THE CONTINUING INTERACTION OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION

Abstract. Stephen I Gould's notion of non‐overlapping magisteria (NOMA) is neither experientially supported nor rationally justifiable. Influence flows between science and religion, as when evolutionary thinking encouraged theology to adopt a kenotic view of the Creator's act of allowing creatures to be and to make themselves. Alleged simplistic dichotomies between science and religion, such as motivated belief contrasted with fideistic assertion, are seen to be false. Promising topics in the currently vigorous dialogue between science and religion include relational ontology, eschatological credibility, and ethical issues relating to advances in human genetics.     

Proper Semantics for Substructural Logics,from a Stalker Theoretic Point of View

We study filters in residuated structures that are associated with congruence relations (which we call -filters), and develop a semantical theory for general substructural logics based on the notion of primeness for those filters. We first generalize Stone’s sheaf representation theorem to general substructural logics and then define the primeness of -filters as being “points” (or stalkers) of the space, the spectrum, on which the representing sheaf is defined. Prime FL-filters will turn out to coincide with truth sets under various well known semantics for certain substructural logics. We also investigate which structural rules are needed to interpret each connective in terms of prime -filters in the same way as in Kripke or Routley-Meyer semantics. We may consider that the set of the structural rules that each connective needs in this sense reflects the difficulty of giving the meaning of the connective. A surprising discovery is that connectives , ⅋ of linear logic are linearly ordered in terms of the difficulty in this sense. Presented by Wojciech Buszkowski     

The Basic Constructive Logic for a Weak Sense of Consistency defined with a Propositional Falsity Constant

The logic B_Kc1 is the basic constructive logic in the ternaryrelational semantics (without a set of designated points) adequateto consistency understood as the absence of the negation ofany theorem. Negation is introduced in B_Kc1 with a negationconnective. The aim of this paper is to define the logic B_Kc1F.In this logic negation is introduced via a propositional falsityconstant. We prove that B_Kc1 and B_Kc1F are definitionally equivalent.     

Quantification over Sets of Possible Worlds in Branching-Time Semantics

Temporal logic is one of the many areas in which a possible world semantics is adopted. Prior's Ockhamist and Peircean semantics for branching-time, though, depart from the genuine Kripke semantics in that they involve a quantification over histories, which is a second-order quantification over sets of possible worlds. In the paper, variants of the original Prior's semantics will be considered and it will be shown that all of them can be viewed as first-order counterparts of the original semantics.     

Combinator Logics

Combinator logics are a broad family of substructual logics that are formed by extending the basic relevant logic B with axioms that correspond closely to the reduction rules of proper combinators in combinatory logic. In the Routley-Meyer relational semantics for relevant logic each such combinator logic is characterized by the class of frames that meet a first-order condition that also directly corresponds to the same combinator's reduction rule. A second family of logics is also introduced that extends B with the addition of propositional constants that correspond to combinators. These are characterized by relational frames that meet first-order conditions that reflect the structures of the combinators themselves.     

Elasticity of Technique: The Psychoanalytic Project and the Trajectory of Ferenczi's Life

The object of this paper is the Elasticity of Psychoanalytic Technique in the work of Sándor Ferenczi. The author sustains that this can be considered neither as an ultimate arrival point nor as a particular stage of Ferenczi's clinical–theoretical body of work, but rather as an ensemble of affective qualities, attitudes and values, which he gradually developed through experience, signalling a paradigm shift in the history of psychoanalysis. The following areas will be explored: the new sensitivity demonstrated by Ferenczi concerning the relational and communicative factors present in the analytic session, his subtle and acute attention to the participation of the analyst's own subjectivity in the therapeutic process, and how these enduring elements of Ferenczi's technique anticipate several significant future developments in psychoanalysis.     

Working in the borderland: early relational trauma and Fordham's analysis of ‘K’

This paper outlines a view of early relational trauma as underlying borderline states of mind, and argues that Knox's 1999 paper on internal working models and the complex provides a basis for understanding such states of mind. The author argues that in addition to internal working models, the complex also embodies and contains primitive defences of the core self. He outlines how these apply on the objective, subjective, transference and archetypal levels, and in direct and reversed forms and applies this to the account of Fordham's analysis of his patient ‘K’, which ended in impasse. The paper explores the dynamic that emerged in that analysis and suggests that it could be helpfully accounted for in terms of the co‐construction and re‐construction of early relational trauma in the analytic relationship.     

Why Colour Primitivism?

Primitivism is the view that colors are sui generis properties of physical objects. The basic insight underlying primitivism is that colours are as we see them, i.e. they are categorical properties of physical objects—simple, monadic, constant, etc.—just like shapes. As such, they determine the content of colour experience. Accepting the premise that colours are sui generis properties of physical objects, this paper seeks to show that ascribing primitive properties to objects is, ipso facto, ascribing to objects irreducible dispositions to look coloured, and that anything that primitive redness can do, the non-reductive disposition to look red can do just as well. What makes primitivism suspect is not the commitment to sui generis properties, but instead the claim that colours are more than dispositions. Since, as I show, whatever primitivism appeals to for the purpose of arguing that colours are more than dispositions—objectivity, explanation, causation, phenomenology, constancy, etc.—can also be invoked by non-reductive dispositionalism, the feature that purportedly renders colours more than dispositions remains mysterious.     

Equivalential and algebraizable logics

The notion of an algebraizable logic in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi [3] is generalized to that of a possibly infinitely algebraizable, for short, p.i.-algebraizable logic by admitting infinite sets of equivalence formulas and defining equations. An example of the new class is given. Many ideas of this paper have been present in [3] and [4]. By a consequent matrix semantics approach the theory of algebraizable and p.i.-algebraizable logics is developed in a different way. It is related to the theory of equivalential logics in the sense of Prucnal and Wroski [18], and it is extended to nonfinitary logics. The main result states that a logic is algebraizable (p.i.-algebraizable) iff it is finitely equivalential (equivalential) and the truth predicate in the reduced matrix models is equationally definable.Most of the results of the present and a forthcoming paper originally appeared in [13].Presented by Wolfgang Rautenberg     

Skepticism and Epistemic Logic

This essay attempts to implement epistemic logic through a non-classical inference relation. Given that relation, an account of '(the individual) a knows that A' is constructed as an unfamiliar non-normal modal logic. One advantage to this approach is a new analysis of the skeptical argument.