Champ et effets de la négation argumentative: contre-argumentation et mise en cause

An argument can be taken as an operation of justification or as the product of this operation. But what about a counter-argument? This article is based on the hypothesis that there exists an operation of argumentative negation, which is both the argumentative and the negative equivalent of the operation of justification. Justification and argumentative negation necessarily act on assertions, for they are active at the level of the epistemic modalities of statements. As an operation, a counter-argument can thus be described, as the application of an argumentative negation; as a product, it can be described as an argument the conclusion of which shows traces of negative modality. Two uses of argumentative negation are distinguished here: counter-argumentation and calling into question. The former can lead only to assertive conclusive statements, but the latter can also lead to directives or commissives. This leads the authors to introduce the notion of pseudo-argument, besides those of argument and counter-argument. It is shown in particular that when a pseudo-argument is rejected, argumentative negation has the effect of making evident an underlying argument. With respect to the latterit functions as a counter-argumentation, whereas with respect to the illocutionary act accomplished by the conclusive statement, it functions as a calling into question of a condition of satisfaction for this act. This article also defines certain characteristics of argument, proposes criteria for identifying argumentative negation in polemical conversations, and distinguishes four modes of counter-argumentation.     

On a neglected feature of moral agency

Two conditions have been thought necessary and sufficient for a person to be morally responsible. The first is a control condition: an agent must control the actions for which she is held responsible. The second is an epistemic condition: an agent must know, or have the right kind of cognitive relationship to, the relevant features of what she is doing. Debate about moral responsibility among contemporary philosophers can be neatly divided into two circles, with each circle attending narrowly to one of these two conditions. I argue that these separate debates should not be had so separately. The two conditions on moral responsibility interact in a way that has been neglected. An agent's possession of knowledge, and her capacity to attain knowledge, increase that agent's control in a sense relevant to the control condition on moral responsibility. Conversely, an agent's control of her actions can be used to acquire knowledge in a sense relevant to the epistemic condition on moral responsibility. It is in this way that a sort of feedback loop arises between the epistemic condition and the control condition—each is capable of augmenting the degree to which their possessor satisfies the other. I argue that this interaction has important implications for each debate.     

Veritism and the normativity of logic

The idea that logic is in some sense normative for thought and reasoning is a familiar one. Some of the most prominent figures in the history of philosophy including Kant and Frege have been among its defenders. The most natural way of spelling out this idea is to formulate wide‐scope deductive requirements on belief which rule out certain states as irrational. But what can account for the truth of such deductive requirements of rationality? By far, the most prominent responses draw in one way or another on the idea that belief aims at the truth. In this paper, I consider two ways of making this line of thought more precise and I argue that they both fail. In particular, I examine a recent attempt by Epistemic Utility Theory to give a veritist account of deductive coherence requirements. I argue that despite its proponents’ best efforts, Epistemic Utility Theory cannot vindicate such requirements.     

Justification,excuse, and proof beyond reasonable doubt

The law requires criminal guilt to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. There are two different approaches to construing this legal rule. On an epistemic approach, the rule is construed in terms of justified belief or knowledge; on a probabilistic approach, the rule is construed in terms of satisfying a probabilistic threshold. An epistemic construction of the rule has this advantage over a probabilistic construction: the former can while the latter cannot excuse the state from blame for a false conviction. This claim rests on an understanding of legal rules, legal justification for a finding of guilt and the central purpose of a criminal trial.     

Who should be on the $10 and $20 bills? Preferences based on gender,sexism, race,racism, political affiliation,and political ideology

In June 2015, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced that a woman would replace Hamilton on the $10 bill. In April 2016, it announced that Harriet Tubman would replace Andrew Jackson on the $20 bill, instead. After each announcement, we surveyed nationally representative samples of American adults and asked them what they thought of these proposed changes for the $10 bill (Study 1, N = 209) and the $20 bill (Study 2, N = 208). Predictors of currency preferences were gender, race, political affiliation and their respective prejudices and biases—sexism, racism, and political ideology. On the basis of social identity, system justification, and social dominance theories we predicted that privileged groups (i.e., males, Whites) and groups who desire to maintain the status quo (i.e., Republicans, conservatives, sexist and racist individuals) would prefer to leave Hamilton on the $10 bill and Jackson on the $20 bill. Results were consistent with these predictions: Overall, we found that under‐represented groups and more liberal individuals support the proposals from the U.S. Department of the Treasury. These findings suggest a bill of money is not just a piece of paper. The person depicted on U.S. currency can be perceived as an in‐group or out‐group member and this can affect judgements in line with relevant social psychological theories.     

Children's reasoning with peers in cooperative and competitive contexts

We report two studies that demonstrate how five‐ and seven‐year‐olds adapt their production of arguments to either a cooperative or a competitive context. Two games elicited agreements from peer dyads about placing animals on either of two halves of a playing field owned by either child. Children had to produce arguments to justify these decisions. Played in a competitive context that encouraged placing animals on one's own half, children's arguments showed a bias that was the result of withholding known arguments. In a cooperative context, children produced not only more arguments, but also more ‘two‐sided’ arguments. Also, seven‐year‐olds demonstrated a more frequent and strategic use of arguments that specifically refuted decisions that would favour their peers. The results suggest that cooperative contexts provide a more motivating context for children to produce arguments.

Statement of contribution

What is already known on this subject ?

• Reasoning is a social skill that allows people to reach joint decisions.
• Preschoolers give reasons for their proposals in their peer conversations.
• By adolescence, children use sophisticated arguments (e.g., refutations and rebuttals).

What the present study adds?

• Cooperation offers a more motivating context for children's argument production.
• Seven‐year‐olds are more strategic than five‐year‐olds in their reasoning with peers.
• Children's reasoning with others becomes more sophisticated after preschool years.

     

Legitimation and Strategic Maneuvering in the Political Field

This article combines a pragma-dialectical conception of argumentation, a sociological conception of legitimacy and a sociological theory of the political field. In particular, it draws on the theorization of the political field developed by Pierre Bourdieu and tries to determine what new insights into the concept of strategic maneuvering might be offered by a sociological analysis of the political field. I analyze a speech made by the President of Romania, Traian Băsescu, following his suspension by Parliament in April 2007. I suggest that the argument developed in this speech can be regarded as an example of adjudication and I discuss its specificity as an adjudication in the political field in an electoral campaign. I also try to relate legitimation as political strategy to strategic maneuvering oriented to meeting the contradictory demands of the political field, which I see—following Bourdieu—as involving a double political game, a game of democratic representation and a game of power.

情绪即社会信息模型述评

情绪即社会信息(EASI)模型提出,个体对他人的情绪信息加工具有两种方式:情感反应与推断加工。认识动机水平及不同的社会情境会影响两种加工的强度,进而影响个体的决策。该模型在谈判、领导者和最后通牒、独裁者博弈研究中获得了直接和间接的实证支持。心理理论与移情的新近神经生理研究成果也有助于深入探索该模型的神经生理基础。该模型具有很强的应用潜力,但形成时间尚短,需要进一步探索并应用到实践领域中去。