Activist Theatre: The Effects of Community Performance on System Justification and Willingness to Engage in Activism

System justification is a motivation to legitimize the status quo that disables individuals from changing oppressive social systems. Community performance has long been used as a tool to illuminate and challenge such systems of power. The goal of the present study was to provide an empirical test of the effectiveness of community performance in the context of gender‐based oppression. Specifically, the present study tested whether a community performance could decrease audience members' system justification and increase intentions to engage in collective and virtual action to correct these oppressive systems. The performance consisted of 18 community‐created pieces performed by 11 actresses before an audience of 165 members of the college and local communities across three days. A total of 153 audience members participated in the study. Results indicated that a 50‐min performance reduced system justification while increasing willingness to take collective and virtual‐based action. Limitations and implications are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why Listen to Philosophers? A Constructive Critique of Disciplinary Philosophy

This article articulates a fundamental crisis of disciplinary philosophy—its lack of disciplinary self‐consciousness and the skeptical problems this generates—and, through that articulation, exemplifies a means of mitigating its force. Disciplinary philosophy organizes itself as a producer of specialized knowledge, with the apparatus of journals, publication requirements, and other professional standards, but it cannot agree on what constitutes knowledge, progress, or value, and evinces ignorance of its history and alternatives. This situation engenders a skepticism that threatens the legitimacy of disciplinary philosophy. The article proposes a response to this skepticism, rooted in the conditions that philosophers evince a specific kind of awareness of their own activity and its professional and cultural location, demonstrate this awareness by articulating it in the practice of philosophy itself, and recognize that precisely such articulation lies at the core of the Socratic idea of philosophy as a form of self‐knowledge.     

System‐justifying behaviors: When feeling dependent on a system triggers gender stereotype‐consistent academic performance

Based on system‐justification theory, we hypothesized that men and women would perform in accordance with gender stereotypes mainly when justification of the system is necessary. In this research, system‐justification motivation was triggered using a system‐dependency manipulation. Study 1 shows that when feeling highly (vs. less) dependent on the system, people endorsed system‐justifying beliefs more. In Study 2, men performed better in math than in verbal domains, while women showed the reverse pattern, but only when they felt highly dependent on the system. Similar results were obtained on performance self‐evaluation. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The courage to be: Paul Tillich's existentialist theology of the cross in relation to Martin Luther

Paul Tillich is a traditionally rooted, yet progressive, theologian and philosopher who sought to bring the Christian message to the predicament of existential meaninglessness faced by modern people. The present article addresses a scholarly gap by emphasizing Tillich's use of Martin Luther's theology of the cross, in order to demonstrate Tillich's theological relevance for today from a Lutheran lens.     

Justification, Discovery, Reason & Argument

In distinguishing justification from discovery, the logical empiricists hoped to avoid confusing causal matters with normative ones. Exaggerating the virtue of this distinction, however, has disguised from us important features of the concept of a reason as it functions in human practice. Surfacing those features gives some insight into reasoning and argument.     

Distributed Knowability and Fitch’s Paradox

Recently predominant forms of anti-realism claim that all truths are knowable. We argue that in a logical explanation of the notion of knowability more attention should be paid to its epistemic part. Especially very useful in such explanation are notions of group knowledge. In this paper we examine mainly the notion of distributed knowability and show its effectiveness in the case of Fitch’s paradox. Proposed approach raised some philosophical questions to which we try to find responses. We also show how we can combine our point of view on Fitch’s paradox with the others. Next we give an answer to the question: is distributed knowability factive? At the end, we present some details concerning a construction of anti-realist modal epistemic logic.     

My beliefs about your beliefs: a case study in theory of mind and epistemic logic

We model three examples of beliefs that agents may have about other agents’ beliefs, and provide motivation for this conceptualization from the theory of mind literature. We assume a modal logical framework for modelling degrees of belief by partially ordered preference relations. In this setting, we describe that agents believe that other agents do not distinguish among their beliefs (‘no preferences’), that agents believe that the beliefs of other agents are in part as their own (‘my preferences’), and the special case that agents believe that the beliefs of other agents are exactly as their own (‘preference refinement’). This multi-agent belief interaction is frame characterizable. We provide examples for introspective agents. We investigate which of these forms of belief interaction are preserved under three common forms of belief revision.     

Paul and the Revisionists: Did Luther Really Get it All Wrong?

Abstract : After the advent of the “new perspective” on Paul as explicated in E. P. Sanders, Krister Stendahl, and N.T. Wright, we need to ask: did Luther get Paul right? In this essay, Donfried analyzes N.T. Wright along with David Brondos on whether Paul—and Luther—properly interpreted concepts such as “law” or “justification” in light of ancient Judaism(s). In contrast to the “new perspective,” Donfried argues that Paul got the Judaisms of his own era right and Luther got Paul right: we are justified or rightwised before God because of the presence of Jesus Christ in the faith of the one who believes.     

SOSA ON EPISTEMIC CIRCULARITY AND REFLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE

Abstract: Ernest Sosa has done important work on epistemic circularity, epistemic virtue, and reflective knowledge. He holds that epistemic circularity need not be vicious and need not prevent us from knowing that our ways of forming beliefs are reliable. In this article, I briefly explore Sosa's defense of this view and raise some questions about what is required for reflective knowledge.     

Sceptical possibilities? No worries

This paper undermines a paradigmatic form of sceptical reasoning. It does this by describing, and then dialectically dissolving, the sceptical-independence presumption, upon which that form of sceptical reasoning relies.