The relationship between allocentric and egocentric frames of reference and categorical and coordinate spatial information processing

We report two experiments on the relationship between allocentric/egocentric frames of reference and categorical/coordinate spatial relations. Jager and Postma (2003) suggest two theoretical possibilities about their relationship: categorical judgements are better when combined with an allocentric reference frame and coordinate judgements with an egocentric reference frame (interaction hypothesis); allocentric/egocentric and categorical/coordinate form independent dimensions (independence hypothesis). Participants saw stimuli comprising two vertical bars (targets), one above and the other below a horizontal bar. They had to judge whether the targets appeared on the same side (categorical) or at the same distance (coordinate) with respect either to their body-midline (egocentric) or to the centre of the horizontal bar (allocentric). The results from Experiment 1 showed a facilitation in the allocentric and categorical conditions. In line with the independence hypothesis, no interaction effect emerged. To see whether the results were affected by the visual salience of the stimuli, in Experiment 2 the luminance of the horizontal bar was reduced. As a consequence, a significant interaction effect emerged indicating that categorical judgements were more accurate than coordinate ones, and especially so in the allocentric condition. Furthermore, egocentric judgements were as accurate as allocentric ones with a specific improvement when combined with coordinate spatial relations. The data from Experiment 2 showed that the visual salience of stimuli affected the relationship between allocentric/egocentric and categorical/coordinate dimensions. This suggests that the emergence of a selective interaction between the two dimensions may be modulated by the characteristics of the task.     

Effects of stimulus order on discrimination processes in comparative and equality judgements: Data and models

In typical discrimination experiments, participants are presented with a constant standard and a variable comparison stimulus and their task is to judge which of these two stimuli is larger (comparative judgement). In these experiments, discrimination sensitivity depends on the temporal order of these stimuli (Type B effect) and is usually higher when the standard precedes rather than follows the comparison. Here, we outline how two models of stimulus discrimination can account for the Type B effect, namely the weighted difference model (or basic Sensation Weighting model) and the Internal Reference Model. For both models, the predicted psychometric functions for comparative judgements as well as for equality judgements, in which participants indicate whether they perceived the two stimuli to be equal or not equal, are derived and it is shown that the models also predict a Type B effect for equality judgements. In the empirical part, the models' predictions are evaluated. To this end, participants performed a duration discrimination task with comparative judgements and with equality judgements. In line with the models' predictions, a Type B effect was observed for both judgement types. In addition, a time-order error, as indicated by shifts of the psychometric functions, and differences in response times were observed only for the equality judgement. Since both models entail distinct additional predictions, it seems worthwhile for future research to unite the two models into one conceptual framework.     

Are Longshots Only for Losers? A New Look at the Last Race Effect

There is evidence that betting on longshots increases in the last race of a day of horse racing. Previous accounts have assumed that the phenomenon is driven by bettors who have lost money and are trying to recoup their losses. To test this assumption of “reference dependence,” three laboratory experiments simulated a day at the races: In each of several rounds, participants chose either (i) a gamble with a small probability of a large gain and a large probability of a small loss (the “longshot”) or (ii) a gamble with a moderate chance of a small gain or a small loss (the “favorite”). The first two experiments employed a game played for points, while a third experiment included monetary incentives and stimuli drawn from a real day of racing. These experiments provide a clear demonstration of the last race effect in a laboratory setting. However, the results indicate that the effect is largely reference independent: Participants were more likely to choose the longshot in the last round regardless of whether, and how much, they had won or lost in previous rounds. Winning or losing, bettors prefer to “go out with a bang” at the end of a series of gambles. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The motivations for Walter Burley’s theory of the proposition

Walter Burley (born c. 1275; died. c. 1344) claims throughout his career that the mind can make a statement (propositio) out of things. Since things include entities that exist outside of the mind, Burley appears to be claiming that the mind can form a statement out of things that exist outside of it. Most scholars of Burley offer a deflationary reading of this claim, arguing that it confuses two distinct but closely related philosophical issues: the nature of propositional content, on the one hand, and the role of facts in a compelling account of truth, on the other. But I argue that Burley means exactly what he says: that the mind can, quite literally, form statements out of things that exist outside of it. In Burley’s account, statements of this sort function as the propositional contents of our thoughts and written or uttered sentences. This account of propositional content is motivated by three more fundamental theses to which Burley is committed: referentialism, compositionality, and a claim about truth-conditionality I call intellectualism.     

Plural Logic and Sensitivity to Order

Sentences that exhibit sensitivity to order (e.g. John and Mary arrived at school in that order and Mary and John arrived at school in that order) present a challenge for the standard formulation of plural logic. In response, some authors have advocated new versions of plural logic based on fine-grained notions of plural reference, such as serial reference [Hewitt 2012] and articulated reference [Ben-Yami 2013]. The aim of this article is to show that sensitivity to order should be accounted for without altering the standard formulation of plural logic. In particular, sensitivity to order does not call for a fine-grained notion of plural reference. We point out that the phenomenon in question is quite broad and that current proposals are not equipped to deal with the full range of cases in which order plays a role. Then we develop an alternative and unified account, which locates the phenomenon not in the way in which plural terms can refer, but in the meaning of special expressions such as in that order and respectively.