The affect heuristic in judgments of risks and benefits

This paper re‐examines the commonly observed inverse relationship between perceived risk and perceived benefit. We propose that this relationship occurs because people rely on affect when judging the risk and benefit of specific hazards. Evidence supporting this proposal is obtained in two experimental studies. Study 1 investigated the inverse relationship between risk and benefit judgments under a time‐pressure condition designed to limit the use of analytic thought and enhance the reliance on affect. As expected, the inverse relationship was strengthened when time pressure was introduced. Study 2 tested and confirmed the hypothesis that providing information designed to alter the favorability of one's overall affective evaluation of an item (say nuclear power) would systematically change the risk and benefit judgments for that item. Both studies suggest that people seem prone to using an ‘affect heuristic’ which improves judgmental efficiency by deriving both risk and benefit evaluations from a common source—affective reactions to the stimulus item. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Forward inference in risky choice: Mapping gaze and decision processes

The study of cognitive processes is built on a close mapping between three components: overt gaze behavior, overt choice, and covert processes. To validate this overt–covert mapping in the domain of decision‐making, we collected eye‐movement data during decisions between risky gamble problems. Applying a forward inference paradigm, participants were instructed to use specific decision strategies to solve those gamble problems (maximizing expected values or applying different choice heuristics) during which gaze behavior was recorded. We revealed differences between overt behavior, as indicated by eye movements, and covert decision processes, instructed by the experimenter. However, our results show that the overt–covert mapping is for some eye‐movement measures not as close as expected by current decision theory, and hence question reverse inference as being prone to fallacies due to a violation of its prerequisite, that is, a close overt–covert mapping. We propose a framework to rehabilitate reverse inference.     

The test taker's fallacy: How students guess answers on multiple‐choice tests

Many students and applicants take multiple‐choice tests to demonstrate their competence and achievement. When they are unsure, they guess the most likely answer to maximize their score. Despite the impact of guessing on test reliability and individual performance, studies have not examined how patterns of answer sequences in multiple‐choice tests affect guessing. This research presents the test taker's fallacy, which refers to an individual's tendency to expect a different answer to appear for the next question given a run of the same answer choices. The test taker's fallacy exhibits negative recency, similar to the gambler's fallacy. However, extending the sequential judgment literature, the test taker's fallacy shows that negative recency arises even when sequences may or may not be randomly generated. In three studies, including a survey and experiments, the test taker's fallacy is robustly observed. The test taker's fallacy is consistent with the operation of the representativeness heuristic. This research explains what and how test takers guess given a streak of answers and extends judgment under uncertainty to the test‐taking context.     

A realist social ontology of religion

Jonathan Z. Smith famously pointed out that the concept of ‘religion’ is not universal but emerged only in the modern West. Several scholars have drawn from Smith the non-realist implication that the existence of religion apart from that concept is an illusion. The word ‘religion,’ they say, does not refer to something out there in the world. In this article, the author argues that Smith’s point is open to a realist interpretation according to which religion exists in the world, as a transhistorical and transcultural reality, even apart from the concept. To make this case, the author outlines and responds to non-realist positions that draw on genealogical, deconstructive, and linguistic arguments, as well as to the alternative proposal that ‘religion’ is simply a heuristic device. In short, the goal of this article is to argue that a realist social ontology provides the better understanding of the central theoretical term in our field.     

推理的启发式再认新模式

本文介绍了推理的启发式再认新模式,阐述了启发式再认的再认基础,介绍了“少即是多”效应,并且引用大量实验介绍了启发式再认的证据以及启发式再认的适用范围。并对启发式理论上的争议问题进行了讨论。同时也对未来的研究方向做了展望。     

Exploring the informational sources of metaperception: the case of Change Blindness Blindness

Perceivers generally show a poor ability to detect changes, a condition referred to as “Change Blindness” (CB). They are, in addition, “blind to their own blindness”. A common explanation of this “Change Blindness Blindness” (CBB) is that it derives from an inadequate, “photographical” folk-theory about perception. This explanation, however, does not account for intra-individual variations of CBB across trials. Our study aims to explore an alternative theory, according to which participants base their self-evaluations on two activity-dependent cues, namely search time and perceived success in prior trials. These cues were found to influence self-evaluation in two orthogonal ways: success-feedback influenced self-evaluation in a global, contextual way, presumably by recalibrating the norm of adequacy for the task. Search time influenced it in a local way, predicting the success of a given trial from its duration.     

Authoritarianism and its relationship with intuitive-experiential cognitive style and heuristic processing

Two studies examined the relationship between authoritarianism, cognitive style and heuristic processing. Focusing on Epstein’s (2003) cognitive-experiential self-theory, Study 1 shows that authoritarianism is related to Epstein’s dimension of faith in intuition, but not need for cognition, even when controlling for individual differences in need for structure. Study 2 confirms that authoritarianism is related to greater heuristic processing. The discussion suggests ways in which individual differences in cognitive style and heuristic processing may account for established effects of authoritarianism.     

整合模型还是占优启发式模型? 从齐当别模型视角进行的检验

实验从齐当别模型的视角,通过对决策过程反应时的考察分别对以累积预期理论(cumulative prospect theory)为代表的整合模型和启发式模型家族的重要成员--占优启发式模型(priority heuristic)--进行检验。结果表明,决策过程反应时并未随着占优启发式模型所假定的决策步骤的增加而变慢;也未随着选项之间整体值差值的变大而变快;模糊决策过程的反应时反而快于风险决策过程的反应时。无论是以累积预期理论为代表的整合模型还是占优启发式模型均不能满意地描述和解释人们的实际决策过程,而齐当别模型则能解释大部分实验结果。文章建议多角度、多指标探讨人们的决策过程,检验、修改、完善,以及建立新的启发式模型或决策过程模型(process model),以增进对人们如何进行风险决策的理解。     

判断与决策中的情感启发式

情感启发式是指在判断与决策的过程中,个体会有意识或无意识的利用自己对任务选项的主观情感反应来做出决策。具体来说,个体头脑中物体和事件的表征会激起不同水平的情感体验,这种不同的体验会对所有的表征做出积极或消极的标记,人们根据这些被标记的体验来做出判断和决策。情感启发式是个体在决策中常用的策略。目前,关于情感启发式心理机制的解释主要有情感启发式模型和双加工理论。此外,情感启发式的影响因素主要包括经验、时间压力、可评估性和计数能力等。未来的研究应主要集中在探究情感启发式的产生根源和进一步扩展情感启发式应用领域的研究。     

午睡剥夺对科学发明问题解决中的原型启发效应的影响

选取生态效度较高的科学发明问题材料(分为高启发量与低启发量两类),采用“1对1”和“8对8”的“学习-测试”实验范式,考察午睡剥夺对科学发明问题解决中的原型启发效应的影响.结果发现:午睡剥夺处理、范式(“1对1”和“8对8”)和材料启发量高低在原型激活率和问题解决率上主效应均显著,午睡剥夺和范式以及启发量高低在问题解决率以及原型激活率上的交互作用不显著.这一结果说明,午睡剥夺影响科学发明问题解决中的原型启发效应,这种影响是通过对启发信息应用和原型激活两个加工过程的影响而实现的.