Principle of organization: a dynamic-systems view of the archetype-as-such

The personality is a dynamic system. Like all other dynamic systems, it must be self-organized. In this paper I focus upon the archetype-as-such, that is, upon the essential core around which both an archetypical image and a complex are organized. I argue that an archetype-as-such is a pre-existing principle of organization. Within the personality that principle manifests itself as a psychological vortex (a complex) into which we are drawn. The vortex is impersonal. We mediate it through myths and rituals or through consciousness. In this paper I show that Jung's intuition about the archetype-as-such is supported by recent science. I evaluate other concepts of the archetype. My concept is different from that proposed recently by Saunders and Skar. My concept allows each archetype-as-such to be defined precisely in mathematical terms. It suggests a new interpretation of mythology. It also addresses our spiritual experience of an archetype. Because the archetypes-as-such are fundamental to the personality, the better we understand them the better we understand our patients. The paper is grounded with clinical examples.     

活体肝移植的伦理学问题

目前,肝移植已成为治疗终末期肝病的有效手段,活体肝移植术部分解决了供肝短缺的问题,10多年来其发展迅速,并取得了良好的疗效,由于活体肝移植需从活的供体身上切取部分肝脏,且供体多为患者家属,故存在着供体的选择,供体的贡献与代价,患者的家庭,心理,社会等伦理等问题。因此在提高活体肝移植技术水平的同时,必须充分考虑活体肝移植的伦理学问题,遵守伦理原则,使活体肝移植不但能从技术上达到,在伦理学方面也是可行的。     

Taking Law Seriously: Starting Points of the Hart/Devlin Debate*

The famous mid-20th century debate between Patrick Devlin and Herbert Hart about the relationship between law and morality addressed the limits of the criminal law in the context of a proposal by the Wolfenden Committee to decriminalize male homosexual activity in private. The original exchanges and subsequent contributions to the debate have been significantly constrained by the terms in which the debate was framed: a focus on criminal law in general and sexual offences in particular; a preoccupation with the so-called “harm principle,” a sharp delineation of the realms of law and morality, and a static conception of the relationship between them. This article explores the limitations imposed by these various starting-points and argues for a holistic and symbiotic understanding of the relationship between law and morality. * Thanks to Tony Connolly, Leighton McDonald and Niki Lacey for penetrating and suggestive comments on previous versions.     

The duality principle: irreducibility of sub-threshold psychophysical computation to neuronal brain activation

A key working hypothesis in neuroscience is ‘materialistic reductionism’, i.e., the assumption whereby all physiological, behavioral or cognitive phenomena is produced by localized neurochemical brain activation (but not vice versa). However, analysis of sub-threshold Weber’s psychophysical stimulation indicates its computational irreducibility to the direct interaction between psychophysical stimulation and any neuron/s. This is because the materialistic-reductionistic working hypothesis assumes that the determination of the existence or non-existence of any psychophysical stimulation [s] may only be determined through its direct interaction [di1] with a given neuron/s [N] that together forms the ‘neural registry’ computational level [NR/di1]. But, this implies that in cases of (initial) sub-threshold (sensory-specific) psychophysical stimulation which is increased above the sensory-specific threshold but below Weber’s psychophysical ‘dv’—the psychophysical computational processing [PCP] produces an apparently ‘computationally indeterminate’ output. This is because materialistic reductionism asserts the contingency of PCP upon the existence of a direct interaction between ‘s’ and ‘N’ within the NR/di1 level, but in the special case of Weber’s sub-threshold psychophysical stimulation the same PCP/di1 also asserts the non-existence of ‘s’ (as demanded by Weber’s psychophysical law). However, given robust empirical evidence indicating the capability of PCP to determine whether (or not) ‘s’ exists, we must conclude that PCP may not be carried out from within NR’s direct interaction between a particular psychophysical stimulation and any set of neuron/s in the brain. Hence, the Duality Principle asserts the conceptual irreducibility of sub-threshold psychophysical stimulation to any direct NR/di1: s-N interaction, thereby challenging the current materialistic-reductionistic assumption.     

Equality of whom? a genetic perspective on equality (of opportunity)

Rawls’ principle of fair equality of opportunity has been regularly discussed and criticized for being inadequate regarding natural inequalities. In so far as this egalitarian goal is sound, the purpose of the paper is to see how the prospect of radical genetic intervention might affect this particular inadequacy. I propose that, in a post-genetic setting, an appropriate response would be to extend the same rules regulating societal inequalities to a regulation of comparable genetic inequalities. I defend this stance against recent arguments from the authors of From Chance to Choice and from Colin Farrelly’s alternative of the genetic difference principle. Thanks and appreciation to Dr. Pete Morris, Noreen McGuire and Ann Feeney for their support and encouragement. My thanks also to the participants of the Ninth Manchester Graduate (Brave New World 2005) Conference in Political Theory, where a shorter version of this paper was read.     

The emotional experience of K

The author raises the question of the emotional experience of K in Bion's schema of affective links, L, H, and K, suggesting that it is the emotional experience of feeling curious. He explores the central role curiosity has in 'On arrogance' and 'Attacks on linking' and hypothesizes that in Learning from experience the more complex notion of K is introduced in its place. Thus, Bion's affective schema is taken to be a version of Freud's account of experience in terms of instinctual impulses recast in terms of emotional experience. Freud's primary developmental dichotomy, the tensions between the pleasure principle and the reality principle, can be seen as the dichotomy of tensions between the emotional experience of L/H and the emotional experience of K. This suggests that the potential tension between K and L/H is critical to what happens in the consulting room. Finally the author argues that containing as a developmental dynamic is an expression of a K-state-of-mind and thus the container is thus a container-in-K. It concludes that one important aspect of what Bion called -K is an attack on a K-state-of-mind by an intrusion of L/H which has the effect of contaminating and dominating the urge to know.     

Debunking,supervenience, and Hume’s Principle

ABSTRACT

Debunking arguments against both moral and mathematical realism have been pressed, based on the claim that our moral and mathematical beliefs are insensitive to the moral/mathematical facts. In the mathematical case, I argue that the role of Hume’s Principle as a conceptual truth speaks against the debunkers’ claim that it is intelligible to imagine the facts about numbers being otherwise while our evolved responses remain the same. Analogously, I argue, the conceptual supervenience of the moral on the natural speaks presents a difficulty for the debunker’s claim that, had the moral facts been otherwise, our evolved moral beliefs would have remained the same.     

仁与天理通而为一视域下的程颢易学

置身由汉唐经学向宋明理学转型过程中的程颢,对易学的天人之学作出了创造性诠释与转化,建构起仁与天理通而为一视域下的崭新易学天人之学,推出了他的理学体系。程颢的易学,首先开示了一个充满盎然生机、生意的有机整体宇宙图景,继之揭示了此一生机、生意之所自来的终极宇宙根基、根据,即天理,并指出天理是一终极的令物生生之理,即是一最高的绝对之善本身,由此天理即仁体。天理与仁通而为一,可名之日天理—仁体。此一天理—仁体令天地万物涵具并彰显出盎然生机、生意,且一体无隔。人禀受它而具备了存在的所以然的终极宇宙根基和充足的价值根据与资源,应据之一则珍视自己生命的内在价值,令其原发性畅然舒展、展现与实现,再则珍视并善待他人他物的内在价值,视天地人物一体无隔的有机宇宙整体中的一切皆为我生命的有机组成部分,期其亦皆能原发性畅然舒展、展现与实现自我,从而成就起一宇宙式大我,达到成为天理—仁体自觉圆融化身的最高的生命境界,即天地境界。为此,尚需作识仁与定性的工夫。     

Movements or targets: What makes an action in action–effect learning?

According to ideomotor theory, actions become linked to the sensory feedback they contingently produce, so that anticipating the feedback automatically evokes the action it typically results from. Numerous recent studies have provided evidence in favour of such action–effect learning but left an important issue unresolved. It remains unspecified to what extent action–effect learning is based on associating effect-representations to representations of the performed movements or to representations of the targets at which the behaviour aimed at. Two experiments were designed to clarify this issue. In an acquisition phase, participants learned the contingency between key presses and effect tones. In a following test phase, key–effect and movement–effect relations were orthogonally assessed by changing the hand–key mapping for one half of the participants. Experiment 1 showed precedence for target–effect over movement–effect learning in a forced-choice RT task. In Experiment 2, target–effect learning was also shown to influence the outcome of response selection in a free-choice task. Altogether, the data indicate that both movement–effect and target–effect associations contribute to the formation of action–effect linkages—provided that movements and targets are likewise contingently related to the effects.