现代技术的伦理沉思

善的追求与人存在的完善统一的重大前提是人的真实的存在。由于理性的张扬,伴随人类社会的发展,特别是现代技术的发展,人的真实存在被遗忘、被扭曲。善,因而逐渐地远离人追求的范畴。人被现代技术所奴役,陷入生存困境。要摆脱这种困境,必须实现现代技术的伦理超越。伦理对现代技术的超越,是一个思维方式转变的过程,一个科学态度向哲学态度转变的过程,一个存在方式重新选择的过程。它的实现不在于建立一门新的伦理学体系,而在于唤起被遮蔽、被诱惑、或沉睡了的“意义性追求”或“对最高价值的意识和追求”。     

Bad times are not good times for revolutions: Collective deprivation and the mobilization level of French radical movements (1882–1980)

Contrary to a popular belief, research has generally found no relationship between collective economic deprivation and the rise of radical political movements. On the other hand, various studies show that collective economic deprivation generates societal surges of conservatism. I therefore hypothesize that the absence of a relationship between collective deprivation and radical movements covers up opposite effects of collective deprivation depending on the ideology of radical movements: Reactionary (i.e., conservative radical) movements should mobilize more in times of collective deprivation, whereas revolutionary (i.e., progressive radical) movements should mobilize more in times of collective improvement. This paper tests this hypothesis via a new database measuring the level of mobilization of French radical organizations from 1882 to 1980. Statistical analyses confirm that collective deprivation, operationalized by long‐term economic recession and long‐term growth of inequality, increases the mobilization of reactionary movements and decreases the mobilization of revolutionary movements. These results contradict the view that economic conditions have no role in triggering radical movements and support recent development of system justification theory implying that ideology matters in the explanation of collective action.     

Do higher-class individuals feel more entitled? The role of system-justifying belief

ABSTRACT

Sense of entitlement can be defined as a pervasive sense that one deserves more and is entitled to more than others. Two studies examined the relationship between social class and sense of entitlement and how this relationship is moderated by system-justifying belief (SJB) in China. In Study 1, we conducted a survey among adults (N = 669) with results showing that social class was positively correlated with sense of entitlement for those endorsing SJB, but negatively correlated with sense of entitlement for those opposing SJB. In Study 2, we conducted an experiment among undergraduates (N = 128) with both social class and SJB being primed and the results replicated the pattern: the positive effect of primed higher social class on pay entitlement existed only for those primed with high SJB, and was dampened for those primed with low SJB. Therefore, higher-class individuals do not necessarily feel more entitled, and SJB may play an important role in shaping their sense of entitlement.     

The hedgehog and the Borg: Common morality in bioethics

In this commentary, I critically discuss the respective views of Gert and Beauchamp–Childress on the nature of so-called common morality and its promise for enriching ethical reflection within the field of bioethics. Although I endorse Beauchamp and Childress’ shift from an emphasis on ethical theory as the source of moral norms to an emphasis on common morality, I question whether rouging up common morality to make it look like some sort of ultimate and universal foundation for morality, untouched by the dialectics of time and reflective equilibrium, was an equally good move. As for Gert’s magisterial conception of common morality, I conclude that certain elements of his system are controversial at best and woefully inadequate at worst. He has a tendency to find in common morality what he himself put there, and his highly restricted conception of duties of assistance strikes this reader as ad hoc, inadequately defended, and unworthy of a project whose goal is to lessen the amount of misery in the world.

Positism: The Unexplored Solution to the Epistemic Regress Problem

As we trace a chain of reasoning backward, it must ultimately do one of four things: (i) end in an unjustified belief, (ii) continue infinitely, (iii) form a circle, or (iv) end in an immediately justified basic belief. This article defends positism—the view that, in certain circumstances, type‐(i) chains can justify us in holding their target beliefs. One of the assumptions that generates the epistemic regress problem is: (A) Person S is mediately justified in believing p iff (1) S has a doxastic reason q for p and (2) S is justified in believing q. Assumption (A) presupposes that reasoning is only justification transmitting, not justification generating. The article rejects (A) and argues that, in certain circumstances, reasoning itself is justification generating, even if that from which one is reasoning is not itself justified. It concludes by comparing positism with its infinitist, coherentist, and foundationalist rivals, acknowledging what is right about these other views.     

真实和虚拟金钱奖赏影响风险决策行为*

在风险情境下人类如何决策是长久以来心理学和经济学研究中一个极具挑战性的核心问题。众多研究采用真实或虚拟金钱作为奖赏强化物来探索风险决策行为的过程和机制,但对金钱奖赏真实性如何影响决策了解很少。仿真气球冒险任务(BART：Balloon Analogue Risk Task)可以在实验室条件下有效评估个体在真实社会中的风险行为。本研究采用 BART任务,通过两个实验探讨和比较了真实与虚拟金钱奖赏对风险决策行为的影响。实验一的结果发现,与虚拟金钱奖赏相比,真实金钱奖赏情境下的风险决策更容易受上一次决策结果的影响,上一次决策失败会导致被试的风险偏好水平显著降低(平均吹气球的次数显著减少),同时决策失败(气球吹爆)次数也显著减少,提示真实金钱奖赏下有更强的反馈学习效应。实验二重复了实验一的结果,并进一步发现,虚拟金钱奖赏的幅度对被试的风险决策行为没有影响,而真实金钱奖赏的幅度能显著改变被试的风险决策行为,较大幅度的真实金钱奖赏可以显著降低被试的风险偏好水平,但这种奖赏幅度对风险偏好的调控效应只对感觉寻求水平低的被试有效,感觉寻求水平高的被试不受影响。这些发现表明真实与虚拟金钱奖赏对风险决策行为有不同的影响。我们的结果可以用风险决策的后悔理论或齐当别模型来解释。     

Naturalizing Moral Justification: Rethinking the Method of Moral Epistemology

The companion piece to this article, “Situating Moral Justification,” challenges the idea that moral epistemology's mission is to establish a single, all‐purpose reasoning strategy for moral justification because no reasoning practice can be expected to deliver authoritative moral conclusions in all social contexts. The present article argues that rethinking the mission of moral epistemology requires rethinking its method as well. Philosophers cannot learn which reasoning practices are suitable to use in particular contexts exclusively by exploring logical relations among concepts. Instead, in order to understand which reasoning practices are capable of justifying moral claims in different types of contexts, we need to study empirically the relationships between reasoning practices and the contexts in which they are used. The article proposes that philosophers investigate case studies of real‐world moral disputes in which people lack shared cultural assumptions and/or are unequal in social power. It motivates and explains the proposed case study method and illustrates the philosophical value of this method through a case study.     

How to be Conservative: a Partial Defence of Epistemic Conservatism

Conservatism about perceptual justification tells us that we cannot have perceptual justification to believe p unless we also have justification to believe that perceptual experiences are reliable. There are many ways to maintain this thesis, ways that have not been sufficiently appreciated. Most of these ways lead to at least one of two problems: the first is an over-intellectualization problem, whereas the second concerns the satisfaction of the epistemic basing requirement on justified belief. I argue that there is at least one Conservative view that survives both difficulties, a view which has the further ability to undercut a crucial consideration that has supported Dogmatist views about perceptual justification. The final section explores a tension between Conservatism and the prospect of having a completely general account of propositional justification. Ironically, the problem is that Conservatives seem committed to making the acquisition of propositional justification too easy. My partial defence of Conservatism concludes by suggesting possible solutions to this problem.     

Public reason,non-public reasons,and the accessibility requirement

ABSTRACT

In Liberalism without Perfection, Jonathan Quong develops what is perhaps the most comprehensive defense of the consensus model of public reason – a model which incorporates both a public-reasons-only requirement and an accessibility requirement framed in terms of shared evaluative standards. While the consensus model arguably predominates amongst public reason liberals, it is criticized by convergence theorists who reject both the public-reasons-only requirement and the accessibility requirement. In this paper, I argue that while we have good reason to reject Quong’s call for a public-reasons-only requirement, all public reason liberals should endorse at least some shared evaluative standards and, hence, an accessibility requirement.     

Hume on presentation and philosophy

Most philosophers agree that an argument's presentation is relevant to its philosophical merit. This paper explains why David Hume considered presentation philosophically important. On Hume's epistemology, presentation is closely connected with two principal aims of philosophical arguments: persuasion and epistemic justification. Hume's views imply that presentation is a factor determining an argument's persuasiveness and that, by philosophical standards of justification, presentation is also a factor determining the extent to which an argument's conclusion is justified.