Book reviews

This paper begins with a critical evaluation of British counselling psychology's aspirations for a scientific basis and considers some of the consequences in terms of theoretical assumptions and research practice. Through identifying certain empirical, theoretical and ideological problems inherent in the dominant tradition of quantifying inferred cognitive constructs (using the example of trainee self-talk), an alternative framework of discursive psychology is simultaneously introduced. the argument is made for a discursive study of storied meanings by trainee counselling psychologists about themselves and their work. This would potentially address two pivotal research areas. First, it affords both a personal and yet socially embedded framework for an increased understanding and more sensitive evaluation of the training process (with its acquisition of skills, knowledge, experience, competencies, etc.). Second, it offers an alternative approach to the problematic area of understanding unique and generic interactions between practitioners and their preferred psychological model(s) of therapy, thus challenging the theoretical and research cul-de-sac of competing modernist visions of purism, eclecticism and integration. Extending from these observations two research possibilities are suggested.     

The fieldwork model: An anthropological perspective on the process of change in long-term psychoanalytic psychotherapy

The question of what takes place in the psychoanalytic consulting room, and whether it has any therapeutic effect on the patient, has consistently been behind various criticisms of the long-term psychoanalytically informed therapies. When it comes to goal-oriented talking therapies –the only ones favoured by the state mechanism – statistical proof of their efficacy is thought of as proof of their scientific value. However, disciplines such as social anthropology have consistently based their complex understanding of social phenomena in qualitative data. This article draws upon the anthropological fieldwork model. It also looks at how anthropological theory has evolved as a result of the increasing centrality of the fieldwork model and a gradual acceptance of the inter-subjective process. It aims to highlight how lived experience, the paradigm on which the fieldwork model is based, constitutes a highly effective way of understanding in depth the patient and the patient's history. Such understanding is in turn the main factor behind profound and lasting psychological change. It is argued here that psychotherapy research and practice could be enhanced by following the example of anthropological qualitative research.     

Collingwood and Ryle on the Concept of Mind

Abstract

This paper argues that Collingwood's philosophy of mind offers an interesting and compelling account of the nature of the mind and of the irreducibility of the mental, an account whose viability and relevance to contemporary debates ought to be given serious consideration. I suggest that the reason why Collingwood's contribution to the philosophy of mind has been neglected is due to the fact that his philosophy of mind is widely, even if mistakenly, regarded as the target of Ryle's attacks on the dogma of the ghost in the machine and proceed to undermine the assumption that Collingwood is a twentieth century adherent of the dogma.     

Four models of the functional contribution of mirror systems

In this paper we raise three questions of clarification about Alfred Mele's fine recent book, Free Will and Luck. Our questions concern the following topics: (i) Mele's combination of ‘luck’ and ‘Frankfurt-style’ objections to libertarianism, (ii) Mele's stipulations about ‘compatibilism’ and the relation between questions about free action and questions about moral responsibility, and (iii) Mele's treatment of the Consequence Argument.     

The four faces of omission

In this paper, the ontological, terminological, epistemological, and ethical aspects of omission are considered in a coherent and balanced framework, based on the idea that there are omissions which are actions and omissions which are non-actions. In particular, we suggest that the approach to causation which best deals with omission is Mackie's INUS conditional proposal. We argue that omissions are determined partly by the ontological conditional structure of reality, and partly by the interests, beliefs, and values of observers. The final upshot is that moral judgments involved in cases of omissions cannot be grounded on, but are the ground for judgments about what INUS conditions count as omissions.     

Con-reasons and the causal theory of action

A con-reason is a reason which plays a role in motivating and explaining an agent's behaviour, but which the agent takes to count against the course of action taken. Most accounts of motivating reasons in the philosophy of action do not allow such things to exist. In this essay, I pursue two aims. First, I argue that, whatever metaphysical story we tell about the relation between motivating reasons and action, con-reasons need to be acknowledged, as they play an explanatory role not played by pro-reasons (the reason the agent takes to count in favour of the action taken). Second, I respond to an argument recently developed by David-Hillel Ruben to the effect that a causal theory of action – still known as ‘the standard story’ – cannot account for con-reasons. His argument attempts to show that a fundamental principle of the causal theory cannot be reconciled with the role con-reasons play in a certain kind of imagined case. I first argue that a causal theorist is not, in fact, committed to the problematic principle; this argument has an added benefit, since the principle has been taken by many to show that the causal theory generates a puzzle about the possibility of weak-willed action. I then argue that a causal theorist has good reason to reject the possibility of Ruben's imagined cases. If successful, my arguments make clearer the commitments of the causal theory and show that it can accommodate con-reasons in the way I think they ought to be accommodated.     

Free will and moral responsibility: does either require the other?

This article explores the conceptual connections between free action and action for which the agent is morally responsible. Questions addressed include the following. Can agents who are never morally responsible for anything sometimes act freely? Can agents who never act freely be morally responsible for some of their actions? Various compatibilist and incompatibilist responses to these questions are discussed, as is the control over their behavior that ordinary agents attribute to themselves.     

Psychoanalytic action explanation

Psychoanalysis is concerned with neurotic behaviour that counts as an action if one takes into account “repressed” mental states. Freud's paradigmatic examples are a challenge for philosophical theories of action explanation. The main problem is that such symptomatic behaviour is, in a characteristic way, irrational. In line with standard interpretations, I will recap that psychoanalytic action explanation is not in accordance with Davidson's classical reason-explanation model, and I will recall that Freud's unconsciousness is not a second mind with its own rationality but that it is non-propositional in character. However, I then will argue that this characterization is not discriminating enough to explain the dynamical unconscious and overlooks the crucial role of “counter-cathexis”. With counter-cathexis the relevant desire turns out to be a complex with two inseparable aspects (“double-aspect view”), so that the causing belief–desire pair is still part of the space of reasons, although it cannot rationalize the behaviour. Psychoanalytic action explanation is hence still Davidsonian, albeit in a modified way.     

Nonrelativist Ethical Standards for Goal Setting in Psychotherapy

A number of authors have commented on the topic of mandated reporting in cases of suspected child maltreatment and the application of this requirement to researchers. Most of these commentaries focus on the interpretation of current legal standards and offer opinions for or against the imposition of mandated reporting laws on research activities. Authors on both sides of the issue offer ethical arguments, although a direct comparison and analysis of these opposing arguments is rare. This article critically examines the ethical arguments made by authors on both sides of the debate. The conclusion is reached that researchers should be mandated reporters of child maltreatment because the current arguments do not justify their exclusion from current ethical and legal standards. The author makes recommendations for the ethically responsible conduct of research in regard to this topic and legal implications are discussed.