Adaptation, teleology, and selection by consequences

This paper presents and defends the view that reinforcement and natural selection are selection processes, that selection processes are neither mechanistic nor teleological, and that mentalistic and vitalistic processes are teleological but not mechanistic. The differences between these types of processes are described and used in discussing the conceptual and methodological significance of “selection type theories” and B. F. Skinner's radical behaviorist view that “operant behavior is the field of intention, purpose, and expectation. It deals with that field precisely as the theory of evolution has dealt with another kind of purpose” (1986, p. 716). The antimentalism of radical behaviorism emerges as a post-Darwinian extension of Francis Bacon's (and Galileo's) influential view that “[the introduction of final causes] rather corrupts than advances the sciences” (Bacon, 1905, p. 302).     

Violations of transitivity: Implications for a theory of contextual choice

Violations of strong stochastic transitivity in concurrent-chains choice were first reported by Navarick and Fantino. In a series of articles, Navarick and Fantino concluded that neither a unidimensional model capable of predicting exact choice probabilities nor a fixed-variable equivalence rule was possible for the concurrent-chains procedure. I show that when choice is modeled contextually (i.e., when preference for a schedule is affected by factors other than the schedule itself, e.g., aspects of the alternative schedule), a unidimensional, exact-choice probability model is possible that both predicts the intransitivities reported by Navarick and Fantino and provides a fixed-variable equivalence rule for the concurrent-chains procedure. The contextual model is an extension of the generalized matching law and violates a key assumption underlying traditional choice models—simple scalability—because of (a) schedule interdependence and (b) bias from procedural contingencies. Therefore, strong stochastic transitivity cannot be expected to hold. Contextual scalability is analyzed to reveal a hierarchy of context effects in choice. Navarick and Fantino's intransitivities can be satisfactorily explained by bias. If attribute sensitivity is context dependent, however, and if there are similarity structures among choice alternatives, the contextual model is shown to be able to predict violations of ordinal preference. Therefore, it may be possible to formulate a deterministic, general psychophysical model of choice as a behavioral alternative to probabilistic, multidimensional choice theories.     

Schedule-induced defecation by rats during ratio and interval schedules of food reinforcement.

Lever pressing in rats was maintained by continuous and intermittent schedules of food while defecation was monitored. In Experiment 1, reinforcement densities were matched across variable-ratio and variable-interval schedules for three pairs of rats. Defecation occurred in all 3 rats on the variable-ratio schedule and in all 3 rats on the yoked variable-interval schedule. In Experiment 2, fixed-ratio and fixed-interval schedules with similar reinforcement densities maintained lever pressing. Defecation occurred in 3 of 4 rats on the fixed-ratio schedule and in 4 of 4 rats on the fixed-interval schedule. Almost no defecation occurred during continuous reinforcement in either experiment. These results demonstrate that defecation may occur during both ratio and interval schedules and that the inter-reinforcement interval is more important than the behavioral requirements of the schedule in generating schedule-induced defecation.     

Unit price as a useful metric in analyzing effects of reinforcer magnitude.

In this paper, we applied the behavioral-economic concept of unit price to the study of reinforcer magnitude in an attempt to provide a consistent account of the effects of reinforcer magnitude on behavior. Recent research in the experimental analysis of behavior and in behavioral pharmacology suggests that reinforcer magnitude interacts with the schedule of reinforcement to determine response rate and total consumption. The utility of the unit-price concept thus stems from its ability to quantify this interaction as a cost-benefit ratio (i.e., unit price = characteristics of the schedule of reinforcement divided by magnitude of reinforcement). Research employing the unit-price concept has shown that as unit price increases, a positively decelerating function exists for consumption (i.e., a function with an increasingly negative slope, when plotted on log coordinates) and a bitonic function exists for response rate. Based on these findings, the present analysis applied the unit-price concept to those studies of reinforcer magnitude and drug self-administration that examined the effects of reinforcer magnitude on response rate using simple schedules of reinforcement (e.g., fixed-ratio schedule). This resulted in three findings: (a) Reinforcer-magnitude manipulations and schedule manipulations interact in a manner that can be quantified in terms of unit price as benefit and cost factors, respectively; (b) different reinforcer-magnitude manipulations are functionally interchangeable as benefit factors in the unit-price ratio; and (c) these conclusions appear warranted despite the differences in reinforcers (food or drug), species (dogs, monkeys, or rats), and schedules (interval or ratio), and despite the fact that these studies were not designed for a unit-price analysis. In methodological terms, these results provide further evidence that employing the unit-price concept is a parsimonious method for examining the effects of reinforcer magnitude. In theoretical terms, these results suggest that a single process may underlie the effect of combined reinforcer-magnitude and schedule manipulations.     

Cooperative learning revisited

The endeavor to teach academic skills known as cooperative learningis of interest to behavioral educators due to its record of effectiveness, its use of behavioral procedures, and its relatively widespread adoption by regular educators. All forms of cooperative learning emphasize operations that encourage students to work together to achieve commonly held goals rather than competing with or ignoring the efforts of others. Despite the apparent soundness of the approach, the present commentary raises several issues. First, it states that some cooperative learning proponents fail to describe the behavioral processes underlying the approach. Second, it is pointed out that it is unclear whether cooperative learning is an independent or dependent variable. Given that cooperative learning applies group contingencies to academic behavior, the question is raised as to whether group contingencies do, in fact, produce desirable social interactions, and whether group contingencies are appropriate for academic behaviors. A concern is also raised as to whether the spontaneous peer tutoring generated by cooperative learning compares favorably with planned peer tutoring. Finally, it is claimed that the minor variations from academic group contingencies that cooperative learning proponents have introduced do not require identifying a new process.     

The effect of token reinforcement on McCarthy Scale performance for white preschoolers of low and high social position

In Study 1, the effect of making tokens contingent on correct performance of low social position preschoolers on the McCarthy Scales of Children's Abilitieswas examined. Preschoolers in a token reinforcement group scored significantly higher (mean=8 IQ points) than subjects in a control group. In Study 2, the effect of tokens on McCarthyresults was examined as a function of social position in a 2×2 design. The high social position control group scored significantly above the low social position control. The low social position token reinforcement group, however, performed as well as both the high social position control and token reinforcement groups. Use of systematic reinforcement contingencies to reduce test error is discussed.     

Exchange delays and impulsive choice in adult humans.

Choice responding by adult humans in a discrete-trial task was examined as a function of conditions that manipulated either the delay to point delivery or the delay between points and their exchange for money. In point-delay conditions, subjects chose between an "impulsive" alternative that provided a small amount of points immediately and a "self-control" alternative that provided a larger amount of points delayed by 15, 30, or 60 s. Points were exchanged for money immediately following the session. Subjects preferred the self-control alternative. In exchange-delay conditions, subjects chose between a small amount of points exchangeable for money immediately following the session and a larger amount of points exchangeable for money after 1 day, 3 weeks, or 6 weeks. A self-control preference observed for all subjects in the 1-day exchange-delay condition reversed to exclusive impulsive preference for 4 of the 6 subjects when choice conditions involved exchange delays of 3 or 6 weeks. These results show that human choice is sensitive to the manipulation of exchange delays and that impulsive preference can be obtained with exchange delays on the order of weeks.     

The power of one reinforcer: The effect of a single reinforcer in the context of shaping

During shaping, if the organism is engaged in behaviors other than the current approximation, the amount of time between reinforcers increases. In these situations, the shaper may resort to what is referred to as a “desperation‐driven click.” That is, after a period of no reinforcement, the shaper delivers one reinforcer for a nontarget approximation. Reports from professional animal trainers suggest that the animal may continue performing this new behavior, even if it is reinforced only once. This study attempted to model this phenomenon with college students. Results from the study demonstrated that a desperation‐driven click situation can be reliably produced in a controlled setting. When participants received one reinforcer for interacting with a new object following a period of no reinforcement, they interacted with the new object for a longer or equal amount of time as compared to an object that had a longer history of reinforcement. The results of this study have implications for the understanding of how reinforcement controls behavior.     

Choice with delayed and probabilistic reinforcers: effects of prereinforcer and postreinforcer stimuli.

In Experiment 1, pigeons' pecks on a green key led to a 5-s delay with green houselights, and then food was delivered on 20% (or, in other conditions, 50%) of the trials. Pecks on a red key led to an adjusting delay with red houselights, and then food was delivered on every trial. The adjusting delay was used to estimate indifference points: delays at which the two alternatives were chosen about equally often. Varying the presence or absence of green houselights during the delays that preceded possible food deliveries had large effects on choice. In contrast, varying the presence of the green or red houselights in the intertrial intervals had no effects on choice. In Experiment 2, pecks on the green key led to delays of either 5 s or 30 s with green houselights, and then food was delivered on 20% of the trials. Varying the duration of the green houselights on nonreinforced trials had no effect on choice. The results suggest that the green houselights served as a conditioned reinforcer at some times but not at others, depending on whether or not there was a possibility that a primary reinforcer might be delivered. Given this interpretation of what constitutes a conditioned reinforcer, most of the results were consistent with the view that the strength of a conditioned reinforcer is inversely related to its duration.