Nietzsche on taste: epistemic privilege and anti-realism

Abstract

The central aim of this article is to argue that Nietzsche takes his own taste, and those in the relevant sense similar to it, to enjoy a kind of epistemic privilege over their rivals. Section 2 will examine the textual evidence for an anti-realist reading of Nietzsche on taste. Section 3 will then provide an account of taste as an ‘affective evaluative sensibility’ (AES), asking whether taste so understood supports an anti-realist reading. I will argue that it does not and that we should resist construing the affects (Affeke), which constitute taste for Nietzsche, as no more than Humean subjective preferences. Section 4 will then consider passages in which Nietzsche makes a connection between taste and epistemic considerations, suggesting that he appears to situate the epistemic privilege of his taste in a more fundamental method of evaluative disclosure, namely pre-reflective affective responses. Finally, Section 5 will argue that we can make sense of how such affective responses could provide us with evaluative knowledge by narrowing the scope of the objects of Nietzsche’s taste to other affective-evaluative states, such that the affective responses are meta-affective evaluations. On the basis of this idea, I construct a theory of meta-affective responses providing their subjects with access to the intrinsic phenomenal value of other affective-evaluative states, and then go on to show how Nietzsche can be read as applying this theory in a number of passages.     

IS CRITICAL THINKING EPISTEMICALLY RESPONSIBLE?

Abstract: There are at least three strategies we might take in approaching controversial issues: (i) we might accept the conclusions of experts on their authority, (ii) we might evaluate the relevant evidence and arguments for ourselves, or (iii) we might give up on finding the answers. Students of “critical thinking” are regularly advised to follow strategy (ii). But strategies (i) and (iii) are usually superior to (ii), from the standpoint of the goal of gaining true beliefs and avoiding false ones.     

Antecedents and Consequences of System-Justifying Ideologies

Abstract— According to system justification theory, there is a psychological motive to defend and justify the status quo. There are both dispositional antecedents (e.g., need for closure, openness to experience) and situational antecedents (e.g., system threat, mortality salience) of the tendency to embrace system-justifying ideologies. Consequences of system justification sometimes differ for members of advantaged versus disadvantaged groups, with the former experiencing increased and the latter decreased self-esteem, well-being, and in-group favoritism. In accordance with the palliative function of system justification, endorsement of such ideologies is associated with reduced negative affect for everyone, as well as weakened support for social change and redistribution of resources.     

Identification with a wrongful subgroup and the feeling of collective guilt

The present study examined the relationship between group identification and the feeling of collective guilt. This study argued that identification with a subgroup of one's ingroup (subgroup identification) would predict the feeling of collective guilt better than identification with the whole ingroup (whole‐group identification). To manipulate the level of subgroup identification, we instructed participants to imagine the presence of a close friend (vs a friend of one's close friend) in a fictitious subgroup. In Experiment 1, we predicted and found that high subgroup identifiers experienced less collective guilt compared to low subgroup identifiers, regardless of their degree of whole‐group identification. In contrast, the results from Experiment 2 indicated that when the presence of the third party was made salient, high subgroup identifiers experienced more collective guilt in comparison to low subgroup identifiers. The importance of interpersonal connections for collective responsibility and the facilitating role of the third party for reconciliation of the intergroup conflicts are discussed.     

Toward a New Pragmatist Politics

In A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, I launched a pragmatist critique of Deweyan democracy and a pragmatist defense of an alternative view of democracy, one based in C. S. Peirce's social epistemology. In this article, I develop a more precise version of the criticism of Deweyan democracy I proposed in A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, and provide further details of the Peircean alternative. Along the way, some recent critics are addressed.     

他连A都知道--认知逻辑EK1-EK3

首先,我们构造认知系统EK1-EK3,给出它们的一些证明论结果。其次,我们引入邻域语义,给出EK1-EK3的特征公理和规则的框架条件,证明EK1-EK3相对这些框架条件分别是框架可靠的。最后,我们证明EK1-EK3相对这些框架条件分别是框架完全的。     

Protesting to challenge or defend the system? A system justification perspective on collective action

Social identity, shared grievances, and group efficacy beliefs are well-known antecedents to collective action, but existing research overlooks the fact that collective action often involves a confrontation between those who are motivated to defend the status quo and those who seek to challenge it. Using nationally representative data from New Zealand (Study 1; N = 16,147) and a large online sample from the United States (Study 2; N = 1,513), we address this oversight and demonstrate that system justification is negatively associated with system-challenging collective action, but positively associated with system-supporting collective action, for members of both low-status and high-status groups. Group identification, group-based injustice, group-based anger, and system-based dissatisfaction/anger mediated these relationships. These findings constitute the first empirical integration of system justification theory into a model of collective action that explains when people will act collectively to challenge—and, just as importantly, defend—the status quo.     

A new puzzle about belief and credence

I present a puzzle about belief and credence, which takes the form of three independently supported views that are mutually inconsistent. The first is the view that S has a modal belief that p (e.g., S believes that probably-p) if and only if S has a corresponding credence that p. The second is the view that S believes that p only if S has some credence that p. The third is the view that, possibly, S believes that p without a modal belief that p. [Word Count: 85]     

决策理由、行动和后果对决策后悔的影响

探讨决策理由(合理与不合理)、行动(做与不做)和后果(严重与轻微)对决策后悔的影响,以2×2×2被试内设计,设置8个决策情境进行实验。结果:不合理决策的后悔体验比合理决策更高,严重的后果导致的后悔比轻微的后果更高,行动无主效应,但在后果轻微,理由不正当条件下,行动也就是“做”导致更多的后悔情绪。结论:决策理由的合理性与后果的严重性是影响决策后悔的重要因素; 只有理由不正当且后果轻微时,才存在“做效应”。