The Intertwinement of Propositional and Doxastic Justification

One important distinction in the debate over the nature of epistemic justification is the one between propositional and doxastic justification. Roughly, while doxastic justification is a property of beliefs, propositional justification is a property of propositions. On a rather common view, which accounts for doxastic justification in terms of propositional justification plus the so-called ‘basing relation’, propositional justification is seen as the prior notion, and doxastic justification is explained in terms of it. According to the opposing view, the direction of explanation needs to be reversed, and doxastic justification should be seen as primary. I distinguish between two notions of priority, and I argue that they give different verdicts with respect to the issue of which notion of justification comes first. The lesson may be taken to be that propositional and doxastic justification are in a relation of intertwinement.     

The new growing block theory vs presentism

It was once held to be a virtue of the growing block theory that it combines temporal dynamism with a straightforward account of in virtue of what past-tensed propositions are true, and an explanation for why some future-tensed propositions are not true (assuming they are not). This put the growing block theory ahead of its principal dynamist rival: presentism. Recently, new growing block theorists have suggested that what makes true, past-tensed propositions, is not the same kind of thing as what makes true, present-tensed propositions. They have done so in an attempt to defuse a particular epistemic objection to their view. In this paper it is argued that the new growing block theorist faces a dilemma. The more unified a strategy is for responding to the epistemic objection, the more that strategy results in the new growing block model positing truthmakers that are similar to those posited by the presentist, which erodes the purported advantage of the growing block theory over presentism. On the other hand, versions of the new growing block theory that embrace disunified strategies are better able to differentiate themselves from presentism, but are unattractive because of their disunity.     

Knowledge‐lies re‐examined

Sorensen says that my assertion that p is a knowledge‐lie if it is meant to undermine your justification for believing truly that ～p, not to make you believe that p and that, therefore, knowledge‐lies are not intended to deceive. It has been objected that they are meant to deceive because they are intended to make you more confident in a falsehood. In this paper, I propose a novel account according to which an assertion that p is a knowledge‐lie if it is intended not to provide evidence that p but to make you stop trusting all testimonies concerning whether p (in a room full of obvious liars, you will trust no one), which is how they undermine your testimonial knowledge. Because they are not intended to provide evidence that bears on the truth of p, they are not intended to make you more confident in a falsehood; therefore, knowledge‐lies are not intended to deceive. This makes them a problem for the traditional account, which takes the intention to deceive as necessary for lying, and an interesting example of Kant's idea that allowing lies whenever one feels like it would bring it about that statements in general are not believed.     

Gender stereotype–consistent memories: How system justification motivation distorts the recollection of information related to the self

Research based on system justification theory has shown that women’s self-perceptions may be altered by the motivation to justify the system and its inequalities. Self-perceptions being built on past experiences, the present study aimed to explore how system justification motivation induced through a system dependency manipulation may alter both women’s recall of autobiographical memories and their behavior. Women who were led to feel highly dependent on the social system perceived themselves as more competent and recalled memories of higher competence in the verbal domain compared with the negatively stereotyped scientific domain. Women’s behavioral choices (between doing a verbal or a math exercise) also revealed a higher preference for the gender stereotype–consistent verbal exercise in the high–system dependency condition, as compared with the low–system dependency condition. These results suggest that gender stereotypes may not only satisfy self- or group-serving motivation but also the need to perceive the system in a positive light.     

人类对知识的好奇:认识性好奇心

认识性好奇心是个体对新知识的好奇,可从状态和特质角度理解,其中特质认识性好奇心又区分为兴趣型和剥夺型两种类型。近年来众多证据表明,认识性好奇心受知道感、性别、对信息的偏好模式等因素影响,并在学习、记忆及创造性方面起到积极作用。未来研究有必要着眼于毕生发展的角度进行纵向考察,完善其测量方式,并深入考察认识性好奇心对学习的影响机制,从而为教育实践提供一定启示。     

Stripped of illusions? Exploring system justification processes in capitalist and post‐Communist societies

Sociologists and political scientists have often observed that citizens of Central and Eastern Europe express high levels of disillusionment with their social, economic and political systems, in comparison with citizens of Western capitalist societies. In this review, we analyze system legitimation and delegitimation in post‐Communist societies from a social psychological perspective. We draw on system justification theory, which seeks to understand how, when and why people do (and do not) defend, bolster and justify existing social systems. We review some of the major tenets and findings of the theory and compare research on system‐justifying beliefs and ideologies in traditionally Capitalist and post‐Communist countries to determine: (1) whether there are robust differences in the degree of system justification in post‐Communist and Capitalist societies, and (2) the extent to which hypotheses derived from system justification theory receive support in the post‐Communist context. To this end, we summarize research findings from over 20 countries and cite previously unpublished data from a public opinion survey conducted in Poland. Our analysis confirms that there are lower levels of system justification in post‐Communist countries. At the same time, we find that system justification possesses similar social and psychological antecedents, manifestations and consequences in the two types of societies. We offer potential explanations for these somewhat complicated patterns of results and conclude by addressing implications for theory and research on system justification and system change (or transition).     

“Poor is pious”: Distinctiveness threat increases glorification of poverty among the poor

The current study examines whether a threat to group distinctiveness motivates the poor to glorify poverty as an identity management strategy. Research shows that threat to ingroup distinctiveness can motivate people to positively differentiate their group from similar outgroups on relevant dimensions of comparison. Little is known however about whether such processes would occur also with respect to devalued group characteristics that are not reflective of explicit group norms. This question is of high theoretical and practical importance because it can illustrate that people internalize and glorify even adverse traits as means of managing their social identity when faced with threat. We therefore tested whether among a poor community, individuals would glorify poverty when faced with distinctiveness threat. We collected data from Haredim (ultra‐Orthodox Jews), a poor and highly religious population in Israel. Across two experiments, we manipulated distinctiveness threat via inducing similarity between Haredim and seculars in Israel. We found that poverty was reconstrued as positive and desirable following distinctiveness threat, but only among Haredim who have a high commitment to group norms (Study 1) and who strongly justify their own social system (Study 2). Theoretical and applied implications of the findings are discussed.     

Avoiding Cheap Grace: Luther and the Need for Moral Despair

Abstract : This article addresses two problems in the development of an adequate Lutheran ethics in our time: moral quietism in the public square and an overly narrow and individualistic moral vision. I argue that the construction of grace as “freedom” tends toward “cheap grace” and that grace needs, then, to be thought of as a compelling of moral striving. Second, I argue that our sense of moral despair today should be broadened to focus on our participation in social structures that damage humans and the nonhuman world as much as on our personal and individual failings.     

How to Be a Bayesian Dogmatist

Rational agents have (more or less) consistent beliefs. Bayesianism is a theory of consistency for partial belief states. Rational agents also respond appropriately to experience. Dogmatism is a theory of how to respond appropriately to experience. Hence, Dogmatism and Bayesianism are theories of two very different aspects of rationality. It's surprising, then, that in recent years it has become common to claim that Dogmatism and Bayesianism are jointly inconsistent: how can two independently consistent theories with distinct subject matter be jointly inconsistent? In this essay I argue that Bayesianism and Dogmatism are inconsistent only with the addition of a specific hypothesis about how the appropriate responses to perceptual experience are to be incorporated into the formal models of the Bayesian. That hypothesis isn't essential either to Bayesianism or to Dogmatism, and so Bayesianism and Dogmatism are jointly consistent. That leaves the matter of how experiences and credences are related, and so in the remainder of the essay I offer an alternative account of how perceptual justification, as the Dogmatist understands it, can be incorporated into the Bayesian formalism.     

Epistemology shmepistemology: moral error theory and epistemic expressivism

Some philosophers object to moral error theory by arguing that there a parity between moral and epistemic normativity. They maintain that moral and epistemic error theory stand or fall together, that epistemic error theory falls, and that moral error theory thus falls too. This paper offers a response to this objection on behalf of moral error theorists. I defend the view that moral and epistemic error theory do not stand or fall together by arguing that moral error theory can be sustained alongside epistemic expressivism. This unusual combination of theories can be underpinned by differences in the foundational norms that guide moral and epistemic inquiry. I conclude that the problem of epistemic normativity fails to show that it is compulsory for us to reject moral error theory.