Norms of criminal conviction

In this paper, I offer three different arguments against the view that knowledge is the epistemic norm governing criminal convictions in the Anglo-American system. The first two show that neither the truth of a juror's verdict nor the juror's belief in the defendant's guilt is necessary for voting to convict in an epistemically permissible way. Both arguments challenge the necessity dimension of the knowledge norm. I then show—by drawing on evidence that is admissible through exclusionary rules—that knowledge is also not sufficient for epistemically proper conviction. A central thesis operative in all of these arguments is that the sort of ideal epistemology underwriting the knowledge norm of conviction should be rejected and replaced with a non-ideal approach. I then defend an alternative, justificationist norm of criminal conviction that not only avoids the problems afflicting the knowledge account, but also takes seriously the important role that narratives play in criminal courts.     

Effects of diversity versus segregation on automatic approach and avoidance behavior towards own and other ethnic groups

We present the results of a study in which we measured automatic intergroup behavior and evaluations in ethnic majority and minority group members. We focus our attention on the level of segregation and diversity of immediate life contexts as indicators of outgroup exposure. Specifically, Dutch ethnic minority and majority students enrolled at ethnically segregated and diverse schools completed a measure of automatic approach and avoidance behavior and reported explicit intergroup attitudes. The research is framed into prevailing theories in the field: Social Identity Theory and System Justification Theory. Results of our study suggest that segregation of minority group members' immediate life context may be an important moderator of evaluations as well as approach and avoidance behavior toward ingroup and outgroup. In particular, minority members in segregated schools showed an approach bias towards their ingroup, whereas minority members in diverse schools showed an approach bias towards the majority outgroup.     

The metaphysics of cognitive artefacts

This article looks at some of the metaphysical properties of cognitive artefacts. It first identifies and demarcates the target domain by conceptualizing this class of artefacts as a functional kind. Building on the work of Beth Preston, a pluralist notion of functional kind is developed, one that includes artefacts with proper functions and system functions. Those with proper functions have a history of cultural selection, whereas those with system functions are improvised uses of initially non-cognitive artefacts. Having identified the target domain, it then briefly looks at the multiple usability of physical structures and the multiple realizability of cognitive function. Further developing insights from the “dual nature of artefacts thesis”, the article ends with conceptualizing the structure–function relations of cognitive artefacts. More specifically, it unpacks the relation between physical structure, representational structure, information, and cognitive function.     

Blaming a Few Bad Apples to Save a Threatened Barrel: The System‐Justifying Function of Conspiracy Theories

This research demonstrates that conspiracy theories—often represented as subversive alternatives to establishment narratives—may bolster, rather than undermine, support for the social status quo when its legitimacy is under threat. A pilot study (N = 98) found a positive relationship between conspiracy belief and satisfaction with the status quo. In Study 1 (N = 120), threatening (vs. affirming) the status quo in British society caused participants to endorse conspiracy theories. In Study 2 (N = 159), exposure to conspiracy theories increased satisfaction with the British social system after this had been experimentally threatened. In Study 3 (N = 109), this effect was mediated by the tendency for participants exposed (vs. not exposed) to conspiracy theories to attribute societal problems relatively more strongly to small groups of people rather than systemic causes. By blaming tragedies, disasters, and social problems on the actions of a malign few, conspiracy theories can divert attention from the inherent limitations of social systems.     

Accounting and convincing: the effect of two types of justification on the decision process

The effect of two types of justification pressure on the decision process was investigated. Three groups of 15 subjects each had to choose the head of a corrective home for criminal adolescents out of six candidates, who were described on 16 attributes. Two groups worked under justification pressure: subjects in the Accounting group were informed that they had to explain their decision afterwards, subjects in the Convincing group that they had to convince the other members of the executive board to vote for their selected candidate. From the third group, no justification was requested. It was found that justification pressure leads to a distinct increase in the amount of utilized information and to a more elaborate choice process, while the global decision heuristics do not seem to change. The two justification groups did not differ in the amount of information utilized, but the Convincing group employed a more elaborate process. This result shows that justification pressure is one of the task characteristics affecting the decision process, and proves that a latent justification pressure as assumed in some decision theories does not have the same effect as an explicit one. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Perceptual consciousness plays no epistemic role

It is often assumed that perceptual experience provides evidence about the external world. But much perception can occur unconsciously, as in cases of masked priming or blindsight. Does unconscious perception provide evidence as well? Many theorists maintain that it cannot, holding that perceptual experience provides evidence in virtue of its conscious character. Against such views, I challenge here both the necessity and, perhaps more controversially, the sufficiency of consciousness for perception to provide evidence about the external world. In addition to motivating and defending the idea that unconscious perception can and does often provide evidence, I observe that whether or not perceptual phenomenology is relevant to the evidentiary status of perception depends on the nature of consciousness. And I argue that a well‐supported theory of consciousness—higher‐order thought theory—invites a striking conclusion: that perceptual phenomenology is not on its own sufficient to provide for evidence of the external world.     

If You Can't Change What You Believe,You Don't Believe It

I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposition, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary view of belief: while most mental states we thought were beliefs are beliefs, some mental states which we thought were beliefs are not beliefs. The argument for this view draws on two key claims: First, subjects are rationally obligated to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Second, if some subject is rationally obligated to revise one of her mental states, then that subject can revise that mental state, given her current psychological mechanisms and skills. Along the way to defending these claims, I argue that rational obligations can govern activities which reflect on one's rational character, whether or not those activities are under one's voluntary control. I also show how the relevant version of epistemic ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ survives an objection which plagues other variants of the principle.     

The Dizzying Turn of Epistemic Contextualism

The debate concerning epistemic contextualism represents a kind of linguistic turn in epistemology, where the focus has shifted from theorising about knowledge to theorising about knowledge attributions. Such a shift may well prove valuable, but only if we are clear on what the relationship is between a semantic analysis of knowledge attributions and a philosophical analysis of knowledge. One plausible approach is to claim that the semantic analysis entails and is entailed by the philosophical analysis. Yet this view—referred to here as the default view—has been explicitly adopted by few in the contextualism debate. This paper considers a form of argument in favour of the default view, and then considers the challenges that arise from either accepting or rejecting the default view.     

Term-Modal Logics

Many powerful logics exist today for reasoning about multi-agent systems, but in most of these it is hard to reason about an infinite or indeterminate number of agents. Also the naming schemes used in the logics often lack expressiveness to name agents in an intuitive way.To obtain a more expressive language for multi-agent reasoning and a better naming scheme for agents, we introduce a family of logics called term-modal logics. A main feature of our logics is the use of modal operators indexed by the terms of the logics. Thus, one can quantify over variables occurring in modal operators. In term-modal logics agents can be represented by terms, and knowledge of agents is expressed with formulas within the scope of modal operators.This gives us a flexible and uniform language for reasoning about the agents themselves and their knowledge. This article gives examples of the expressiveness of the languages and provides sequent-style and tableau-based proof systems for the logics. Furthermore we give proofs of soundness and completeness with respect to the possible world semantics.