference may be affected by whether additional cue knowledge has been learned outside or within the experimental setting. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

市场信息整合的创造性思维机制初探

采用个别测试和集体测试相结合的方法, 辅以个别访谈等技术, 运用自编的实验测试材料, 通过两个实验探索市场信息的量、关键启发信息的突出性等对商业投资问题的思维决策结果的影响, 初步探讨了市场信息整合的创造性思维过程和机制。实验结果发现, 提供给被试的市场信息越多, 信息整合的问题空间越大, 其整合过程难度越大; 在问题空间进行搜索时, 被试需要抓住关键启发信息形成一个初始意向, 明确进一步搜索的思维方向; 初始意向形成后, 被试须筛选必要信息、排除冗余信息, 并进一步整合有用信息, 使初始意向更加精致化, 最终形成一个“可盈利的完善的投资方案”。     

动态系统累积变量判断中的关联启发式

关联启发式是指在累积变量判断中, 将存量与流量建立正相关关系, 认为存量变化特征与流量变化特征具有相似性而导致判断偏差的思维模式。在多特征交互及简单动态系统任务判断中, 关联启发式偏差以不同形式的S-F错误表现出来。作为一种内生性的、顽固的思维模式, 对于关联启发式的心理机制提出了客体偏差、特征替代、不充分调整等多种观点解释。影响关联启发式的个体因素和情境因素的研究结果不尽一致。由于关联启发式偏差直接影响人对复杂系统的可持续性决策和行动, 减少偏差策略的研究也已实现起步。本文系统总结和分析了关联启发式研究的发展脉络, 针对澄清关联启发式的发生机制、系统考察关联启发式的影响因素及其相互作用、丰富和深化关联启发式的研究范式、开发减少关联启发式的有效途径等方面, 提出了深化研究的方向和思路。