Justified indulgence: self-licensing effects on caloric consumption

Objective: Research on self-licensing, i.e. employing justifications to give into temptation, largely consists of studies examining dichotomous food choices (healthy vs. unhealthy), while evidence for its effects on how much (unhealthy) food is consumed remains scarce. The present studies aimed to demonstrate self-licensing effects on caloric consumption in both lab (Study 1 & 2) and field setting (Study 3).

Design: In all studies, female student samples were recruited. They either received a justification cue (license condition) or not (control condition), after which they could eat freely from unhealthy snacks (Study 1, N?=?85 and Study 2, N?=?95) or choose a snack for direct consumption at a take-out lunch place (Study 3, N?=?110).

Main outcome measures: Caloric value of consumed snacks (Study 1 and 2) and chosen snack (Study 3).

Results: In all studies, caloric consumption was higher in the license condition compared to the control condition: Participants ate more of the provided unhealthy snacks (Study 1 and 2) and chose a snack of higher caloric value (Study 3).

Conclusions: The present research corroborates self-licensing as an important factor in the consumption of unhealthy foods by employing more ecologically valid outcomes.     

The puzzle of transparency and how to solve it

ABSTRACT

According to the transparency approach, achievement of self-knowledge is a two-stage process: first, the subject arrives at the judgment ‘p’; second, the subject proceeds to the judgment ‘I believe that p.’ The puzzle of transparency is to understand why the transition from the first to the second judgment is rationally permissible. After revisiting the debate between Byrne and Boyle on this matter, I present a novel solution according to which the transition is rationally permissible in virtue of a justifying argument that begins from a premise referring to the mental utterance that is emitted in the course of judging ‘p.’     

On Empty Compliments and Deceptive Detours A Neopragmatist Response to Theodore W. Nunez

The philosophical question Nunez raises is whether we can have, as he thinks we need, a theoretical grounding for appeal to the intrinsic value of nature. This article examines the neopragmatist reasons for repudiating metaphysical realism's notions of intrinsicality and subject-independent reality. Following the holism of Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty rather than the epistemological premises of Holmes Rolston and Bernard Lonergan, the author concludes that coping with the ecological crisis does not require conjuring an epistemic crisis. Environmental ethics in neopragmatist hands would seek procedures for bringing about agreement in improving our practices, not our epistemology.     

Turning a blind eye: Meritocracy moderates the impacts of social status on corruption perception

Findings on the effect of social status on corruption perception are mixed. To make sense of the mixed results, three studies were conducted to examine whether meritocracy moderates this effect. In Study 1, we measured all variables using a questionnaire-based correlational design. In the preregistered Study 2, we adopted an experimental design in which we manipulated social status using a false feedback paradigm and measured corruption perception and meritocracy. In Study 3, we manipulated meritocracy using a scrambled sentence task and measured its effect on the relationship between social status and corruption perception. The results consistently demonstrated that meritocracy could moderate the influence of social status on corruption perception. Specifically, social status was negatively associated with corruption perception when meritocracy was weak, whereas the association was not significant when meritocracy was strong. Our results suggest that meritocracy critically affects acknowledgment of the pervasiveness of social injustice and even deters the disadvantaged from fighting against corruption.     

Letters, Notes, & Comments

Includes:
G. Simon Harak, S.J., Commenting on Recent Studies in Aquinas's Virtue Ethic: A Review Essay by Jean Porter
James F. Keenan, S.J., Commenting on Recent Studies in Aquinas's Virtue Ethic: A Review Essay by Jean Porter
The author replies... by Jean Porter, author of Recent Studies in Aquinas's Virtue Ethic: A Review Essay     

THE STRUCTURE OF JUSTIFICATION IN POLITICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

Abstract: In this article the author develops the view, held by some, that political constructivism is best interpreted as a pragmatic enterprise aiming to solve political problems. He argues that this interpretation's structure of justification is best conceived in terms of two separate investigations—one develops a normative solution to a particular political problem by working up into a coherent whole certain moral conceptions of persons and society; and the other is an empirically based analysis of the political problem. The author argues that the empirically based analysis can generate criteria for assessing whether the normative theory successfully works out a solution, thereby developing a functionalist structure of justification. He further argues that this interpretation overcomes a longstanding criticism of constructivism, namely, that the use of substantive moral concepts in the hypothetical choice procedure biases the defense of principles in a particular direction and therefore begs important philosophical questions.     

论价值规范

价值规范既是社会生活意义与秩序的表现形式，又是社会资源控制和利益分配的约束条件。当它从古代习俗走向现代国家意识形态时，它自身不仅成为了公共利益的抽象符号，而且还成为了个体自我认识的知识形式。作为一种社会化的公共实践话语，它日益同国家权力和技术系统相结合，并渗透在系统整合的诸多方面，由此便引出值得思考的问题。     

Grace as Pardon and Power: Pictures of the Christian Life in Luther, Calvin, and Barth

Christians have long understood grace both as a declaration of acceptance and as a power that transforms. This article illumines two theses while investigating the relationship between these understandings of grace in Luther, Calvin, and Barth's development of the law/gospel dialectic and the doctrines of justification and sanctification. First, though each theologian makes use of both understandings of grace, each also tends to emphasize one over the other. The unity and tension within and between these perspectives help to show that while both pictures are of the greatest importance for each other and cannot be separated, they also exist in tension, as long as they are worked out in the lives of sinners. Second, the author claims that the positions of Luther and Barth are more alike than is generally recognized.     

Reasonably Traditional: Self–Contradiction and Self–Reference in Alasdair MacIntyre's Account of Tradition–Based Rationality

Alasdair MacIntyre's account of tradition–based rationality has been the subject of much discussion, as well as the object of some recent charges of inconsistency. The author considers arguments by Jennifer Herdt, Peter Mehl, and John Haldane which attempt to show that MacIntyre's account of rationality is, in some way, inconsistent. It is argued that the various charges of inconsistency brought against MacIntyre by these critics can be understood as variations on two general types of criticism: (1) that MacIntyre's account of tradition–based rationality presents a picture of rationality with inconsistent internal elements, and (2) that MacIntyre, in the act of presenting his picture of rationality, makes the sort of claims to which his own account of rationality denies legitimacy, and thus MacIntyre's account is self–referentially incoherent. In response to criticisms of the first sort, it is argued that MacIntyre can further clarify or develop his position to take the current criticisms into account without altering the fundamental aspects of his picture of rationality. In response to the charge of self–referential incoherence, it is argued that the charge rests on a mistaken understanding of MacIntyre's position and of the nature of justification. In dealing with these arguments, the author hopes to not only vindicate MacIntyre's account of rationality against the charges of some of its recent critics, but also to shed some light on the nature of arguments both for and against relativism and historicism.     

Rethinking Human Rights A Review Essay on Religion, Relativism, and Other Matters

In reviewing five edited collections and one monograph from the 1990s, the article summarizes the present status of the "human rights revolution" that was signaled by the adoption in 1948 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . It goes on to elaborate and evaluate some of the attempts contained in these books to deal with theoretical and practical controversies surrounding the subject of human rights, particularly the discussion of what to make of "cultural relativism" as far as human rights are concerned. Finally, the article summarizes some recent thinking and research on a neglected area, namely compliance with human rights standards protecting "freedom of religion or belief."