Gender stereotype–consistent memories: How system justification motivation distorts the recollection of information related to the self

Research based on system justification theory has shown that women’s self-perceptions may be altered by the motivation to justify the system and its inequalities. Self-perceptions being built on past experiences, the present study aimed to explore how system justification motivation induced through a system dependency manipulation may alter both women’s recall of autobiographical memories and their behavior. Women who were led to feel highly dependent on the social system perceived themselves as more competent and recalled memories of higher competence in the verbal domain compared with the negatively stereotyped scientific domain. Women’s behavioral choices (between doing a verbal or a math exercise) also revealed a higher preference for the gender stereotype–consistent verbal exercise in the high–system dependency condition, as compared with the low–system dependency condition. These results suggest that gender stereotypes may not only satisfy self- or group-serving motivation but also the need to perceive the system in a positive light.     

Knowledge‐lies re‐examined

Sorensen says that my assertion that p is a knowledge‐lie if it is meant to undermine your justification for believing truly that ～p, not to make you believe that p and that, therefore, knowledge‐lies are not intended to deceive. It has been objected that they are meant to deceive because they are intended to make you more confident in a falsehood. In this paper, I propose a novel account according to which an assertion that p is a knowledge‐lie if it is intended not to provide evidence that p but to make you stop trusting all testimonies concerning whether p (in a room full of obvious liars, you will trust no one), which is how they undermine your testimonial knowledge. Because they are not intended to provide evidence that bears on the truth of p, they are not intended to make you more confident in a falsehood; therefore, knowledge‐lies are not intended to deceive. This makes them a problem for the traditional account, which takes the intention to deceive as necessary for lying, and an interesting example of Kant's idea that allowing lies whenever one feels like it would bring it about that statements in general are not believed.     

“Poor is pious”: Distinctiveness threat increases glorification of poverty among the poor

The current study examines whether a threat to group distinctiveness motivates the poor to glorify poverty as an identity management strategy. Research shows that threat to ingroup distinctiveness can motivate people to positively differentiate their group from similar outgroups on relevant dimensions of comparison. Little is known however about whether such processes would occur also with respect to devalued group characteristics that are not reflective of explicit group norms. This question is of high theoretical and practical importance because it can illustrate that people internalize and glorify even adverse traits as means of managing their social identity when faced with threat. We therefore tested whether among a poor community, individuals would glorify poverty when faced with distinctiveness threat. We collected data from Haredim (ultra‐Orthodox Jews), a poor and highly religious population in Israel. Across two experiments, we manipulated distinctiveness threat via inducing similarity between Haredim and seculars in Israel. We found that poverty was reconstrued as positive and desirable following distinctiveness threat, but only among Haredim who have a high commitment to group norms (Study 1) and who strongly justify their own social system (Study 2). Theoretical and applied implications of the findings are discussed.     

What Have Lutherans Learned from Orthodox?

The purpose of this article is to consider the influence of Eastern Orthodox theology and spirituality, particularly soteriology, upon the Lutheran doctrine of salvation. It focuses on the emergence of a new interpretation of Martin Luther’s view of justification as union and Christ’s “real” presence in the believer through the Holy Spirit. This account materially reflects key intuitions of the Eastern Orthodox vision of deification (divinization, theosis) and was developed in Helsinki, Finland, under the tutelage of Tuomo Mannermaa and his school. Even though this new interpretation continues to be contested and debated, particularly in German Luther scholarship, it has also exercised wide influence on international theological discussion. The latter part of the article, more constructive in nature, seeks to link the Helsinki School insights to some other current Lutheran contributions as well as relevant viewpoints from the wider Christian West.     

Norms of criminal conviction

In this paper, I offer three different arguments against the view that knowledge is the epistemic norm governing criminal convictions in the Anglo-American system. The first two show that neither the truth of a juror's verdict nor the juror's belief in the defendant's guilt is necessary for voting to convict in an epistemically permissible way. Both arguments challenge the necessity dimension of the knowledge norm. I then show—by drawing on evidence that is admissible through exclusionary rules—that knowledge is also not sufficient for epistemically proper conviction. A central thesis operative in all of these arguments is that the sort of ideal epistemology underwriting the knowledge norm of conviction should be rejected and replaced with a non-ideal approach. I then defend an alternative, justificationist norm of criminal conviction that not only avoids the problems afflicting the knowledge account, but also takes seriously the important role that narratives play in criminal courts.     

Effects of diversity versus segregation on automatic approach and avoidance behavior towards own and other ethnic groups

We present the results of a study in which we measured automatic intergroup behavior and evaluations in ethnic majority and minority group members. We focus our attention on the level of segregation and diversity of immediate life contexts as indicators of outgroup exposure. Specifically, Dutch ethnic minority and majority students enrolled at ethnically segregated and diverse schools completed a measure of automatic approach and avoidance behavior and reported explicit intergroup attitudes. The research is framed into prevailing theories in the field: Social Identity Theory and System Justification Theory. Results of our study suggest that segregation of minority group members' immediate life context may be an important moderator of evaluations as well as approach and avoidance behavior toward ingroup and outgroup. In particular, minority members in segregated schools showed an approach bias towards their ingroup, whereas minority members in diverse schools showed an approach bias towards the majority outgroup.     

Blaming a Few Bad Apples to Save a Threatened Barrel: The System‐Justifying Function of Conspiracy Theories

This research demonstrates that conspiracy theories—often represented as subversive alternatives to establishment narratives—may bolster, rather than undermine, support for the social status quo when its legitimacy is under threat. A pilot study (N = 98) found a positive relationship between conspiracy belief and satisfaction with the status quo. In Study 1 (N = 120), threatening (vs. affirming) the status quo in British society caused participants to endorse conspiracy theories. In Study 2 (N = 159), exposure to conspiracy theories increased satisfaction with the British social system after this had been experimentally threatened. In Study 3 (N = 109), this effect was mediated by the tendency for participants exposed (vs. not exposed) to conspiracy theories to attribute societal problems relatively more strongly to small groups of people rather than systemic causes. By blaming tragedies, disasters, and social problems on the actions of a malign few, conspiracy theories can divert attention from the inherent limitations of social systems.     

Accounting and convincing: the effect of two types of justification on the decision process

The effect of two types of justification pressure on the decision process was investigated. Three groups of 15 subjects each had to choose the head of a corrective home for criminal adolescents out of six candidates, who were described on 16 attributes. Two groups worked under justification pressure: subjects in the Accounting group were informed that they had to explain their decision afterwards, subjects in the Convincing group that they had to convince the other members of the executive board to vote for their selected candidate. From the third group, no justification was requested. It was found that justification pressure leads to a distinct increase in the amount of utilized information and to a more elaborate choice process, while the global decision heuristics do not seem to change. The two justification groups did not differ in the amount of information utilized, but the Convincing group employed a more elaborate process. This result shows that justification pressure is one of the task characteristics affecting the decision process, and proves that a latent justification pressure as assumed in some decision theories does not have the same effect as an explicit one. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Perceptual consciousness plays no epistemic role

It is often assumed that perceptual experience provides evidence about the external world. But much perception can occur unconsciously, as in cases of masked priming or blindsight. Does unconscious perception provide evidence as well? Many theorists maintain that it cannot, holding that perceptual experience provides evidence in virtue of its conscious character. Against such views, I challenge here both the necessity and, perhaps more controversially, the sufficiency of consciousness for perception to provide evidence about the external world. In addition to motivating and defending the idea that unconscious perception can and does often provide evidence, I observe that whether or not perceptual phenomenology is relevant to the evidentiary status of perception depends on the nature of consciousness. And I argue that a well‐supported theory of consciousness—higher‐order thought theory—invites a striking conclusion: that perceptual phenomenology is not on its own sufficient to provide for evidence of the external world.