The Russian Cards Problem

Suppose we have a stack of cards that is divided over some players. For certain distributions of cards it is possible to communicate your hand of cards to another player by public announcements, without yet another player learning any of your cards. A solution to this problem consists of some sequence of announcements and is called an exchange. It is called a direct exchange if it consists of (the minimum of) two announcements only. The announcements in an exchange have a special form: they are safe communications, an interesting new form of update. Certain unsafe communications turn out to be unsuccessful updates. A communication is a public announcement that is known to be true. Each communication may be about a set of alternative card deals only, and even about a set of alternatives to the communicating player's own hand only. We list the direct exchanges for a deal of seven cards where the two players holding three cards communicate their hands to each other. Our work may be applicable to the design of cryptographic protocols.     

Sex differences in social representations of aggression: Men justify,women excuse?

Women tend to hold an expressive social representation of aggression (as a loss of self‐control) while men tend to hold an instrumental representation (as a means of imposing control over others). Because expressive beliefs correspond to excuses and instrumental beliefs to justifications, it may be a sex difference in moral acceptability of aggression that informs social representation. Participants completed the Expagg questionnaire with reference to an episode of same‐sex or cross‐sex physical aggression and rated the moral acceptability of their behaviour. Women scored higher on Expagg (specifically lower than men on the instrumental scale) but there was no effect of target sex or participant‐by‐target interaction. Contrary to expectation, women rated their own aggression as more acceptable than did men and hence this could not explain their lower levels of instrumentality relative to men. Aggr. Behav. 29:128–133, 2003. © 2003 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

Luther and Justification

In this article, I reflect on Luther's doctrine on justification as it came out in different ways in some of his seminal writings between 1518 and 1538, all represented in volume 2 of The Annotated Luther. Discovering the righteousness of God as something already given to humans opened fundamentally new perspectives to Luther.     

Nietzsche on taste: epistemic privilege and anti-realism

Abstract

The central aim of this article is to argue that Nietzsche takes his own taste, and those in the relevant sense similar to it, to enjoy a kind of epistemic privilege over their rivals. Section 2 will examine the textual evidence for an anti-realist reading of Nietzsche on taste. Section 3 will then provide an account of taste as an ‘affective evaluative sensibility’ (AES), asking whether taste so understood supports an anti-realist reading. I will argue that it does not and that we should resist construing the affects (Affeke), which constitute taste for Nietzsche, as no more than Humean subjective preferences. Section 4 will then consider passages in which Nietzsche makes a connection between taste and epistemic considerations, suggesting that he appears to situate the epistemic privilege of his taste in a more fundamental method of evaluative disclosure, namely pre-reflective affective responses. Finally, Section 5 will argue that we can make sense of how such affective responses could provide us with evaluative knowledge by narrowing the scope of the objects of Nietzsche’s taste to other affective-evaluative states, such that the affective responses are meta-affective evaluations. On the basis of this idea, I construct a theory of meta-affective responses providing their subjects with access to the intrinsic phenomenal value of other affective-evaluative states, and then go on to show how Nietzsche can be read as applying this theory in a number of passages.     

IS CRITICAL THINKING EPISTEMICALLY RESPONSIBLE?

Abstract: There are at least three strategies we might take in approaching controversial issues: (i) we might accept the conclusions of experts on their authority, (ii) we might evaluate the relevant evidence and arguments for ourselves, or (iii) we might give up on finding the answers. Students of “critical thinking” are regularly advised to follow strategy (ii). But strategies (i) and (iii) are usually superior to (ii), from the standpoint of the goal of gaining true beliefs and avoiding false ones.     

Antecedents and Consequences of System-Justifying Ideologies

Abstract— According to system justification theory, there is a psychological motive to defend and justify the status quo. There are both dispositional antecedents (e.g., need for closure, openness to experience) and situational antecedents (e.g., system threat, mortality salience) of the tendency to embrace system-justifying ideologies. Consequences of system justification sometimes differ for members of advantaged versus disadvantaged groups, with the former experiencing increased and the latter decreased self-esteem, well-being, and in-group favoritism. In accordance with the palliative function of system justification, endorsement of such ideologies is associated with reduced negative affect for everyone, as well as weakened support for social change and redistribution of resources.     

Protesting to challenge or defend the system? A system justification perspective on collective action

Social identity, shared grievances, and group efficacy beliefs are well-known antecedents to collective action, but existing research overlooks the fact that collective action often involves a confrontation between those who are motivated to defend the status quo and those who seek to challenge it. Using nationally representative data from New Zealand (Study 1; N = 16,147) and a large online sample from the United States (Study 2; N = 1,513), we address this oversight and demonstrate that system justification is negatively associated with system-challenging collective action, but positively associated with system-supporting collective action, for members of both low-status and high-status groups. Group identification, group-based injustice, group-based anger, and system-based dissatisfaction/anger mediated these relationships. These findings constitute the first empirical integration of system justification theory into a model of collective action that explains when people will act collectively to challenge—and, just as importantly, defend—the status quo.     

决策理由、行动和后果对决策后悔的影响

探讨决策理由(合理与不合理)、行动(做与不做)和后果(严重与轻微)对决策后悔的影响,以2×2×2被试内设计,设置8个决策情境进行实验。结果:不合理决策的后悔体验比合理决策更高,严重的后果导致的后悔比轻微的后果更高,行动无主效应,但在后果轻微,理由不正当条件下,行动也就是“做”导致更多的后悔情绪。结论:决策理由的合理性与后果的严重性是影响决策后悔的重要因素; 只有理由不正当且后果轻微时,才存在“做效应”。     

New Horizons for a Theory of Epistemic Modals

Recent debate over the semantics and pragmatics of epistemic modals has focused on intuitions about cross-contextual truth-value assessments. In this paper, we advocate a different approach to evaluating theories of epistemic modals. Our strategy focuses on judgments of the incompatibility of two different epistemic possibility claims, or two different truth value assessments of a single epistemic possibility claim. We subject the predictions of existing theories to empirical scrutiny, and argue that existing contextualist and relativist theories are unable to account for the full pattern of observed judgments. As a way of illustrating the theoretical upshot of these results, we conclude by developing a novel theory of epistemic modals that is able to predict the results.