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341.
Raj Bharath Patta 《Dialog》2019,58(2):115-122
The aim of this article is to construct a “Dalit public Lutheran theology” as an “after‐justification” conversation, which drafts an agenda for the future of Lutheran theology in the twenty‐first century. In moving toward that construction, I first briefly explain Dalit theology, public theology, and Lutheran theology and shall discuss the rationale for a Dalit public Lutheran theology. From there I propose that Lutheran theology needs to take a contextual, post‐colonial and subaltern turn. Then I discuss the contours of Dalit public Lutheran theology by discussing one of the pivotal doctrine of Luther, “justification by grace through faith,” by engaging in a Dalit public discourse and propose “hospitality by love” as what comes after justification. Finally, I bring out the relevance of such a theology for our present‐day context. The method I employ in this article is subaltern methodology, which is to “read from below” or “read against the grain.” “After justification” is understood as “beyond” the understanding of doctrine of justification, as a forward‐looking public theological understanding of justification, where it finds fecundity and validity. 相似文献
342.
Jan‐Erik Lnnqvist Zsolt Pter Szab Laszlo Kelemen 《International journal of psychology》2019,54(3):292-296
We investigated the “rigidity of the right” hypothesis in the context of the far‐right breakthrough in the 2010 Hungarian parliamentary elections. This hypothesis suggests that psychological characteristics having to do with need for security and certainty attract people to a broad‐based right‐wing ideology. A nationally representative sample (N = 1000) in terms of age, gender and place of residence was collected by means of the random walking method and face‐to‐face interviews. Voters of JOBBIK (n = 124), the radically nationalist conservative far‐right party, scored lower on System Justifying Belief, Belief in a Just World (Global) and higher on Need for Cognition than other voters. Our results contradict the “rigidity of the right” hypothesis: JOBBIK voters scored, on many measures, opposite to what the hypothesis would predict. 相似文献
343.
Michael Klenk 《Ratio》2019,32(4):246-259
I make a case for distinguishing clearly between subjective and objective accounts of undercutting defeat and for rejecting a hybrid view that takes both subjective and objective elements to be relevant for whether or not a belief is defeated. Moderate subjectivists claim that taking a belief to be defeated is sufficient for the belief to be defeated; subjectivist idealists add that if an idealised agent takes a belief to be defeated then the belief is defeated. Subjectivist idealism evades some of the objections levelled against moderate subjectivism but can be shown to yield inconsistent results in some cases. Both subjectivisms should be rejected. We should be objectivists regarding undercutting defeat. This requirement, however, is likely to be problematic for a popular interpretation of evolutionary debunking arguments in metaethics as it can be shown that existing objectivist accounts of defeat do not support such arguments. I end by discussing the constraints of developing such an account. 相似文献
344.
Jimmy Alfonso Licon 《Ratio》2019,32(2):93-103
Intractable disagreement among philosophers is ubiquitous. An implication of such disagreement is that many philosophers hold false philosophical beliefs (i.e. at most only one party to a dispute can be right). Suppose that we distribute philosophers along a spectrum arranged from philosophers with mostly true philosophical beliefs on one end (high‐reliability), to those with mostly false philosophical beliefs on the other (low‐reliability), and everyone else somewhere in‐between (call this is the reliability spectrum). It is hard to see how philosophers could accurately locate themselves on the reliability spectrum; they are prima facie as well positioned as their peers with respect to philosophical matters (call this the placement problem). In this paper, I argue that the reliability spectrum and placement problem lend support to modest meta‐philosophical skepticism: we have a pro tanto (but not an all‐things‐considered) reason to withhold ascent to philosophical claims. 相似文献
345.
Abstract : This essay offers a comprehensive introduction to German theologian Eberhard Jüngel's theology and philosophy of religion. It traces his intellectual development, beginning with his formation studies in New Testament with Ernst Fuchs, and ends with his controversial position in matters of church unity and ecumenism. Special attention is paid to his theological anthropology, and the potential contributions his theology could make in the North American context are assessed. 相似文献
346.
Horacio Arló Costa 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2005,34(5-6):581-605
The article focuses on representing different forms of non-adjunctive inference as sub-Kripkean systems of classical modal logic, where the inference from □A and □B to □A∧B fails. In particular we prove a completeness result showing that the modal system that Schotch and Jennings derive from a
form of non-adjunctive inference in (Schotch and Jennings, 1980) is a classical system strictly stronger than EMN and weaker than K (following the notation for classical modalities presented in Chellas, 1980). The unified semantical characterization in
terms of neighborhoods permits comparisons between different forms of non-adjunctive inference. For example, we show that
the non-adjunctive logic proposed in (Schotch and Jennings, 1980) is not adequate in general for representing the logic of
high probability operators. An alternative interpretation of the forcing relation of Schotch and Jennings is derived from
the proposed unified semantics and utilized in order to propose a more fine-grained measure of epistemic coherence than the
one presented in (Schotch and Jennings, 1980). Finally we propose a syntactic translation of the purely implicative part of
Jaśkowski's system D2 into a classical system preserving all the theorems (and non-theorems) explicilty mentioned in (Jaśkowski, 1969). The translation
method can be used in order to develop epistemic semantics for a larger class of non-adjunctive (discursive) logics than the
ones historically investigated by Jaśkowski. 相似文献
347.
348.
349.
Tarek Hayfa 《Res Publica》2004,10(3):233-246
The article examines Rawlss Law of Peoples as an attemptto extend the conception of public justification originallydeveloped in Political Liberalism to the internationaldomain. After briefly sketching the main elements of Rawlssconception of public justification, the article examineshow this is developed in Law of Peoples, pointingout the main differences with the domestic case. The articlethen tries to show that Rawlss justificatory strategy containsa number of inconsistencies which undermine the persuasivenessof the conception of international justice he advocates. Thisin turn can be traced back to the failure fully to addressthe constituency problem facing theories ofpublic justification. 相似文献
350.
Rasmus Jaksland 《Ratio》2023,36(1):1-10
Radical naturalized metaphysics wants to argue (1) that metaphysics without sufficient epistemic warrant should not be pursued, (2) that the traditional methods of metaphysics cannot provide epistemic warrant, (3) that metaphysics using these methods must therefore be discontinued, and (4) that naturalized metaphysics should be pursued instead since (5) such science-based metaphysics succeeds in establishing justified conclusions about ultimate reality. This paper argues that to defend (5), naturalized metaphysics must rely on methods similar to those criticized in (2). If naturalized metaphysics instead opts for the weaker claim that science-based metaphysics is only superior to other metaphysics, then this is insufficient to establish (4). In this case, (4) might therefore be defeated by (1). An alternative is to replace (1) with the view that we should just approach metaphysical questions with the best means available. While this would recommend a science-based approach whenever possible, it would also allow for the continuation of science-independent metaphysics in domains that science has no bearing on and thus reject (3). The paper concludes that none of these alternatives is entirely satisfactory for naturalized metaphysics. 相似文献