EXPERIENCE AND EXPLANATION: THE JUSTIFICATION OF COGNITIVE CLAIMS IN THEOLOGY

Abstract. The justification of cognitive claims in theology can be dealt with adequately only if the epistemological issues of metaphorical reference, experiential adequacy, and explanatory progress are seen as crucial problems for the more encompassing problem of rationality in theology. In order to guarantee any claim to reality depiction the theologian will have to argue for a plausible theory of reference on the basis of interpreted religious experience. In this discussion important analogies between the rationality of theological theorizing and the rationality of science are revealed.     

The internal environment of knowledge claims: One aspect of the knowledge-society connection

In the sociology of knowledge, the relationship between society and knowledge —or rather what separates them — remains an unsolved problem. A critical analysis of various solutions that we must look for to this problem suggests the plausibility of a passage between social groups, styles of argumentation and objects of knowledge. An empirical model of decision displacements is proposed on the basis of a corpus of texts and of observations derived from concrete analysis of a laboratory situation.     

Defeasibility and Gettierization: A Reminder

For some of us, the defeasibility theory of knowledge remains the most plausible approach to the Gettier Problem. Epistemological fashion and faded memories notwithstanding, persuasive objections to the theory are very hard to find. The most impressive of those objections to the theory that have hitherto gone unanswered are examined and rejected here. These are objections put forward by Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, and John Turri. While these are all interesting, the objection recently put forward by Turri is, we think, by far, the most serious threat to the theory that we have seen in a long time. A successful reply to it requires a surprising amount of care, as it turns out. If tenable, Turri's objection deals a devastating blow to the theory developed by Roderick Chisholm, Keith Lehrer, Peter Klein, Marshall Swain, Risto Hilpinen, John Pollock, and Paul Moser, among others. Under scrutiny, however, the threat proves illusory. It results from inattention to a crucial, but relatively subtle, aspect of the theory. Interestingly, there is only one source in the defeasibilist literature for a precise account of this crucial feature of the theory: one of the most neglected passages in Peter Klein's work on the issue. That crucial feature is put under the spotlight here. Our response to three major objections to the defeasibility theory requires a brief introduction to the theory as an anti-Gettier weapon, an introduction aimed at countering the numbing simplicity that characterizes most introductions to the topic. Following this brief introduction, those three objections are tackled. We conclude, on that basis, that anybody who fails to notice how resilient the defeasibility theory has proven to be for the last fifty years has a seriously deficient understanding of the current state of play in the debate over the Gettier Problem.     

Pure Gospel or Full Gospel: On the Principles of Lutheran and Pentecostal Theology

The claim in recent conversations among Lutherans and Pentecostals that the “pure gospel” and “full gospel” paradigms held respectively by each tradition represent contrasting theological principles is examined through a historical and theological study of the notion of “gospel.” The two paradigms, although not mutually exclusive, identify different hermeneutical and doctrinal commitments that suggest that the contrast between the two traditions exists not in the idea of the gospel but in its mode of expression.     

A philosophical critique of psychological studies of emotion: the example of jealousy

The aim of this article is to provide a critical review of recent writings about jealousy in psychology, as seen from a philosophical perspective. At a more general level of inquiry, jealousy offers a useful lens through which to study generic issues concerned with the conceptual and moral nature of emotions, as well as the contributions that philosophers and social scientists can make to understanding them. Hence, considerable space is devoted to comparisons of psychological and philosophical approaches to emotion research in general. It turns out that although (Aristotle-style) arguments about the necessary conceptual features of jealousy qua specific emotion, do carry philosophical mileage, they may fail to cut ice with psychologists who tend to focus on jealousy as a broad dimension of temperament. The review reveals a disconcerting lack of cross-disciplinary work on jealousy: the sort of work that has moved the discourse on other emotions (such as gratitude) forward in recent years.     

Epistemic justification and premise acceptability

In this paper, we want to explore the connection between premises' being acceptable and their being in some sense justified. The equivalence of premise acceptability and justification seems intuitively correct. But to argue for such a connection, we need to analyze the concepts of acceptability and justification. Such an analysis also seems necessary if this equivalence is to advance our understanding of premise acceptability. Following L. J. Cohen, we may say S believes that p when S is disposed to feel it true that p, while S accepts that p when S takes that p as a premise for further deliberation or action. Reasons for belief are reasons for acceptance, and epistemological (as opposed to pragmatic) reasons for acceptance are reason for belief. Following William P. Alston, we may explicate being a justifying reason for belief through the notion of an adequate ground on which the belief is based. In turn, adequacy of ground means that the mechanism grounding the belief is reliable. Given these notions, we may define a concept of justification in terms of presumptive adequacy.     

Educating ethically: Culture,commitment and integrity

In this paper, it is argued that the criticism of the Enlightenment project in education and the disappearance in the philosophy of education discourse of particular educational problems which confront practitioners has resulted in a philosophy of education which — as a kind of Spielerei — begs the question. To revitalize itself, philosophy of education must take up anew its perennial mission, one near to specific educational problems. In explaining how the I of the educator can be conceived after postmodernism, this study elaborates the concepts of integrity and particularity as relevant for education. Education itself is conceived as a personal relation with a real person that aids in developing individuality. It is concluded that this answer is an authoritative and authentic response from one individual to another within a particular situation.     

Is systemic reform in education morally justifiable?

Systemic education reform calls for state imposition of uniform standards for student performance, the curriculum, and student opportunities to learn that curriculum, coupled with the alignment of basic state accountability, teacher education, and financing policies and expanded school decision-making authority. Proponents argue that systemic reform will have the effect of enhancing overall economic growth and equalizing opportunities for the most disadvantaged. Analysis of the first claim suggests that the inherent tension between employment-oriented outcome standards and discipline-oriented curriculum frameworks and the uniform application of such standards to all schools may undermine economic growth. Moreover, systemic reform appears more likely to transform current social inequalities than to eliminate them.     

Champ et effets de la négation argumentative: contre-argumentation et mise en cause

An argument can be taken as an operation of justification or as the product of this operation. But what about a counter-argument? This article is based on the hypothesis that there exists an operation of argumentative negation, which is both the argumentative and the negative equivalent of the operation of justification. Justification and argumentative negation necessarily act on assertions, for they are active at the level of the epistemic modalities of statements. As an operation, a counter-argument can thus be described, as the application of an argumentative negation; as a product, it can be described as an argument the conclusion of which shows traces of negative modality. Two uses of argumentative negation are distinguished here: counter-argumentation and calling into question. The former can lead only to assertive conclusive statements, but the latter can also lead to directives or commissives. This leads the authors to introduce the notion of pseudo-argument, besides those of argument and counter-argument. It is shown in particular that when a pseudo-argument is rejected, argumentative negation has the effect of making evident an underlying argument. With respect to the latterit functions as a counter-argumentation, whereas with respect to the illocutionary act accomplished by the conclusive statement, it functions as a calling into question of a condition of satisfaction for this act. This article also defines certain characteristics of argument, proposes criteria for identifying argumentative negation in polemical conversations, and distinguishes four modes of counter-argumentation.     

On a neglected feature of moral agency

Two conditions have been thought necessary and sufficient for a person to be morally responsible. The first is a control condition: an agent must control the actions for which she is held responsible. The second is an epistemic condition: an agent must know, or have the right kind of cognitive relationship to, the relevant features of what she is doing. Debate about moral responsibility among contemporary philosophers can be neatly divided into two circles, with each circle attending narrowly to one of these two conditions. I argue that these separate debates should not be had so separately. The two conditions on moral responsibility interact in a way that has been neglected. An agent's possession of knowledge, and her capacity to attain knowledge, increase that agent's control in a sense relevant to the control condition on moral responsibility. Conversely, an agent's control of her actions can be used to acquire knowledge in a sense relevant to the epistemic condition on moral responsibility. It is in this way that a sort of feedback loop arises between the epistemic condition and the control condition—each is capable of augmenting the degree to which their possessor satisfies the other. I argue that this interaction has important implications for each debate.