Children's Understanding of Behavioral Consequences of Epistemic States: A Comparison of Knowledge,Ignorance, and False Belief

The author addressed the issue of the simultaneity of false belief and knowledge understanding by investigating children's ability to predict the behavioral consequences of knowledge, ignorance, and false belief. The second aim of the study was to explore the role of counterfactuals in knowledge understanding. Ninety-nine (99) children, age 3–7 years old, completed the unexpected transfer task and a newly designed task in which a protagonist experienced 1 of the following 4 situations: knowing a fact, not knowing a fact, knowing a procedure, and not knowing a procedure. The results showed that factual ignorance was as difficult as false belief for the children, whereas the other conditions were all easier than false belief, suggesting that the well-known lag between ignorance and false belief may be partly methodologically based. The results provide support for a common underlying conceptual system for both knowing and believing, and evidence of the role of counterfactual reasoning in the development of epistemic state understanding. Methodological variations of the new task are proposed for future research.     

Doctrine of Scripture in Lutheran Theology—Its Missional Thrust: A Response to Lamin Sanneh's Hein‐Fry Lecture 20081

Abstract : In this article, I argue that Lutheran doctrine of Scripture is rooted in a christological centre, a centre that is coherent with Lamin Sanneh's thesis that the missionary experience must encompass both the work of the missionary who comes from ‘outside’ and, more especially, the reflections of the ‘indigenous’ peoples on Scripture in its witness to God's coming in Jesus Christ. This essential mutuality of ‘receiving’ and ‘giving’ in reading Scripture christologically undercuts imperial biblical hermeneutical practices that privilege certain cultures, languages, ethnic, racial, and class groupings as bearers of the gospel of Jesus Christ.     

Rats place greater value on rewards produced by high effort: An animal analogue of the “effort justification” effect

The effort justification phenomenon, in which greater value is given to rewards that require more effort to obtain, is frequently explained in terms of cognitive dissonance (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). Here, we employed a novel combination of operant and lick analysis techniques to show that rats place more value on a sucrose reward when it follows high effort than when the same reward follows low effort. This is the first demonstration of a direct analogue of the effort justification phenomenon in nonhuman animals. As the behavior of rats is normally considered in terms of relatively simple mechanisms, the current results question the need for complex cognitive accounts for the effort justification phenomenon (in rats or humans). As an alternative, we examine the possibility that high effort produces an aversive state that enhances reward value by a process of contrast.     

Costs and benefits of political ideology: The case of economic self-stereotyping and stereotype threat

Across two experiments, the cognitive salience of a stigmatized ingroup identity harmed self-evaluation and elicited stereotype-consistent behavior to the degree that participants endorsed the political status quo. In Experiment 1, ethnic identity salience caused Filipina domestic workers in Hong Kong to evaluate their own labor as meriting less pay if they were high in social dominance orientation but more pay if they were low in social dominance orientation. In Experiment 2, gender identity salience caused women in the US to evaluate their work on a logic task (but not a verbal task) as meriting less pay if they were politically conservative but more pay if they were politically liberal—a pattern mirrored in task performance. Depending on the degree to which the political status quo is accepted or rejected, findings suggest that members of stigmatized groups can be either implicit participants in their own subjugation or agents of change.     

A PUZZLE ABOUT NATURALISM

Abstract: This article presents and solves a puzzle about methodological naturalism. Trumping naturalism is the thesis that we must accept p if science sanctions p, and biconditional naturalism the apparently stronger thesis that we must accept p if and only if science sanctions p. The puzzle is generated by an apparently cogent argument to the effect that trumping naturalism is equivalent to biconditional naturalism. It turns out that the argument for this equivalence is subtly question‐begging. The article explains this and shows more generally that there are no scientific arguments for biconditional naturalism.     

INTRODUCTION: VIRTUE AND VICE

Abstract: This introduction to the collection Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic addresses three main questions: (1) What is a virtue theory in ethics or epistemology? (2) What is a virtue? and (3) What is a vice? (1) It suggests that a virtue theory takes the virtues and vices of agents to be more fundamental than evaluations of acts or beliefs, and defines right acts or justified beliefs in terms of the virtues. (2) It argues that there are two important but different concepts of virtue: virtues are qualities that attain good ends, and virtues are qualities that involve good motives. (3) Accordingly, vices are qualities that either fail to attain good ends or involve bad motives. Finally, the introduction summarizes the eleven essays in the collection, which are divided into four sections: the Structure of Virtue Ethics and Virtue Epistemology; Virtue and Context; Virtue and Emotion; and Virtues and Vices.     

The Black-White Malleability Gap in Implicit Racial Evaluations: A Nationally Representative Study

This study replicates and extends the experimental design originated by Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001), who found a decrease in implicit pro-White biases after exposure to pictures of admired Black individuals. A nationally representative sample was analyzed comparing implicit pro-White biases among Black and White participants. Hypothesis 1 (H1) predicted a replication of previous research among White participants, and H2, derived from the balanced identity theory, predicted an increased pro-Black bias among Blacks after exposure to admired Black individuals. Results provided partial support for H1 and a lack of support for H2. This is the first study to use a nationally representative sample to examine implicit pro-White biases. System justification theory was used to explain the malleability gap in Black and White pro-racial biases.     

Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement?

The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification is the distinction between having justification to believe that P (= propositional justification) versus having a justified belief in P (= doxastic justification). The focus of this paper is on doxastic justification and on what conditions are necessary for having it. In particular, I challenge the basing demand on doxastic justification, i.e. the idea that one can have a doxastically justified belief only if one's belief is based on an epistemically appropriate reason. This demand has been used to refute versions of coherentism and conservatism about perceptual justification, as well as to defend phenomenal ‘conservatism’ and other views besides. In what follows, I argue that there is virtually no reason to think there is a basing demand on doxastic justification. I also argue that, even if the basing demand were true, it would still fail to serve the dialectical purposes for which it has been employed in arguments concerning coherentism, conservatism, and phenomenal ‘conservatism’. I conclude by discussing the fact that knowledge has a basing demand and I show why this needn't raise the same sort of problems for coherentism and conservatism that doxastic justification's basing demand seemed to raise.     

Estimation of trade‐off between costs of preprocessing and primary processing

When people engage in a task, they often take preliminary actions (preprocessing) to simplify primary processing. Usually, a trade‐off is made between the costs of preprocessing and primary processing. We conducted three experiments to find out whether people could adaptively estimate the utility of preprocessing depending on the task situation. The result demonstrated that in performing a high‐complexity task, almost all the participants reduced their overall task performance cost by conducting cost‐adaptive preprocessing. However, for a low‐complexity task, participants tended to conduct preprocessing even though this increased overall task performance cost. Based on these results, we discuss human nature from the viewpoint of the influence of cognitive effort.     

Lgbt Catholics: a paradigmatic case of intra-confessional pluralism

ABSTRACT

I will reflect on the reconciliation between “subjective” life and “objective” doctrine experienced by Catholic lgbt couples. Even though their particular experience cannot be considered as universal it can nevertheless constitute a case study for theological reflection. I will propose a theological model for the integration of lgbt Catholics into Christian communities. The case of lgbt Catholics also helps us address the theoretical difficulties of religious pluralism. Their experience of faith is an example of “lived pluralism”. In the lexicon of religious pluralism, this experience is an intra-system or intra-theistic diversity, but it also touches upon the meta-theological issue of the model of reason that is to be applied to every system. I believe that every possible case of pluralism is worth considering if we want to theorize this concept. This may lead us to consider pluralism as a premise from which to start, articulated at different levels.