The Moral Foundations taxonomy: Structural validity and relation to political ideology in Sweden

Although Moral Foundations Theory claims that the foundations of morality are universal, there are still few studies addressing it through non-English measures. In the current research, 540 persons filled out a Swedish translation of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, and 332 of them filled out political attitude measures. Confirmatory factor analyses suggested that the fit of the five-factor model was better than alternative models but not optimal, replicating previous findings. Concerns with fairness and prevention of harm predicted political identity leftward, mediated mainly by preference for equality, and concerns with loyalty, authority, and sanctity predicted political identity rightward, mediated mainly by resistance to change and system justification, as hypothesized. Fairness and authority concerns were the best predictors of political ideology.     

Relativized common knowledge for dynamic epistemic logic

Relativized common knowledge is a generalization of common knowledge proposed for public announcement logic by treating knowledge update as relativization. Among other things relativized common knowledge, unlike standard common knowledge, allows reduction axioms for the public announcement operators. Public announcement logic can be seen as one of the simplest special cases of action model logic (AML). However, so far no notion of relativized common knowledge has been proposed for AML in general. That is what we do in this paper. We propose a notion of action model relativized common knowledge for action model logic, and study expressive power and complete axiomatizations of resulting logics. Along the way we fill some gaps in existing expressivity results for standard relativized common knowledge.     

Unconfirmed peers and spinelessness

The Equal Weight View holds that, when we discover we disagree with an epistemic peer, we should give our peer’s judgment as much weight as our own. But how should we respond when we cannot tell whether those who disagree with us are our epistemic peers? I argue for a position I will call the Earn-a-Spine View. According to this view, parties to a disagreement can remain confident, at least in some situations, by finding justifiable reasons to think their opponents are less credible than themselves, even if those reasons are justifiable only because they lack information about their opponents.     

A Sense of Powerlessness Fosters System Justification: Implications for the Legitimation of Authority,Hierarchy, and Government

In an attempt to explain the stability of hierarchy, we focus on the perspective of the powerless and how a subjective sense of dependence leads them to imbue the system and its authorities with legitimacy. In Study 1, we found in a nationally representative sample of U.S. employees that financial dependence on one's job was positively associated with the perceived legitimacy of one's supervisor. In Study 2, we observed that a general sense of powerlessness was positively correlated with the perceived legitimacy of the economic system. In Studies 3 and 4, priming experimental participants with feelings of powerlessness increased their justification of the social system, even when they were presented with system‐challenging explanations for race, class, and gender disparities. In Study 5, we demonstrated that the experience of powerlessness increased legitimation of governmental authorities (relative to baseline conditions). The processes we identify are likely to perpetuate inequality insofar as the powerless justify rather than strive to change the hierarchical structures that disadvantage them.     

When Suspicious Minds Go Political: Distrusting and Justifying the System at the Same Time

Drawing on the sensitivity to mean intentions model, we hypothesized that sensitivity to injustice from a victim's perspective (victim sensitivity) is negatively related to the acceptance of political reforms due to an inclination to attribute ulterior motives to policy makers. In Study 1 with a Canadian sample, initial evidence for this mediational model was obtained, as victim sensitivity uniquely predicted distrust of policy makers through general trait suspiciousness. In Study 2, victim‐sensitive Austrians and Germans ascribed sinister motives to initiators of an economic reform when contextual cues of initiators' untrustworthiness were given. This situational suspiciousness led them to subsequently oppose this particular reform, and it even generalized to the whole economic system by reducing economic‐system justification. However, in both studies, mutually suppressive tendencies toward both opposing and justifying the system occurred. This suggests that victim‐sensitive individuals may be torn between distrusting and endorsing the system because it can not only victimize but also promote a sense of security from victimization by conferring order.     

Knowledge and availability

The mentioning of error-possibilities makes us less likely to ascribe knowledge. This paper offers a novel psychological account of this data. The account appeals to “subadditivity,” a well-known psychological tendency to judge possibilities as more likely when they are disjunctively described.     

Children's reasoning with peers in cooperative and competitive contexts

We report two studies that demonstrate how five‐ and seven‐year‐olds adapt their production of arguments to either a cooperative or a competitive context. Two games elicited agreements from peer dyads about placing animals on either of two halves of a playing field owned by either child. Children had to produce arguments to justify these decisions. Played in a competitive context that encouraged placing animals on one's own half, children's arguments showed a bias that was the result of withholding known arguments. In a cooperative context, children produced not only more arguments, but also more ‘two‐sided’ arguments. Also, seven‐year‐olds demonstrated a more frequent and strategic use of arguments that specifically refuted decisions that would favour their peers. The results suggest that cooperative contexts provide a more motivating context for children to produce arguments.

Statement of contribution

What is already known on this subject ?

• Reasoning is a social skill that allows people to reach joint decisions.
• Preschoolers give reasons for their proposals in their peer conversations.
• By adolescence, children use sophisticated arguments (e.g., refutations and rebuttals).

What the present study adds?

• Cooperation offers a more motivating context for children's argument production.
• Seven‐year‐olds are more strategic than five‐year‐olds in their reasoning with peers.
• Children's reasoning with others becomes more sophisticated after preschool years.

     

Defeasibility and Gettierization: A Reminder

For some of us, the defeasibility theory of knowledge remains the most plausible approach to the Gettier Problem. Epistemological fashion and faded memories notwithstanding, persuasive objections to the theory are very hard to find. The most impressive of those objections to the theory that have hitherto gone unanswered are examined and rejected here. These are objections put forward by Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, and John Turri. While these are all interesting, the objection recently put forward by Turri is, we think, by far, the most serious threat to the theory that we have seen in a long time. A successful reply to it requires a surprising amount of care, as it turns out. If tenable, Turri's objection deals a devastating blow to the theory developed by Roderick Chisholm, Keith Lehrer, Peter Klein, Marshall Swain, Risto Hilpinen, John Pollock, and Paul Moser, among others. Under scrutiny, however, the threat proves illusory. It results from inattention to a crucial, but relatively subtle, aspect of the theory. Interestingly, there is only one source in the defeasibilist literature for a precise account of this crucial feature of the theory: one of the most neglected passages in Peter Klein's work on the issue. That crucial feature is put under the spotlight here. Our response to three major objections to the defeasibility theory requires a brief introduction to the theory as an anti-Gettier weapon, an introduction aimed at countering the numbing simplicity that characterizes most introductions to the topic. Following this brief introduction, those three objections are tackled. We conclude, on that basis, that anybody who fails to notice how resilient the defeasibility theory has proven to be for the last fifty years has a seriously deficient understanding of the current state of play in the debate over the Gettier Problem.     

Pure Gospel or Full Gospel: On the Principles of Lutheran and Pentecostal Theology

The claim in recent conversations among Lutherans and Pentecostals that the “pure gospel” and “full gospel” paradigms held respectively by each tradition represent contrasting theological principles is examined through a historical and theological study of the notion of “gospel.” The two paradigms, although not mutually exclusive, identify different hermeneutical and doctrinal commitments that suggest that the contrast between the two traditions exists not in the idea of the gospel but in its mode of expression.