Scientific claims can be assessed epistemically in either of two ways: according to scientific standards, or by means of philosophical
arguments such as the no-miracle argument in favor of scientific realism. This paper investigates the basis of this duality
of epistemic assessments. It is claimed that the duality rests on two different notions of epistemic justification that are
well-known from the debate on internalism and externalism in general epistemology: a deontological and an alethic notion.
By discussing the conditions for the scientific acceptability of empirical results, it is argued that intrascientific justification
employs the deontological notion. Philosophical disputes such as those on scientific realism can by contrast be shown to rest
on the alethic notion. The implications of these findings both for the nature of the respective epistemic projects and for
their interrelation are explored. 相似文献
The author adopts a coherentist approach to legal argumentation.Ceteris paribus, the degree of coherence of argumentation depends on answers to such questions as: How many statements belonging to the justification are supported by reasons, that is, not arbitrary?, How profound is the justification, that is, how long are the chains of reasons it contains?, How closely interconnected are the reasons, for example in such a way that the same conclusion follows from various independent reasons?, How relevant are the reasons in the context in question?, etc.A reasonable legal argumentation is a special case of a reasonable moral argumentation. Both contain moral substantive reasons and legal authority reasons. On the other hand, some particularities of legal argumentation must be noticed, as well. Among other things, the lawyers take for granted that legal reasoning is based on valid law and that some sources of law, such as statutes, are binding.There exist various juristic roles and corresponding types of argumentation, e.g., judicial and doctrinal ones. Yet, all kinds of legal argumentation must use weighing and balancing in order to make the law coherent and morally acceptable. Consequently, all general principles and criteria of coherence are applicable to all these types but their weight varies between them. 相似文献
There are distinct but legitimate notions of both personal justification and interpersonal justification. Interpersonal justification is definable in terms of personal justification. A connection is established between good argumentation and interpersonal justification. 相似文献
Freud introduced the concept of psychical reality as a consequence of abandoning the theory of seduction, and although this meant a turning point in his theoretical thinking he never defined the concept concisely and systematically. Thus it is possible to delineate at least two meanings of psychical reality that run through Freud´s writings as well as the writings of contemporary analysts. On the one hand psychical reality encompasses the whole field of subjective experiences. On the other, it is understood more narrowly as a transformation of experiences in the unconscious.
Substituting the idea of different meanings ascribed to Freud´s concept this article proposes to differentiate between levels in the psyche with the main focus on the unconscious level of the dream and of phantasy and the real unconscious. Starting from the most superficial level of subjective reality the text moves to that of fantasy formation illustrated by primarily Freud´s text on `A child is being beaten´. Adding Laplanche´s translational model the article ends up at the deepest level represented by the late Lacan and his concept of the real Unconscious.
The paper concludes that the term real points to something exceeding symbolization and the imaginary—thus escaping comprehension—and yet is absolutely indispensable to the organization of unconscious processes. 相似文献
ABSTRACTMy aim is a philosophical understanding of sacrifice, and especially of the Christian conception of sacrifice. Initially distancing myself a little from the strictly ritual notion of sacrifice, I work with a concept of sacrifice as 1) a voluntary choice (2) to forgo or lose or give away (3) something costly, perhaps supremely costly, (4) as an expressive action, where (5) what is so expressed typically is or includes devotion or loyalty to something exalted. I consider three historical examples of political sacrifices, sacrifices made for a cause, and three literary examples of personal sacrifices, sacrifices made by one person for another. I note that in the Christian context it is very common for sacrifices either political or personal to be taken to be imitations of Jesus’ sacrifice as presented in the New Testament, and ask therefore how we are to understand that. My conclusion is that Jesus’ sacrifice can be seen as involving both a political and a personal aspect—but that in fact, it can only be made as intelligible as may be by understanding it, as the Letter to the Hebrews does, in ritual terms. 相似文献
As some thinkers have sought in the concept of global civil society an ethically driven site of deliberation and even resistance, so others have criticized global civil society for its lack of legitimacy and representativeness. This article attempts to answer these criticisms – at least in part – by invoking a moral commitment to the value of justification. I argue that the idea of justification, when examined, offers us a particular understanding of legitimacy which would be attainable for global civil society actors. The article begins by setting out the case for concern about the legitimacy of global civil society. I then outline a certain understanding of justification, showing how a commitment to this conception provides both a response to critics of global civil society and an ethical baseline for humane actors within global civil society. I move on to trace the significance of the moral relevance of justification for actors' strategies. Lastly, however, I highlight the difficulty of justification in a diverse world. This is to say that the issues of legitimacy and strategy facing global civil society are only made more tractable, not dissolved, by an appeal to the importance of justification. 相似文献
This paper develops a theory of civil disobedience informed by a deliberative conception of democracy. In particular, it explores the justification of illegal, public and political acts of protest in constitutional deliberative democracies. Civil disobedience becomes justifiable when processes of public deliberation fail to respect the principles of a deliberative democracy in the following three ways: when deliberation is insufficiently inclusive; when it is manipulated by powerful participants; and when it is insufficiently informed. As a contribution to ongoing processes of public deliberation, civil disobedience should be carried out in a way that respects the principles of deliberative democracy, which entails a commitment to persuasive, non-violent forms of protest.Civil disobedience is understood in this paper as public, illegal and political protest carried out against state laws or policies. Justification here is understood as a moral or political justification -- where civilly disobedient citizens claim that they are morally or politically entitled to disobey law. It does not imply legal justification.John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972); Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (London: Harvard University Press, 1985). 相似文献
This essay considers some major questions raised by civil and other forms of conscientious disobedience. What distinguishes that form of dissent? Can we recognise the legitimacy of a political system yet defy its laws? Is disobeying a democratic decision especially or entirely unacceptable, or can disobedience be an instrument of democracy? If a regime recognises rights, how should we regard disobedience that appeals to those rights in challenging the regime’s laws? How should reasons for obedience figure in our thinking about justified disobedience? The essay locates the contributions that make up this special issue of Res Publica within these debates about disobedience. It questions whether any general theory of justified disobedience can command agreement: the conditions that give rise to conscientious disobedience -- conflicting values and judgements -- seem to preclude consensus on when its use is justified. 相似文献
This paper examines the question whether foundational epistemology (“FE”) can be replaced by naturalized epistemology (“NE”).
First, it argues that Quine's defense of NE is inadequate since it is only based on arguments showing the impossibility of
the logical empiricist version of FE rather than on arguments for the impossibility of FE as such. Second, it proposes that
a more promising argument for the impossibility of FE can be found in the Münchhausen-trilemma which aims at showing that
ultimate foundations (and, hence, FE) are unattainable. However, Karl-Otto Apel has shown that this trilemma is unconclusive
since it uncritically presupposes the premise that all argumentation is deductive in nature. Apel's argument implies that
FE is possible if and only if it is possible to devise a non-deductive foundation (“NDF”). It is argued, however, that the
possibility of NDF cannot be demonstrated. This leads to a situation called the Multatuli-dilemma: we cannot prove the possibility
of ultimate foundations nor can we prove the impossibility of ultimate foundations. This dilemma shows that the discussion
about the possibility of FE is pointless. Thus, it suggests that it is legitimate to replace FE by NE. Barry Stroud and Henri
Lauener, however, argue that this replacement is not feasible since NE is not capable of refuting scepticism (Stroud) or justifying
methodological rules (Lauener). But these objections are shown to be mistaken: First, epistemological scepticism is practically
impossible and, hence, does not pose a serious threat to NE. Second, NE is capable of justifying methodological norms if and
only if it makes use of so-called internal justifications. Thus, the final conclusion of this paper is that FE can be replaced
by NE.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献