In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief

Many meta-ethicists are alethists: they claim that practical considerations can constitute normative reasons for action, but not for belief. But the alethist owes us an account of the relevant difference between action and belief, which thereby explains this normative difference. Here, I argue that two salient strategies for discharging this burden fail. According to the first strategy, the relevant difference between action and belief is that truth is the constitutive standard of correctness for belief, but not for action, while according to the second strategy, it is that practical considerations can constitute motivating reasons for action, but not for belief. But the former claim only shifts the alethist's explanatory burden, and the latter claim is wrong—we can believe for practical reasons. Until the alethist can offer a better account, then, I argue that we should accept that there are practical reasons for belief.     

Simul What? Toward a Grace for the Fearful

The doctrines of forensic justification and simul iustus et peccator assume a primarily moral theo‐cosmology. However, the former constricts the excessiveness of divine grace, while the latter fails to adequately capture the fullness of the human condition. Freeing divine grace and theological anthropology from the moral requires a shift in emphasis toward suffering and an acknowledgment that a deep root of sin is creaturely vulnerability. In this case, the incurved self might symbolize the fearful, pulling goods toward the self for protection. While accountability for sin remains important, the first response to the fearful, who act from a sense of deep vulnerability, is compassion rather than judgment. In this way grace attends to but ultimately exceeds the moral.     

Working for the Hierarchical System: The Role of Meritocratic Ideology in the Endorsement of Corruption

Corruption has a wide range of corrosive effects on societies, but it is widespread throughout the world. There is a question, however, as to whether corruption is endorsed as an outcome of a legitimate hierarchy and meritocracy. To address this issue, the present study examines the associations between meritocratic ideology and the indicators of corruption by performing two empirical studies with correlational and experimental designs. In Study 1, all variables were measured with scales, and the results demonstrated that meritocratic ideologies were negatively associated with corruption perception but positively associated with corrupt intention. In Study 2, meritocratic ideology was manipulated, and the results demonstrated that compared with the low meritocratic‐ideology condition, the participants primed by the high meritocratic‐ideology condition reported a lower corruption perception but higher corrupt intention. In both studies, the findings suggest that the meritocratic ideology that motivates people to maintain and bolster the current hierarchical structure and meritocracy leads to the endorsement of corruption. The present study explores the roles of meritocratic ideology in the perception and intention of corruption, extends the scope of the predictive power of system justification theory to corruption beyond mere injustice‐related aspects of disadvantage, and also provides suggestions for interpreting and fighting against corruption.     

Implicit racial bias and epistemic pessimism

Implicit bias results from living in a society structured by race. Tamar Gendler has drawn attention to several epistemic costs of implicit bias and concludes that paying some costs is unavoidable. In this paper, we reconstruct Gendler’s argument and argue that the epistemic costs she highlights can be avoided. Though epistemic agents encode discriminatory information from the environment, not all encoded information is activated. Agents can construct local epistemic environments that do not activate biasing representations, effectively avoiding the consequences of activation. We conclude that changing our local environments provides a way to avoid paying implicit bias’s epistemic costs.     

伦理氛围与亲组织非伦理行为:道德辩护的中介效应

与纯粹的私利性非伦理行为不同,亲组织非伦理行为是个体为了组织利益而实施的非伦理行为。探讨了伦理氛围对亲组织非伦理行为的影响以及道德辩护的中介作用。实证研究结果发现,自利型、关怀型伦理氛围分别对亲组织非伦理行为具有正向影响,规则型伦理氛围对亲组织非伦理行为具有负向影响,道德辩护分别在三种伦理氛围与亲组织非伦理行为关系间具有部分中介作用。     

Excuses,justifications, and the just war tradition: are there good reasons to kill the Naked Soldier?

In war there is a phenomenon known as the Naked Soldier problem (NS). A combatant discovers a vulnerable enemy combatant who is unable to defend himself and usually unaware of the combatant’s presence. This enemy combatant is not presently engaged in fighting and not threatening the lives of others. While killing the NS is legally permissible, the question I address in this essay is whether or not there can be a moral justification for doing so. I think such a moral justification is lacking, and there are only excuses for killing the NS. In this essay, I distinguish between a justification and an excuse and then I examine four traditional reasons given for the acceptability of killing in war to see if any of them are (a) justifications for killing in war in general and (b) justifications for killing the Naked Soldier, specifically.     

目标取向与社会认知冲突调节的关系

本研究采用问卷法考察目标取向与社会认知冲突调节的关系.结果表明:任务取向对认识冲突调节有显著的正向预测作用;趋向型自我取向对关系冲突调节有显著的正向预测作用;逃避型自我取向对社会认知冲突调节无显著的预测作用;社会认知冲突调节的直接与间接测量方式具有等价作用.     

Virtuous intuitions: comments on Lecture 3 of Ernest Sosa’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">A Virtue Epistemology</Emphasis>

I agree with Sosa that intuitions are best thought of as attractions to believe a certain proposition merely on the basis of understanding it. However, I don’t think it is constitutive of them that they supply strictly foundational justification for the propositions they justify, though I do believe that it is important that the intuition of a suitable subject be thought of as a prima facie justification for his intuitive judgment, independently of the reliability of his underlying capacities. I also think that we need to be able to explain how mere understanding of a proposition can confer upon us an ability to have reliable intuitions, that we cannot simply take that idea for granted. And that when try to explain that, our best avenue for doing so is to take the intuitions as constituting the understanding of which they are said to be a manifestation.

On the general argument against internalism

I respond to John Greco’s argument that all forms of internalism in epistemology are either false or uninteresting. The paper divides into two sections. First, I explain precisely what internalists and externalists in epistemology disagree over. This puts us in a position to assess whether Greco’s argument succeeds. Second, I present Greco’s argument and offer two objections.     

A Quintet,a Quartet,a Trio,a Duo? The Epistemic Regress Problem,Evidential Support,and Skepticism

In his topical article, Andrew Cling claims that the best extant formulation of the so-called epistemic regress problem rests on five assumptions that are too strong. Cling offers an improved version that rests on a different set of three core epistemic assumptions, each of which he argues for. Despite of owing a great deal to Cling’s ideas, I argue that the epistemic regress problem surfaces from more fundamental assumptions than those offered by Cling. There are ultimately two core assumptions—in fact two contradictory strands within the concept of epistemic support—which jointly create a powerful challenge for our pursuit of paramount epistemic values.