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21.
Gabriel Levy 《Religion》2013,43(4):614-621
Norenzayan's book is an ambitious attempt to integrate recent research from behavioral economics and social psychology, particularly priming studies, into a book about religion. If the account is meant as an explanation of religion or big religion, it does not succeed. If it has more modest aims, namely to describe how surveillance institutions, of which big religion is one important class, can sometimes lead to cooperation and conflict, then it is quite successful in doing so. 相似文献
22.
23.
Brad Weslake 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(4):785-797
If counterfactual dependence is sufficient for causation and if omissions can be causes, then all events have many more causes than common sense tends to recognize. This problem is standardly addressed by appeal to pragmatics. However, Carolina Sartorio [2010] has recently raised what I shall argue is a more interesting problem concerning omissions for counterfactual theories of causation—more interesting because it demands a more subtle pragmatic solution. I discuss the relationship between the idea that causes are proportional to their effects, the idea that causation is contrastive, and the question of the dimensions along which causal explanations should be evaluated with respect to one another. 相似文献
24.
ABSTRACTTwo main scientific approaches have renewed in the last decade the scientific study of religion: the cognitive and the adaptationist. The former is focused on proximate causes, the latter is looking for ultimate causes of religious beliefs and behaviours. Both approaches are useful and promising. However, in both cases, various important aspects and contexts associated with the origin, acquisition, and transmission of religious beliefs have been neglected. The present paper offers an approach that conjoins both models after reviewing several critical issues, to highlight a distinction between cognitive conditions and structures, on one side; and developments or applications, on the other. As a result greater attention needs to be paid to religious functions and their cultural framework to better understand religion and to explain some current processes, like massive secularization in several areas. 相似文献
25.
Adrian Haddock 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(2):157-172
Jennifer Hornsby's account of human action frees us from the temptation to think of the person who acts as ‘doing’ the events that are her actions, and thereby removes much of the allure of ‘agent causation’. But her account is spoiled by the claim that physical actions are ‘tryings’ that cause bodily movements. It would be better to think of physical actions and bodily movements as identical; but Hornsby refuses to do this, seemingly because she thinks that to do so would be to endorse the so–called ‘standard causal story’. But Hornsby misses a possibility here, for we can insist on this identity claim without endorsing the standard story if we embrace an account which parallels the disjunctive account in the philosophy of perception. This will leave us with a picture of physical action that saves the insights of Hornsby's account without succumbing to its distortions. 相似文献
26.
Nick Zangwill 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(3):298-314
I argue that an evaluational conception of love collides with the way we value love. That way allows that love has causes, but not reasons, and it recognizes and celebrates a love that refuses to justify itself. Love has unjustified selectivity, due to its arbitrary causes. That imposes a non-tradability norm. A love for reasons, rational love or evaluational love would be propositional, and it therefore allows that the people we love are tradable commodities. A moralized conception of love is no less committed to treating those we love as tradable commodities; it is just that they are tradable moral commodities. An evaluative criterion of adequacy, I suggest, encourages the opposite view – a non-rational and non-evaluational concept of love. Such a love can set up partial obligations, which may even demand that one sacrifice one's life. Only a love that has causes but not reasons can have the kind of value that we think love has, and thus it would only be rational to pursue and foster such a love. 相似文献
27.
《Sport, Ethics and Philosophy》2013,7(1):19-29
Leon Culbertson's recent contribution, ‘Does Sport Have Intrinsic Value?’ objects to the account of the value of sport as intrinsic value I had developed in my Sport, Rules and Values; in particular, as this occurs in my argument that the value of some sports resided in the possibility of their functioning as a moral laboratory. He identifies two accounts of intrinsic value; and shows that neither would fit my purposes seamlessly. He urges that my account of the place of normative reasons cannot generate intrinsic value: rather, the person whose reasons they are somehow imports that value. Yet he has misunderstood my particularist conception of values; and the place occupied by my contextualism – these, rather than a residual commitment to essentialism, are what generates an apparent inconsistency he identifies. But they also explain it away. As a result, much of his concern to find some exact account of the term ‘intrinsic’ is misplaced: we need to look contextually. Further, the project of my discussion was limited to showing, first, how the moral laboratory idea might explain the value of some sport (on the assumption that sport had intrinsic value); and, second, how failures of realisation of that intrinsic value might be traced to the distinction between motivating reasons and normative ones. 相似文献
28.
Julie Tannenbaum 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2002,5(3):321-337
A central claim in Kantian ethics is that an agent is properly morally motivated just in case she acts from duty alone. Bernard Williams, Michael Stocker, and Justin Oakley claim that certain emotionally infused actions, such as lending a compassionate helping hand, can only be done from compassion and not from duty. I argue that these critics have overlooked a distinction between an action's manner, how an action is done, and its motive, the agent's reason for acting. Through a range of examples I demonstrate how an emotion can determine an action's manner without also serving as the motive. Thus, it is possible for an agent to act compassionately from duty alone. This distinction between the manner and the motive of an action not only restores a central claim in Kantian ethics but it also allows for an expanded role of emotions in moral action. 相似文献
29.
Christopher Hookway 《Metaphilosophy》2003,34(1-2):78-96
This article defends the view that an adequate response to some central epistemological problems requires us to find a role for emotions and other affective states in epistemic evaluation and also to invoke virtuous traits of character in order to explain how these affective evaluations are regulated. The argument is based on the need for some epistemic evaluations to possess a kind of immediacy, if we are not to face a worrying regress. The closing sections support the claim that epistemic evaluation depends upon appropriate character traits though a discussion of what is involved in being observant . 相似文献
30.
CHRISOULA ANDREOU 《Metaphilosophy》2007,38(5):654-668
Abstract: A variety of strategies have been used to oppose the influential Humean thesis that all of an agent's reasons for action are provided by the agent's current wants. Among these strategies is the attempt to show that it is a conceptual truth that reasons for action are non‐relative. I introduce the notion of a basic reason‐giving consideration and show that the non‐relativity thesis can be understood as a corollary of the more fundamental thesis that basic reason‐giving considerations are generalizable. I then consider the relationship between the generalizability thesis and the Humean thesis that all of an agent's reasons for action are provided by the agent's current wants. I argue that, contrary to a common assumption, there is a subtle and clearly motivated version of the Humean thesis that does not deny, and so is not threatened by, the generalizability thesis. 相似文献