想象积极群际接触对利他型集体行动意愿的影响:系统公正感和群际评价的中介作用

集体行动是维护和实现社会公平正义的有效途径之一。以往研究主要聚焦于弱势群体利己型集体行动,很少有研究考察利他型集体行动的影响因素。本研究采用双随机设计,通过三个实验探讨积极群际接触与利他型集体行动的中介效应因果模型。实验1采用想象性群际接触范式操纵积极群际接触,发现积极群际接触促进利他型集体行动,系统公正感和群际评价中的热情维度起中介作用。实验2与实验3分别操纵系统公正感和热情,检验中介变量与因变量间的因果关系,证实了积极群际接触-系统公正感、热情-利他型集体行动的因果关系链。     

Who's in power matters: System justification and system derogation in Hungary between 2002 and 2018

The present study employed European Social Survey (ESS) data collected between 2002 and 2018 to investigate system justification versus derogation in Hungary. In all nine ESS rounds, system derogation was stronger than system justification. System justification was consistently at its strongest among those who had voted for the ruling party, be it left-wing MSZP (until 2008) or right-wing Fidesz (2010 onward). This pattern can be explained by ego and group justification motives alone, with no need to posit an autonomous system justification motive. Voters of Jobbik, who were as right-wing as Fidesz voters, but whose party was not in power, did not believe the system to be any more just than did left-wing voters. Much of the research supporting system justification theory has been conducted in stable Western democracies. Our results highlight the need for research in more politically volatile contexts.     

Using Self‐Regulated Learning Strategies to Develop Students’ Multicultural Counseling Competency

This study examines the effect of self‐regulated learning strategies on students’ multicultural competency development. Quantitative and qualitative data were collected from 26 students who took a semester‐long multicultural counseling course. Results show statistically significant improvement in students’ multicultural awareness and knowledge and statistical insignificance in multicultural skill development compared to their level of competence before the training. Implications of using this approach to teach multicultural counseling courses and future research are discussed. Este estudio examina el efecto de las estrategias de aprendizaje autorregulado en el desarrollo de la competencia multicultural de los estudiantes. Se recopilaron datos cuantitativos y cualitativos de 26 estudiantes que atendieron un curso de consejería multicultural de un semestre. Los resultados muestran una mejora estadísticamente significativa en la conciencia y conocimentos multiculturales de los estudiantes y una insignificancia estadística en el desarrollo de las habilidades multiculturales comparadas con su nivel de competencia antes de la capacitación. Se discuten las implicaciones de usar este enfoque didáctico en cursos de consejería multicultural y para investigaciones futuras.     

Are our moral responsibility practices justified? Wittgenstein,Strawson and justification in ‘Freedom and Resentment’

D. Justin Coates argues that, in ‘Freedom and Resentment’, P. F. Strawson develops a modest transcendental argument for the legitimacy of our moral responsibility practices. I disagree with Coates’ claim that Strawson’s argument provides a justification, in Wittgenstein’s and/or Strawson’s sense of that term, of our responsibility practices. I argue that my interpretation of Strawson solves some difficulties with Coates’ argument, while retaining its advantages.     

社会不平等如何影响低地位者的系统合理信念

系统合理信念反映了人们的系统支持态度,即对社会系统公正性、合理性、正当性的感知,以及相应的支持和维护社会系统的态度。以往关于社会不平等与低地位者系统合理信念的关系形成了两种对立的理论观点。一方面,社会认同理论等自利取向的理论认为,严重的不平等不利于低地位者维护自我及内群体利益,因此会损害其系统合理信念;另一方面,系统合理化理论却提出,在不平等更极端（而非平等）的社会中,人们（甚至是低地位者）反而更可能合理化不平等,表现出更高的系统合理信念。实证研究中,两种观点分别得到了一些研究的支持,但同时也面临很多质疑。 面对上述分歧,本文提出了一个整合性的解释框架,即“社会不平等影响低地位者系统合理信念的双路径模型”。该模型认为,自利取向理论与系统合理化理论其实并不矛盾,而是共同解释了不平等与低地位者系统合理信念关系的“全貌”。因此,理论争议的焦点不在于不平等究竟增强还是减弱低地位者的系统合理信念,而在于分析不平等增强或减弱低地位者系统合理信念的不同条件（即认知基础）及其内在机制（即动机基础）。 第一,在认知基础方面,不同于以往研究仅关注不平等“量”的程度及其与系统合理信念的线性关系,该模型认为还应关注不平等“质”的差异及其不同效应,即关注低地位者对不平等的认知过程。一方面,严重的不平等损害低地位者个人或群体的现实利益,构成一种现实威胁;另一方面,严重不平等的社会现状与人们关于社会系统公正性、合理性的信念相冲突,构成一种象征威胁。 第二,在动机基础方面,低地位者的自利动机与系统合理化动机分别使其反对或维护不平等现状,且两种动机彼此冲突;不同于以往研究采用对立视角考察两种动机,或是过于强调二者之一的作用;该模型认为,两种动机是并存的,相互之间并非全或无的关系。因此有必要厘清二者发挥作用的条件,即什么影响二者孰强孰弱,又是什么决定了何者发挥主导作用。 第三,区分不平等“质”的差异是厘清自利动机与系统合理化动机如何发挥作用的关键。换言之,不同动机为低地位者反对或维护不平等现状提供了动力,而何种动机发挥主导作用则取决于低地位者如何对不平等进行认知。具体而言,当凸显不平等在个体或群体水平的现实威胁时,更可能激活低地位者的自利动机（进而抑制其系统合理化动机）,继而损害其系统合理信念;而当凸显不平等在系统水平的象征威胁时,更可能激活其系统合理化动机（进而抑制其自利动机）,继而增强其系统合理信念。 “双路径模型”通过分析不平等影响低地位者系统合理信念的不同认知基础,进而厘清不同动机的作用,将以往研究中看似矛盾的结论整合于一,为理解不平等对低地位者系统合理信念的影响、解释两种理论的“分歧”提供了一种整合框架,需要未来研究进一步检验和发展。     

Semantic and Moral Luck

The similarities between the philosophical debates surrounding assessment sensitivity and moral luck run so deep that one can easily adapt almost any argument from one debate, change some terms, adapt the examples, and end up with an argument relevant to the other. This article takes Brian Rosebury's strategy for resisting moral luck in “Moral Responsibility and ‘Moral Luck' ” (1995) and turns it into a strategy for resisting assessment sensitivity. The article shows that one of Bernard Williams's examples motivating moral luck is very similar to one of the examples John MacFarlane uses to motivate the assessment sensitivity of epistemic modals, and in particular the assessment sensitivity of the auxiliary verb “might.” This means that, if Rosebury is right and we do not actually need moral luck to explain Williams's example, we may not need assessment sensitivity to account for the semantic behaviour of the epistemic modal verb “might” either.     

The Price of a Piece of Cheese: Value from Fit Between Epistemic Needs and a Learning Versus an Outcome Focus

In decision making, people can focus on decisional outcomes (outcome focus), but they can also focus on gaining knowledge about the decisional domain (learning focus). Furthermore, people differ in the strength of their epistemic needs—their preference for developing a rich and accurate understanding of the world. We invoke the regulatory fit theory to predict that higher epistemic needs better fit a learning focus than lower epistemic needs, resulting in a greater increase in valuation of the chosen option when a learning rather than an outcome focus is induced. This general hypothesis was tested and supported in three studies, each focusing on a different proxy to epistemic needs. Thus, individuals experienced greater value when they had lower expertise (Study 1), higher need for assessment (Study 2), and higher need for cognition (Study 3) when a learning rather than an outcome focus was induced. Implications for work on epistemic needs, regulatory fit theory, and decision‐making practice are discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Which Scientificity for the social Sciences?

Since their emergence in the nineteenth century, the epistemology of social sciences has oscillated from aiming at the classical model of scientificity to emphasizing its own specificities. We argue here that the existence of unambiguous, well defined objects has allowed discoveries and cumulativity in the natural sciences. Whereas, in the social sciences, the term is most often used in a metaphorical meaning, as it represents a basically fluid and changing reality. Its apprehension partly depends on the emotional/intellectual identity of the researcher, which makes it difficult to achieve a full consensus. Yet, beside real, natural or created objects, we do find structures, regularities and objectivations in society.     

What the Wise Ought Believe: A Voluntarist Interpretation of Hume's General Rules

This paper advances an interpretation of what Hume called ‘the general rules’: natural principles of belief-formation that nevertheless can be augmented via reflection. According to Hume, reflection is, in part, what separates the wise from the vulgar. In this paper, I argue that for Hume being wise must therefore be, to some degree, voluntary. Hume faced a significant problem in attempting to reconcile his epistemic normativity, i.e. his claims about what we ought to believe, with his largely involuntarist theory of the mind. Reflection on the General Rules, and an interpretation of that reflection as voluntary, helps explain not only Hume's theory of belief, but also how he hoped to reconcile epistemic normativity with naturalism about the mental.