风险决策中的参照点效应研究

本研究以展望理论和社会决策范式模型为基础,着重探讨三种参照点对个体和群体风险决策产生的影响。３００名被试经实验者设置参照点后分别在个体和群体条件下对不同风险度的博弈方案进行选择。结果表明：（１）个体决策中,损失参照点的被试和无得失经验者比得益者更冒险;（２）得益被试的决策受到社会比较的影响;（３）损失参照点的被试并未对群体决策有更大影响,决定群体决策结果的主要是多数原则。     

Why do Alzheimer patients have difficulty with pronouns? Working memory, semantics, and reference in comprehension and production in Alzheimer's disease

Three experiments investigated the extent to which semantic and working-memory deficits contribute to Alzheimer patients' impairments in producing and comprehending referring expressions. In Experiment 1, the spontaneous speech of 11 patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD) contained a greater ratio of pronouns to full noun phrases than did the spontaneous speech produced by 9 healthy controls. Experiments 2 and 3 used a cross-modal naming methodology to compare reference comprehension in another group of 10 patients and 10 age-matched controls. In Experiment 2, patients were less sensitive than healthy controls to the grammatical information necessary for processing pronouns. In Experiment 3, patients were better able to remember referent information in short paragraphs when reference was maintained with full noun phrases rather than pronouns, but healthy controls showed the reverse pattern. Performance in all three experiments was linked to working memory performance but not to word finding difficulty. We discuss these findings in terms of a theory of reference processing, the Informational Load Hypothesis, which views referential impairments in AD as the consequence of normal discourse processing in the context of a working memory impairment.     

Discrimination training facilitates pigeons' performance on one-trial-per-day delayed matching of key location

Six pigeons were tested on a one-trial-per-day variant of delayed matching of key location. In one condition, a trial began with the illumination of a pair of quasi-randomly selected pecking keys in a large 10-key test box. Pigeons' pecks to one key (the sample) were reinforced with 8-second access to grain on a variable-interval 30-second schedule, whereas pecks to the other key (the distractor) had no scheduled consequences. In the second condition, the nonreinforced distractor was not presented. In both conditions, subjects were removed from the apparatus after 15 minutes and placed in a holding cage. Subjects were subsequently replaced in the box after a delay (retention interval) of 30 seconds and were reexposed to the illuminated sample and distractor keys for 1 minute. If a pigeon made more pecks to the sample during this interval, the distractor was extinguished and subsequent pecks to the sample were reinforced on the previous schedule for an additional 15 minutes. If, however, a pigeon made more pecks to the distractor, both keys were extinguished and the subject was returned to its home cage. For all subjects, matching-to-sample accuracy was higher in the first condition. In a second experiment, the retention interval was increased to 5, 15, and 30 minutes, and then to 1, 2, 4, 8, 12, and 24 hours. Most subjects remembered the correct key location for up to 4 hours, and in one case, up to 24 hours, demonstrating a spatial-memory proficiency far better than previously reported in this species on delayed matching tasks. The results are discussed in terms of the commonly held distinction between working and reference memory.     

CRITICAL REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: RESPONSE TO ROBBINS, VAN HUYSSTEEN, AND HEFNER

Abstract. I read Robbins's essay as a hermeneutics of suspicion against the claims of critical realism, especially the tendency of critical realism to achieve correspondence with the world rather than participation in changing it. I read van Huyssteen's essay as an application of critical realism which tends toward correspondence in spite of his correct statement of the theory. I read Hefner's paper as an exposition of both claims and methods capable of conveying truth and genuine knowledge. As such, Hefner's paper illustrates an adequate application of the theory of critical realism and overcomes the suspicion suggested by Robbins.     

语篇中指代词的分布规律与心理机制

语篇理解加工过程的一个重要环节就是对不同类型的指代词进行解释。首先介绍了指代词在语篇中的分布规律和对局部语篇连贯性的影响;其次,分析了话语信息结构和韵律特征在指代词加工中的作用;然后,揭示了语篇当中不同类型的指代词分布规律的心理机制;最后。对以前指代词研究的贡献和有待解决的问题进行了评述,并指出了几个可行的研究方法。     

Perspective taking in referring to objects behind versus in front of an observer: Frames of reference,intraindividual consistency,and response latencies

Speakers of English and German typically adopt the reflection variant of the relative frame of reference (FoR) in order to describe how nonoriented objects that are located in front of them are related to one another. Little is known, however, about how they proceed in dorsal settings, with objects located in their back. In this article, we explore the turn hypothesis, which assumes a (mental) 180° turn of the observer to face the objects, converting the dorsal into a frontal situation, so that the preferred FoR variant for frontal settings can be applied. To elicit spatial references, we used photographs that showed an observer and two objects either in the observer's visual field (frontal condition) or in the observer's back (dorsal condition). The observer was looking either in the same direction as the referencing individual (aligned perspectives) or in the opposite direction (vis-à-vis perspective). Data from two experiments show that while participants do adopt the observer's perspective, their references in dorsal settings are incompatible with the turn hypothesis. Analyses of response latencies indicate additional cognitive costs for establishing a FoR for the very first item in the dorsal condition as compared to the frontal condition, but fast adaption for subsequent items, and high intraindividual consistency in FoR choice in both conditions. Maintaining the assumption that references in dorsal settings should be compatible with the variant of the relative FoR adopted in frontal settings, participants’ references can be explained by assuming a backward projection that gets by without a (mental) turn of the observer.     

空间知识记忆和提取的理论模型

对物理空间知识记忆和提取规律的探讨一直是空间认知领域研究中的一个重点和热点。对其进行深入研究,不仅有助于了解人类的空间行为,而且为相关的诸如界面设计、虚拟环境等空间认知应用领域（研究）提供支持。该文从空间记忆的内在参照系理论、坐标系统模型、空间情境模型和位置记忆的空间类属模型4个方面对当前有关物理环境中空间知识记忆和提取的理论或模型进行了回顾并作了初步评价。     

Ethical Naturalism and Moral Twin Earth

In order to rebut G. E. Moore’s open question argument, ethical naturalists adopt a theory of direct reference for our moral terms. T. Horgan and M. Timmons have argued that this theory cannot be applied to moral terms, on the ground that it clashes with competent speakers’ linguistic intuitions. While Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment shows that our linguistic intuitions confirm the theory of direct reference, as applied to ‘water’, Horgan and Timmons devise a parallel thought experiment about moral terms, in order to show that this theory runs against our linguistic intuitions about such terms. My claim is that the Horgan–Timmons argument does not work. I concede that their thought experiment is a good way to test the applicability of the theory of direct reference to moral terms, and argue that the upshot of their experiment is not what they claim it is: our linguistic intuitions about Moral Twin Earth are parallel to, not different from, our intuitions about Twin Earth.

GALILEO STILL GOES TO JAIL: CONFLICT MODEL PERSISTENCE WITHIN INTRODUCTORY ANTHROPOLOGY MATERIALS

Historians have long since rejected the dubious assertions of the conflict model, with its narratives of perennial religion versus science combat. Nonetheless, this theory persists in various academic disciplines, and it is still presented to university students as the authoritative historical account of religion–science interactions. Cases of this can be identified within modern anthropology textbooks and reference materials, which often recapitulate claims once made by John W. Draper and Andrew D. White. This article examines 21st‐century introductory anthropology publications, demonstrating how such works perpetuate religion–science myths and the notion that history has been replete with inevitable religion versus science warfare. In particular, this study reveals how such introductory materials propagate discord narratives associated with the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment. Affiliated with these anecdotes are oversimplified accounts of religious responses to heliocentrism and evolutionary theory, as well as claims that science has invariably led to the usurpation of religious belief and secularization from Galileo onwards.     

The philosophical significance of the De Se

Abstract

Inspired by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that, among singular thoughts in general, thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’ – first-personal thoughts, which Lewis aptly called de se – call for special treatment: we need to abandon one of two traditional assumptions on the contents needed to provide rationalizing explanations, their shareability or their absoluteness. Their arguments have been very influential; one might take them as establishing a new ‘effect’ – new philosophical evidence in need of being accounted for. This is questioned by the skeptical arguments in recent work by Cappelen & Dever and Magidor, along lines that a few discrepant voices had already announced earlier. Skeptics content that the evidence does not really call for revising traditional theories of content. I will discuss their challenges – first and foremost, concerning action explanations – aiming to make the case that the ‘De Se effect’ is no illusion: de se attitudes require us to revise one of the two tenets of traditional views.