The effect of justified video game violence on aggressive behavior and moderated immersion: An experimental approach

The effect of violent video games on aggressive behavior is an important topic in the field of game research. Recently, growing evidence suggests that justified game violence decreases feelings of guilt caused by in-game immoral behavior. However, little is known about the impact on aggressive behavior, and whether other factors moderate this effect. In a two-factor experiment, we tested the impact of justification of video game violence on aggressive behavior, and whether this effect would be enhanced by game immersion. Pilot experiment 1 (N = 60) and pilot experiment 2 (N = 40) demonstrated that the justification of violence and game immersion was successfully controlled by avatar and graphics quality. In the Main experiment, 123 participants played one of four conditions of a video game (2 [justification: justified vs. unjustified violence] × 2 [immersion: high vs. low immersion]) and it was found that participants who played in the justified violence condition reported greater aggressive behavior than those in the unjustified violence condition. In addition, participants who played in high immersion reported greater aggressive behavior than those in low immersion. However, game immersion did not moderate the effects of justified violence. This unexpected effect is likely due to participants' distancing themselves from and identifying less with their violent avatars.     

Formal aspects of Legal reasoning

This paper discusses the functions of deductive justification in ideal reconstructions of judicial reasoning. It departs from the point of judicial reasoning: explaining and justifying the judicial decision. It argues that deductive validity is not enough for good judicial argument. On the other hand, deductive justification is necessary, not only for easy cases but for hard cases as well. It draws some consequences for the concept of jumps in legal reasoning and for the traditional distinction between internal and external justification.     

知识验证信念对于多文本阅读理解的影响机制:阅读策略的中介效应和主题知识的调节效应

为厘清知识验证信念对于多文本阅读理解的影响机制,本研究构建了有调节的中介模型。采用知识验证信念量表、主题知识问卷和阅读策略量表,对于173名大学生进行调查,并要求其在多文本阅读理解之后进行开放问题回答。结果显示：精致化策略和信息收集策略在知识验证信念对于多文本阅读理解的影响中起部分中介作用;知识验证信念对于精致化策略的预测作用受到主题知识的调节。该结果不但展示了知识验证信念对于多文本阅读理解的间接影响机制,也提示了主题知识的作用在于提供了选择复杂策略的自由。     

Objective and Subjective Socioeconomic Status as Sources of Status-Legitimacy Effect and Legitimation of Income Inequality

System justification theory proposes that people are motivated to perceive the existing social system as fair, legitimate, and desirable. However, status-legitimacy effect, understood as the most disadvantaged living in the most unequal contexts experiencing this need most strongly, has only found mixed support in empirical works. This article presents a comprehensive test of the original reading of status-legitimacy hypothesis which implied that those with lower objective status are the most motivated to system justify and of the respecified version that posits subjective powerlessness to be the driver of undue system legitimization. Multilevel mixed-effects linear regression analysis of International Social Survey Programme modules on social inequality, covering almost 50,000 respondents from 28 countries, shows that the mean effects of both subjective and objective status are in line with predictions of economic rationality. To model contextual inequality, we distinguish between an objective measure, Gini, and perceived amounts of income differences as reported by respondents. The analysis testing contextual moderation lends support for the original reading of status-legitimacy hypothesis—the objectively, rather than subjectively, disadvantaged experience greater motivation to defend the system.     

COMPARATIVE ETHICS, A COMMON MORALITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

This essay is a brief attempt to summarize and evaluate the contributions that Democracy and Tradition makes to the field of comparative ethics. It is argued that the potential impact of these contributions would be strengthened by engagement with the common morality already imbedded in international human rights norms.     

Two Methods of Representing the Distribution of an Attitude in a Group

ABSTRACT

In an experimental vignette study performed with 92 Portuguese women, we analyzed the relations between exposure to hostile sexism (HS) and benevolent sexism (BS) in a workplace context, system justification (SJ), and anxiety, measured after participants were exposed to an HS, a BS, or a neutral communication about the context of the industry they would have worked in, if selected. The results indicated that both HS and BS fostered participants’ anxiety, and that SJ moderated the relation between HS and anxiety. Anxiety was highest among participants low in SJ. Main contributions of the study, limitations, and possible future research directions are discussed.     

Skeptical hypotheses and moral skepticism

Moral skeptics maintain that we do not have moral knowledge. Traditionally they haven't argued via skeptical hypotheses like those provided by perceptual skeptics about the external world, such as Descartes' deceiving demon. But some believe this can be done by appealing to hypotheses like moral nihilism. Moreover, some claim that skeptical hypotheses have special force in the moral case. But I argue that skeptics have failed to specify an adequate skeptical scenario, which reveals a general lesson: such arguments are not a promising avenue for moral skeptics to take. They're ultimately weaker when applied to morality compared to perception.     

How Could Chinese Thinking Modes Integrate into Contemporary Western Epistemology? —A Hybrid Perspective of Both AI and the Confucian Theory of the Rectification of Names

Post-Gettier contemporary epistemology is different from traditional epistemology in the sense that the former is concerned more with the normative dimension of knowledge, while the latter is concerned more with how knowledge is actually formed. Due to the cultural differences concerning how to understand key epistemological terms like “knowledge,” “belief,” and “justification,” the Chinese-speaking philosophical world, analytic thinkers precluded, has long been unable to appreciate the fruits of the post-Gettier epistemology. Two intermediate moves are proposed to take for filling the gap between post-Gettier epistemology and the Chinesespeaking intellectual community: Firstly, the fusion of AI and epistemology is encouraged, hence, such a move would provide a chance to double-check the putative universal applicability of specific conclusions of the post-Gettier epistemology from an engineering perspective; secondly, an algorithmoriented reconstruction of the Confucian theory of the rectification of names is also encouraged to bring new life to some traditional Chinese-based thoughts on the process of epistemic justification.     

Knowledge with and Without Belief

This article argues for the thesis that the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification should be extended to knowledge. A consequence of this thesis is that there is a type of knowledge that requires belief and a type that does not. A familiar example strikingly similar to the sort of example used to introduce the propositional/doxastic justification makes a prima facie case. Additional theoretical advantages are revealed when the distinction is applied within the context of some recent epistemological debates. These include debates over the knowledge account of assertion, testimonial knowledge, self‐deception, and the question of whether knowledge can be essentially based on falsehood. It is contended that the sort of distinction offered here provides a way to settle these debates and, at the same time, acknowledge what is correct in the opposing positions.     

On Peter Klein's Concept of Arbitrariness

According to Peter Klein, foundationalism fails because it allows a vicious form of arbitrariness. The present article critically discusses his concept of arbitrariness. It argues that the condition Klein takes to be necessary and sufficient for an epistemic item to be arbitrary is neither necessary nor sufficient. It also argues that Klein's concept of arbitrariness is not a concept of something that is obviously vicious. Even if Klein succeeds in establishing that foundationalism allows what he regards as arbitrariness, this does not yet mean that he confronts it with a sound objection.