The role of similarity and dissimilarity focus in sequential judgments of physical attractiveness

The present results indicate that procedurally priming comparison focus can change the contrast effect in judgments of physical attractiveness (Kenrick & Gutierres, 1980). Participants were primed to search for similarities vs. differences between target and standard of comparison in a task using material irrelevant to the subsequent physical attractiveness judgment. Focusing participants on similarities testing produced the assimilation effect: evaluation of target and comparison standard as being similar. Focusing participants on dissimilarity testing produced the contrast effect: evaluating the target as different from the standard of comparison.     

Inferring the Mental Processes of Other Minds

Abstract

In 4 experiments, the authors examined how several variables influence the quality and quantity of information that people use to make judgments about other people. The results showed that when possible, participants consistently responded appropriately to variables that influenced information that they used to make inferences about other minds. The results also suggested that under circumstances with no opportunity to contrast behavior in different situations, people might not be sensitive to the quality and quantity of information present. The authors interpreted results to mean that under most circumstances, people make inferences in a way that efficiently uses information about the causes of behavior.     

Ignorance is no excuse: moral judgments are influenced by a genetic variation on the oxytocin receptor gene

Perspective-taking has become a main focus of studies on moral judgments. Recent fMRI studies have demonstrated that individual differences in brain activation predict moral decision making. In particular, pharmacological studies highlighted the crucial role for the neuropeptide oxytocin in social behavior and emotional perception. In the present study N=154 participants were genotyped for a functional polymorphism (rs2268498) in the promoter region of the OXTR gene. We found a significant difference between carriers and non-carriers of the C-allele in exculpating agents for accidental harms (F((1,152))=11.49, p=.001, η(2)=.07) indicating that carriers of the C-allele rated accidentally committed harm as significantly more blameworthy than non-carriers. This is the first study providing evidence for a genetic contribution to moral judgments.     

Increased Attentional Control for Emotional Distractors Moderates the Use of Reflective Pondering in Times of Life Stress: A Prospective Study

According to the response styles theory, rumination is a cognitive response to a stressor with repetitive and self‐focused attention on a negative mood state. The attentional disengagement theory highlights that attentional processes are critical, underlying individual differences in ruminative thinking, such as reflective pondering and depressive brooding. Using a prospective design, the current study sought to determine whether attentional control for negative material was differently associated with brooding and reflection upon life stress. Spanning a period of three months, 76 never depressed undergraduate students completed a baseline measurement of attentional bias by using an emotional modification of the exogenous cueing task (T1) and subsequently, six weeks after T1, completed Internet questionnaires during their final examinations at four weekly fixed moments (T2–T5). Data were analysed with a series of multilevel regression analyses. Results revealed that the relation between stress and the use of reflective pondering is stronger when participants allocate less attention to emotional information (negative and positive stimuli). On the other hand, attentional control did not moderate the relation between stress and depressive brooding. On the basis of the current research findings, it might be important to train attentional control to disengage from emotional distractors, which in turn may increase the use of more self‐controlling thinking in response to stress. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The illusion of courage in self‐predictions: Mispredicting one's own behavior in embarrassing situations

People exhibit an “illusion of courage” when predicting their own behavior in embarrassing situations. In three experiments, participants overestimated their own willingness to engage in embarrassing public performances in exchange for money when those performances were psychologically distant: Hypothetical or in the relatively distant future. This illusion of courage occurs partly because of cold/hot empathy gaps. That is, people in a relatively “cold” unemotional state underestimate the influence on their own preferences and behaviors of being in a relative “hot” emotional state such as social anxiety evoked by an embarrassing situation. Consistent with this cold/hot empathy gap explanation, putting people “in touch” with negative emotional states by arousing fear (Experiments 1 and 2) and anger (Experiment 2) decreased people's willingness to engage in psychologically distant embarrassing public performances. Conversely, putting people “out of touch” with social anxiety through aerobic exercise, which reduces state anxiety and increases confidence, increased people's willingness to engage in psychologically distance embarrassing public performances (Experiment 3). Implications for self‐predictions, self‐evaluation, and affective forecasting are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

If you have a choice,you have trouble: Stimulus valence modulates presentation‐order effects in preference judgment

It is well known that the presentation order of choice options often affects decision outcomes to a significant degree. However, despite the significance and wide occurrence of the effects, they are ignored in most preference models. Furthermore, psychophysical findings of stimulus‐magnitude dependent presentation‐order effects have not been acknowledged previously in the cognitive literature on preference judgments. Thus, the potential moderating effect of the level of stimulus magnitude (here, valence) on the direction and size of order effects in preference judgment has not been investigated previously. In two experiments, participants (117 and 204, respectively) rated their preference for pairs of everyday‐type objects and phenomena (e.g., apple–pear, headache–stomachache). Stimuli were spaced horizontally, and each participant received them in one of two opposite within‐pair presentation orders. Participants also rated the stimuli's valence on a scale from very bad to very good. The results showed a positive correlation between the rated valence and the tendency to prefer the first‐mentioned (left) stimulus; that is, the effect was greatest, and opposite, for choices between the most attractive and the most unattractive options, respectively. In terms of Hellström's ( 1979 ) sensation‐weighting model, the positive correlation is caused by a higher weight (i.e., impact on the preference judgment) for the left stimulus than for the right, which is possibly due to the left stimulus being compared to the right. The results suggest that researchers may have failed previously to find important moderators of presentation‐order effects in preference judgment due to the failure to use sufficiently attractive or unattractive stimuli. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

质性研究中的资料饱和及其判定

在质性研究中,资料饱和通常被用以评估研究资料的充足性。但在研究实践中,资料饱和却存在概念模糊及操作性问题。作为某项质性研究所抽取的样本量已满足研究需要的标志,按照在研究过程中判定时点的先后顺序,资料饱和可划分为数据饱和、编码或主题饱和、意义饱和及理论饱和4种主要形式。4种形式的资料饱和各有其特定的内涵、评估方式和判定标准。研究认为,达到资料饱和的样本量标准不应统一设定,其检验需嵌入具体的研究过程;资料饱和存在逻辑上的不确定性,适度追加抽样有助于进一步确认;资料饱和作为考察研究质量的一项重要指标,并不适用于所有质性研究。     

The Effects of Intent,Outcome, and Causality on Moral Judgments and Decision Processes

Over the past decade, moral judgments and their underlying decision processes have more frequently been considered from a dynamic and multi-factorial perspective rather than a binary approach (e.g., dual-system processes). The agent’s intent and his or her causal role in the outcome–as well as the outcome importance–are key psychological factors that influence moral decisions, especially judgments of punishment. The current research aimed to study the influence of intent, outcome, and causality variations on moral decisions, and to identify their interaction during the decision process by embedding the moral scenarios within an adapted mouse-tracking paradigm. Findings of the preregistered study (final n = 80) revealed main effects for intent, outcome, and causality on judgments of punishment, and an interaction between the effects of intent and causality. We furthermore explored the dynamics of these effects during the decision process via the analysis of mouse trajectories in the course of time. It allowed detecting when these factors intervened during the trial time course. The present findings thus both replicate and extend previous research on moral judgment, and evidence that, despite some ongoing challenges, mouse-tracking represents a promising tool to investigate moral decision-making.     

From regulation to projection: Reliance on regulatory mode in predictions about others

Past research showed that people project their goals onto unknown others. The present research investigates whether they also rely on their motivational orientation in terms of regulatory mode (locomotion vs. assessment). In line with work on self-judgments, a stronger chronic personal focus on locomotion over assessment decreased predictions of others' experiences of nostalgia (Study 1) and increased predictions of others' preference for, motivation by, and evaluation of a transformational over a transactional leader (Study 2). Furthermore, an experimentally induced locomotion mode compared to an assessment mode increased peoples' predictions of others' motivation to reconcile after interpersonal conflict (Study 3). We examined process evidence via the Testing-Process-by-Interaction-Strategy: As predicted, effects only emerged under time pressure (vs. ample deliberation; Study 2) and for ingroup (vs. outgroup) members (Study 3). These findings suggest that people's regulatory mode is a basis for predicting others' reactions and preferences. We discuss implications and future research directions.