The four faces of omission

In this paper, the ontological, terminological, epistemological, and ethical aspects of omission are considered in a coherent and balanced framework, based on the idea that there are omissions which are actions and omissions which are non-actions. In particular, we suggest that the approach to causation which best deals with omission is Mackie's INUS conditional proposal. We argue that omissions are determined partly by the ontological conditional structure of reality, and partly by the interests, beliefs, and values of observers. The final upshot is that moral judgments involved in cases of omissions cannot be grounded on, but are the ground for judgments about what INUS conditions count as omissions.     

Con-reasons and the causal theory of action

A con-reason is a reason which plays a role in motivating and explaining an agent's behaviour, but which the agent takes to count against the course of action taken. Most accounts of motivating reasons in the philosophy of action do not allow such things to exist. In this essay, I pursue two aims. First, I argue that, whatever metaphysical story we tell about the relation between motivating reasons and action, con-reasons need to be acknowledged, as they play an explanatory role not played by pro-reasons (the reason the agent takes to count in favour of the action taken). Second, I respond to an argument recently developed by David-Hillel Ruben to the effect that a causal theory of action – still known as ‘the standard story’ – cannot account for con-reasons. His argument attempts to show that a fundamental principle of the causal theory cannot be reconciled with the role con-reasons play in a certain kind of imagined case. I first argue that a causal theorist is not, in fact, committed to the problematic principle; this argument has an added benefit, since the principle has been taken by many to show that the causal theory generates a puzzle about the possibility of weak-willed action. I then argue that a causal theorist has good reason to reject the possibility of Ruben's imagined cases. If successful, my arguments make clearer the commitments of the causal theory and show that it can accommodate con-reasons in the way I think they ought to be accommodated.     

Free will and moral responsibility: does either require the other?

This article explores the conceptual connections between free action and action for which the agent is morally responsible. Questions addressed include the following. Can agents who are never morally responsible for anything sometimes act freely? Can agents who never act freely be morally responsible for some of their actions? Various compatibilist and incompatibilist responses to these questions are discussed, as is the control over their behavior that ordinary agents attribute to themselves.     

Psychoanalytic action explanation

Psychoanalysis is concerned with neurotic behaviour that counts as an action if one takes into account “repressed” mental states. Freud's paradigmatic examples are a challenge for philosophical theories of action explanation. The main problem is that such symptomatic behaviour is, in a characteristic way, irrational. In line with standard interpretations, I will recap that psychoanalytic action explanation is not in accordance with Davidson's classical reason-explanation model, and I will recall that Freud's unconsciousness is not a second mind with its own rationality but that it is non-propositional in character. However, I then will argue that this characterization is not discriminating enough to explain the dynamical unconscious and overlooks the crucial role of “counter-cathexis”. With counter-cathexis the relevant desire turns out to be a complex with two inseparable aspects (“double-aspect view”), so that the causing belief–desire pair is still part of the space of reasons, although it cannot rationalize the behaviour. Psychoanalytic action explanation is hence still Davidsonian, albeit in a modified way.     

Nonrelativist Ethical Standards for Goal Setting in Psychotherapy

A number of authors have commented on the topic of mandated reporting in cases of suspected child maltreatment and the application of this requirement to researchers. Most of these commentaries focus on the interpretation of current legal standards and offer opinions for or against the imposition of mandated reporting laws on research activities. Authors on both sides of the issue offer ethical arguments, although a direct comparison and analysis of these opposing arguments is rare. This article critically examines the ethical arguments made by authors on both sides of the debate. The conclusion is reached that researchers should be mandated reporters of child maltreatment because the current arguments do not justify their exclusion from current ethical and legal standards. The author makes recommendations for the ethically responsible conduct of research in regard to this topic and legal implications are discussed.     

Ethical Conflicts in Commercialization of University Research in the Post–Bayh–Dole Era

Protection of intellectual property as well as its exploitation for monetary benefit have existed for centuries. However, commercialization of intellectual property had not entered the precincts of academic universities in a significant way until the introduction of the Bayh–Dole Act in the 1980s in the United States. The post–Bayh–Dole era has seen a quantitative increase in patenting activity in universities. This article summarizes the ethical conflicts ushered in by increasing commercialization of academic university research. Activities related to the protection and commercial exploitation of intellectual property have led to changes in academic culture that have given room for debate between the puritans and the modernists. Issues contended by the two groups have been identified, and both sides of the argument are discussed. The key to achieving “responsible commercialization of research” is to balance the Bayh–Dole ethos with the traditional Mertonian norms of academic research.     

Responsible Conduct of Research Training and Trust Between Research Postgraduate Students and Supervisors

The federal regulations of human research were written to permit the use of discretion so that research can fit the circumstances under which it is conducted. For example, the researcher and institutional review board (IRB) could waive or alter some informed consent elements if they deem this the morally and scientifically best way to conduct the research. To do so, however, researchers and IRBs would first have to use mature moral and scientific judgment. They might also have to rely on empirical research to discover the most effective way to act on their moral sense (e.g., to discover how best to approach potential research participants and explain the nature and purpose of the research participation for which they are being recruited, to ensure comprehension and competent decision making). On discovering the most ethical way to proceed, they would then need to look to the federal regulations of human research to discover how to document their decision and justify it within that somewhat flexible regulatory structure. Unfortunately, many IRBs and researchers fail to take these sensible steps to solve ethical problems and proceed immediately to a default requirement of the regulations that places science at odds with the regulations and, ostensibly, with ethics. The following articles in this special issue are about the process of learning to engage in ethical problem solving and using the flexibility permitted by the federal regulations. These articles extricate researchers from the mindset that has gotten them into trouble, and, ideally, provoke them to use mature common sense and moral judgment.     

Empirical Research on Ethical Issues in Pediatric Research

Although there is usually agreement about the ethical principles that should govern research on children, there may be little agreement on how those principles should be interpreted into research procedures in some instances. Empirical research on ethical issues that arise in research on children can often elucidate ways to improve on existing research practices and ways to resolve debates about best practices. Following in the success of evidence-based medicine, evidence-based ethical problem solving in human research can enable investigators to avoid such poor alternatives as doing nothing, endlessly debating, or acting on the basis of hunch or time-honored but dubious research practices. A variety of approaches to evidence-based ethical problem solving are illustrated in this article.     

Beyond Data Collection: Ethical Issues in Minority Research

This article examines ethical concerns surrounding research on minority issues. Specifically, it addresses whether researchers have an obligation to consider (a) the impact that minority research can have on vulnerable populations and (b) their own backgrounds before conducting or assessing minority research for publication. The article argues for such an obligation mainly from a consequentialist perspective and then explores possible strategies for assessing and meeting that obligation. Finally, it explores the possible negative secondary effects of those strategies and censorship concerns.     

Using Rasch modelling to examine the international personality item pool (IPIP) values in action (VIA) measure of character strengths

This paper investigates the psychometric properties of the values in action (VIA) character strengths (Peterson and Seligman, 2004 Peterson, C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2004). Character strengths and virtues: A handbook and classification. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]). A sample of 904 South African undergraduate students (female=77%, male=23%, black=70%, mean age=21.07 years, SD age=2.73 years) was assessed using a 380-item questionnaire that included the items from the international personality item pool (IPIP) values in action (VIA) measure of 24 character strengths as well as additional items based on the underlying theory of the particular constructs. Responses were analysed with the Rasch rating scale model. Reliability coefficients were computed for the retained scale items. The majority (21) of the scales demonstrated satisfactory Rasch model fit and good reliability of scores. The finding that a large proportion of strengths exhibited differential item functioning for at least one of (1) gender, (2) ethnicity and (3) home language group, challenges the assumption that character strengths are necessarily accultural, indicating qualitative distinctions in construct conceptualisations and measurement as a function of emic factors.