Why Colour Primitivism?

Primitivism is the view that colors are sui generis properties of physical objects. The basic insight underlying primitivism is that colours are as we see them, i.e. they are categorical properties of physical objects—simple, monadic, constant, etc.—just like shapes. As such, they determine the content of colour experience. Accepting the premise that colours are sui generis properties of physical objects, this paper seeks to show that ascribing primitive properties to objects is, ipso facto, ascribing to objects irreducible dispositions to look coloured, and that anything that primitive redness can do, the non-reductive disposition to look red can do just as well. What makes primitivism suspect is not the commitment to sui generis properties, but instead the claim that colours are more than dispositions. Since, as I show, whatever primitivism appeals to for the purpose of arguing that colours are more than dispositions—objectivity, explanation, causation, phenomenology, constancy, etc.—can also be invoked by non-reductive dispositionalism, the feature that purportedly renders colours more than dispositions remains mysterious.     

Who are maximizers? Future oriented and highly numerate individuals

Two studies investigated cognitive mechanisms that may be associated with people's tendency to maximize. Maximizers are individuals who are spending a great amount of effort in order to find the very best option in a decision situation, rather than stopping the decision process when they encounter a satisfying option. These studies show that maximizers are more future oriented than other people, which may motivate them to invest the extra energy into optimal choices. Maximizers also have higher numerical skills, possibly facilitating the cognitive processes involved with decision trade‐offs.     

Working in the borderland: early relational trauma and Fordham's analysis of ‘K’

This paper outlines a view of early relational trauma as underlying borderline states of mind, and argues that Knox's 1999 paper on internal working models and the complex provides a basis for understanding such states of mind. The author argues that in addition to internal working models, the complex also embodies and contains primitive defences of the core self. He outlines how these apply on the objective, subjective, transference and archetypal levels, and in direct and reversed forms and applies this to the account of Fordham's analysis of his patient ‘K’, which ended in impasse. The paper explores the dynamic that emerged in that analysis and suggests that it could be helpfully accounted for in terms of the co‐construction and re‐construction of early relational trauma in the analytic relationship.     

Promoting the emergence of advanced knowledge: A review of peak relational training system: Direct training module by Mark R. Dixon

Mark Dixon's (2014) manual, PEAK Relational Training System: Direct Training Module, proposes a novel approach to manualized evaluation and curriculum development. Dixon's PEAK system, introduced in the book as the first of four modules, translates derived relational responding methodology into a new verbal‐behavior approach. The PEAK system is firmly rooted in the basic, conceptual, and applied behavior‐analytic tradition; however, it differs substantially from the competition in its unique application of relational frame theory to produce efficient learning. The manual's accessible nature renders it a viable product for many users and readers. The growing empirical support for PEAK’s efficacy, usability, and psychometrics is impressive and provides a robust empirical basis for the system that is not described within the pages of the manual. Behavior analysts may shy away from a manualized system that explicitly omits discussion of scholarship and empirical bases but would be remiss in doing so, given the potential of PEAK to revolutionize the way clinicians and parents apply the verbal behavior approach.     

Should One Be A Left or A Right Sellarsian? (And is There Really Such A Choice?)

The followers of Wilfrid Sellars are often divided into “right” and “left” Sellarsians, according to whether they believe, in Mark Lance's words, that “linguistic roles constitutive of meaning and captured by dot quoted words are ‘normative all the way down.’” The present article anatomizes this division and argues that it is not easy to give it a nontrivial sense. In particular, the article argues that it is not really possible to construe it as a controversy related to ontology, and goes on to argue that it is also not easy to construe it as one concerning the translatability of the normative idiom into the non‐normative one. The conclusion is that the only coherent interpretation of this disagreement is as a disagreement about the possibility and desirability of assuming a standpoint “inside” our linguistic practices.     

Relational‐Cultural Theory: Fostering the Growth of a Paradigm Through Empirical Research

This study identified empirical literature supporting relational‐cultural theory (RCT) for explaining experiences of individuals, assessing theoretical constructs, and providing an effective treatment option. A systematic review of available literature revealed that (a) RCT was a useful framework for understanding client experiences, (b) there is considerable support for the psychometric validation of RCT constructs, and (c) support for RCT interventions is currently limited. Limitations of studies reviewed, recommendations for future research, and implications for counselors are provided.     

Visual perspective in remembering and episodic future thought

According to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, remembering and episodic future thinking are supported by a common set of constructive processes. In the present study, we directly addressed this assertion in the context of third-person perspectives that arise during remembering and episodic future thought. Specifically, we examined the frequency with which participants remembered past events or imagined future events from third-person perspectives. We also examined the different viewpoints from which third-person perspective events were remembered or imagined. Although future events were somewhat more likely to be imagined from a third-person perspective, the spatial viewpoint distributions of third-person perspectives characterizing remembered and imagined events were highly similar. These results suggest that a similar constructive mechanism may be at work when people remember events from a perspective that could not have been experienced in the past and when they imagine events from a perspective that could not be experienced in the future. The findings are discussed in terms of their consistency with—and as extensions of—the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis.