Sex differences in social representations of aggression: Men justify,women excuse?

Women tend to hold an expressive social representation of aggression (as a loss of self‐control) while men tend to hold an instrumental representation (as a means of imposing control over others). Because expressive beliefs correspond to excuses and instrumental beliefs to justifications, it may be a sex difference in moral acceptability of aggression that informs social representation. Participants completed the Expagg questionnaire with reference to an episode of same‐sex or cross‐sex physical aggression and rated the moral acceptability of their behaviour. Women scored higher on Expagg (specifically lower than men on the instrumental scale) but there was no effect of target sex or participant‐by‐target interaction. Contrary to expectation, women rated their own aggression as more acceptable than did men and hence this could not explain their lower levels of instrumentality relative to men. Aggr. Behav. 29:128–133, 2003. © 2003 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

IS CRITICAL THINKING EPISTEMICALLY RESPONSIBLE?

Abstract: There are at least three strategies we might take in approaching controversial issues: (i) we might accept the conclusions of experts on their authority, (ii) we might evaluate the relevant evidence and arguments for ourselves, or (iii) we might give up on finding the answers. Students of “critical thinking” are regularly advised to follow strategy (ii). But strategies (i) and (iii) are usually superior to (ii), from the standpoint of the goal of gaining true beliefs and avoiding false ones.     

Why Listen to Philosophers? A Constructive Critique of Disciplinary Philosophy

This article articulates a fundamental crisis of disciplinary philosophy—its lack of disciplinary self‐consciousness and the skeptical problems this generates—and, through that articulation, exemplifies a means of mitigating its force. Disciplinary philosophy organizes itself as a producer of specialized knowledge, with the apparatus of journals, publication requirements, and other professional standards, but it cannot agree on what constitutes knowledge, progress, or value, and evinces ignorance of its history and alternatives. This situation engenders a skepticism that threatens the legitimacy of disciplinary philosophy. The article proposes a response to this skepticism, rooted in the conditions that philosophers evince a specific kind of awareness of their own activity and its professional and cultural location, demonstrate this awareness by articulating it in the practice of philosophy itself, and recognize that precisely such articulation lies at the core of the Socratic idea of philosophy as a form of self‐knowledge.     

Two Methods of Representing the Distribution of an Attitude in a Group

ABSTRACT

In an experimental vignette study performed with 92 Portuguese women, we analyzed the relations between exposure to hostile sexism (HS) and benevolent sexism (BS) in a workplace context, system justification (SJ), and anxiety, measured after participants were exposed to an HS, a BS, or a neutral communication about the context of the industry they would have worked in, if selected. The results indicated that both HS and BS fostered participants’ anxiety, and that SJ moderated the relation between HS and anxiety. Anxiety was highest among participants low in SJ. Main contributions of the study, limitations, and possible future research directions are discussed.     

Skeptical hypotheses and moral skepticism

Moral skeptics maintain that we do not have moral knowledge. Traditionally they haven't argued via skeptical hypotheses like those provided by perceptual skeptics about the external world, such as Descartes' deceiving demon. But some believe this can be done by appealing to hypotheses like moral nihilism. Moreover, some claim that skeptical hypotheses have special force in the moral case. But I argue that skeptics have failed to specify an adequate skeptical scenario, which reveals a general lesson: such arguments are not a promising avenue for moral skeptics to take. They're ultimately weaker when applied to morality compared to perception.     

Situating Rhetorical Politics in Heidegger's Protopractical Ontology 1923–25: The French Occupy the Ruhr

Abstract

¹ 1 I am grateful to audiences at the University of California, Riverside, the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association at the University of East Anglia, and at Dalhousie University for helpful questions. Sincere thanks go to two anonymous referees and the editors of this Journal. For written comments, detailed discussion and encouragement, I am particularly grateful to Duncan MacIntosh, Susan Sherwin, Richmond Campbell, Lorraine Code, Steven Burns, Guy Longworth, Gary Watson, Margaret Chapman and Guy Blanchard. This paper makes a preliminary case for a central and radical claim. I begin with Bernard Williams’ seldom-faced argument that integrity cannot be a moral virtue because it lacks two key ingredients of moral virtues, namely a characteristic thought and motivation. Whereas, for example, generosity involves the thought that another could use assistance, and the motivation to actually give assistance, integrity lacks these two things essential to morally excellent responses. I show that several maneuvers aimed at avoiding Williams’ challenge fail and that others are likely to remain unpersuasive. The paper concludes by offering an argument to the best explanation: Williams’ important insight is best explained by the supposition that integrity is an epistemic virtue, and an epistemic virtue of a practical sort.