Self-report measure of parental reflective functioning: A study of reliability and validity across three samples of varying clinical risk

The Parental Reflective Functioning Questionnaire (PRFQ) provides an efficient way to measure a parent's capacity to recognize their child's mental states and to understand the relationship between underlying mental states and behavior. To date, limited work evaluates its psychometric properties beyond initial validation studies. Here we examined the reliability and validity of the PRFQ in three samples of varying clinical risk (e.g., community sample, previous mental health diagnosis, substance use disorder diagnosis). Across samples, the majority (e.g., 75%–78%) of mothers identified as White; all mothers were from the USA. We compared the PRFQ to task-based measures of mentalization, the Parent Development Interview (PDI), and measures of the parent-child relationship. The PRFQ was a reliable measure across samples, and it was associated in theoretically consistent ways with task-based measures of mentalization. Parental RF across the PDI and PRFQ were not highly correlated in a sample of mothers with substance use disorders. Existing RF measures may be tapping into a different component of the broader construct of parental reflective functioning (PRF). The PRFQ was further validated by demonstrating relationships with parent-report measures of the parent-child relationship. Taken together, these findings provide additional support for the reliability and validity of the PRFQ.     

Without Intuitions

This paper criticizes Analytic philosophy with its reliance on intuitions in pursuit of conceptual analysis. Rejecting naturalism as an alternative philosophical method, I offer in its place a pragmatic and revisionary conception of philosophical method. I explain the method of Analytic philosophy and show why reliance on intuitions is essential to that method, which is unable to provide substantive answers to philosophical problems. I further show that reflective equilibrium or wide analysis requires some criterion of intuition choice and that this criterion can be applied directly to definitions themselves.     

Intuitions,Biases, and Extra-Wide Reflective Equilibrium

It seems that intuitions are indispensable in philosophical theorizing. Yet, there is evidence that our intuitions are heavily influenced by biases. This generates a puzzle: we must use our intuitions, but we seemingly cannot fully trust those very intuitions. This paper develops a methodology for philosophical theorizing that attempts to avoid this puzzle. Specifically, it develops and defends a methodology it calls Extra-Wide Reflective Equilibrium. It argues that this method allows us to use intuitions, while also providing a mechanism to check the influence of bias on our intuitions. In section 1, it defends the claim that intuitions are indispensable in philosophical theorizing. In section 2, it outlines recent arguments against the reliability of intuitions. In section 3, it explains and defends its account of Extra-Wide Reflective Equilibrium.     

MORAL DELIBERATION AND OPERATIVE RIGHTS: A RESPONSE TO MARY MAGADA‐WARD AND CYNTHIA GAYMAN

Abstract: The aim of this article is to show how intimately connected Beth J. Singer's theory of operative rights is with her understanding of the deliberative process. I thus argue against Cynthia Gayman's effort to set in contrast Singer's theory of rights and Dewey's characteristic emphasis on reflective morality. Since I take the value of Singer's approach to be most evident in its relevance to the abortion debate as an ongoing deliberation, I question whether Mary Magada‐Ward sufficiently appreciates the dialogical and deliberative emphases of Singer's stance. My goal, however, is not so much to argue against either Gayman or Magada‐Ward as it is to argue for taking Singer's position even more seriously than either author does. In particular, I want to highlight the finely nuanced character of Singer's philosophical intervention in the debate regarding abortion, especially stressing certain features that Gayman and Magada‐Ward overlook.     

Where do counsellors in private practice receive their support? A pilot study

Background: Previous research suggests that independent practitioners should ensure that they attend to self-care, and the requirement for self-care is written into ethical practice requirements. Aims: To explore whether or how counsellors in private practice received support, and if so from where. Method: A survey questionnaire containing 29 questions was sent to 525 recipients. Results: 31 questionnaires were completed. The results from these questionnaires indicated that support was primarily received through supervision. Discussion: The support needs of private practitioners are discussed in the context of a very low response rate. The researcher considers factors that might have led to this response rate, as well as reflecting on the study design.     

Drawing on creative reflective practices in counselling research: an example of using mental imagery to shed light on the research process

The disciplines of counselling and psychotherapy have generated a range of innovative qualitative research methods. There is the potential for further developments, particularly in relation to methods that reveal how the researcher is implicated in the research. Practitioner-researchers could help to identify potential new methods through a willingness to engage in creative applications of clinical expertise and knowledge to their research projects. This article presents an example of applying a creative reflective method to the research process and discusses its potential for delivering insights into how the researcher is shaping the research and its findings. This particular mental imagery technique is considered in the light of conceptual metaphor theory and the possibility that representing the research project as a mental image can reveal how the researcher is cognitively structuring the research process.     

On Wittgenstein's Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy

In 1931 Wittgenstein wrote: ‘the limit of language manifests itself in the impossibility of describing the fact that corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence’. Here, Wittgenstein claims, ‘we are involved?…?with the Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy’. This paper shows how this remark fits with Wittgenstein's early account of the substance of the world, his account of logic, and ultimately his view of philosophy. By contrast to the currently influential resolute reading of the Tractatus, the paper argues that the early Wittgenstein did not aim at destroying the idea of a limit of language, but that the notion lies at the very heart of Wittgenstein's early view. In doing so, the paper employs and defends the Kantian interpretation of Wittgenstein's early philosophy.