The Sixteen Strivings for God

Abstract. A psychological theory of religious experiences, sensitivity theory, is proposed. Whereas other theories maintain that religious motivation is about a few overarching desires, sensitivity theory provides a multifaceted analysis consistent with the diversity, richness, and individuality of religious experiences. Sixteen basic desires show the psychological foundations of meaningful experience. Each basic desire is embraced by every person, but to different extents. How we prioritize the basic desires expresses our individuality and influences our attraction to various religious images and activities. Each basic desire is associated with a basic goal and a unique joy, such as love, self‐worth, relaxation, or strength. We do not seek to experience joys infinitely; we regulate joys, in accordance with our core values, to sixteen balance points (sensitivities) that vary based on individuality. Religions help persons of faith regulate the sixteen basic joys by providing some images that strengthen joyful experiences and others that weaken them. We can strengthen our experience of self‐ worth, for example, by contemplating God in the image of savior; we can weaken our experience of self‐worth by contemplating original sin. The theory of sixteen basic desires is testable scientifically and suggests such philosophical concepts as value‐based happiness.     

企业核心竞争力与企业伦理品质

企业真正的核心竞争力来自企业伦理品质所产生的道德实力。企业的道德实力是企业遵循与市场经济理性相适应的道德准则,它一贯尊重和尽力满足利益相关人利益,并与利益相关人和谐交往共同发展而产生的道德凝聚力和影响力。与企业经营实力一样,企业道德实力是可以描述和量度的客观状态。具体可以从顾客忠诚度、员工忠诚度、股东忠诚度、融资资信度、同行联系度、供销稳定度、社区融洽度和社会美誉度等八个方面进行考量。     

Stopping points: ‘I’, immunity and the real guarantee

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to bring out exactly what makes first-personal (and more generally indexical and demonstrative) contents special, by showing that they perform a distinctive cognitive function. Namely, they are stopping points of inquiry. First, I articulate this idea and then I use it to clear the ground from a troublesome conflation. That is, the conflation of this particular function all first-person thoughts have with the property of immunity to error through misidentification, which only some I-thoughts enjoy. Afterward, I show the implications of this idea for a theory of first-person content and of immunity to error though misidentification. I then make some comparisons with Pryor’s notion of wh-misidentification and immunity thereof and with Cappelen and Dever’s position on immunity to error through misidentification and show why they are defective.     

Therapists’ perspective on the therapeutic relationship: Examining a tripartite model

The components of a tripartite model of the therapeutic relationship, namely the working alliance, the transference configuration (transference and countertransference), and real relationship, were examined in terms of how they relate to one another and to the outcome of a psychotherapy session, from the therapists’ perspective. Although previous studies have examined these components separately, no study to date has examined the components together in their relation to session outcome. Licensed psychotherapists (n = 249) were recruited from two Divisions of the American Psychological Association. Therapists completed measures for the last session they had with a client. Results revealed that from the therapist’s perspective the real relationship and working alliance related positively to session outcome, and countertransference behavior related negatively to session outcome. The components related to each other mostly as predicted by the tripartite model, and a principal-axis factor analysis revealed the presence of four distinct factors resembling the components theorized to comprise the tripartite model. The components together accounted for 27% of the variance in session outcome and only the real relationship and the working alliance predicted session outcome when all the components were looked at simultaneously in a regression model.     

The marketing of industrial real estate: application of Taguchi loss functions

The marketing of industrial real estate is a resource‐consuming endeavour for all parties involved consisting of many objectives that, in many cases, may be in conflict with one another. One method of minimizing resource requirements, especially time, while increasing the probability of a successful match is to select properties for presentation that maximizes buyer utility. Zionts (1992) indicated one area for future research in multiple criteria decision‐making (MCDM) is in the development of ‘Eclectic Approaches’ using old ideas in a new way to help develop MCDM approaches. In this paper Taguchi loss functions, a procedure commonly used in quality control, is proposed as a tool that can be used by industrial real estate professionals to more efficiently determine the property that most closely matches the buyer's needs. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Motivation-encompassing attitudes

Alfred R. Mele defends a broadly ‘Humean’ theory of motivation. One common dispute between Humeans and anti-Humeans has to do with whether or not a desire is required to motivate action. For the most part Mele avoids this dispute. He claims that there are reasons to think that beliefs cannot motivate action, but finally allows that it might be that it is a contingent fact that beliefs can motivate action in human beings. Instead Mele argues for the claim that certain kinds of desires – namely action-desires – are ‘paradigmatic motivational attitudes’, similar in an essential way to intentions, and that beliefs are not. Hence it is a necessary truth that action-desires encompass motivation to act; if beliefs encompass motivation to act, it is not a necessary truth that they do. In this way Mele preserves some of what is intuitively right about the Humean account, while admitting that the arguments normally offered in support of the standard Humean claims are open to objections. I argue that Mele's account is implausible. His argument against the claim that state-desires are essentially motivation-encompassing attitudes is convincing, but the same argument proves that action-desires are not essentially motivation-encompassing either. If this difference between desires and beliefs cannot be maintained, however, then Mele fails to defend any motivationally relevant difference between beliefs and desires.     

Real relationship,working alliance,transference/countertransference and outcome in time-limited counseling and psychotherapy

Six client/therapist dyads (three therapists each working with two clients) were studied to determine how the real relationship unfolds over the course of time-limited treatment and how this unfolding relates to the development of the client/therapist working alliance, client transference, and therapist countertransference. We also examined how these indices of the relationship fluctuate as a function of treatment outcome. Results indicate that in general for all six dyads, therapists’ and clients’ ratings of the real relationship and working alliance were strong throughout treatment. However, patterns of real relationship and working alliance over the course of treatment varied between dyads categorized as more vs. less successful. Therapists’ countertransference was low, as was client transference, but differences in ratings were evident when the dyads were classified by outcome.     

From the dreams of a generation to the theory of dreams: Freud's Roman dreams

In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud's interpretation of oedipal desires does not occur at the expense of historical and personal desires, which are always there as a backdrop. In the relentless examination of his own dreams that Freud makes in order to show the mechanisms inherent in all oneiric deformation, we are also led to another, specifically historical, aspect of the issue of Jewish emancipation, which he experiences at first hand. By analysing his own dreams, Freud not only shows us the mechanisms governing dream formation, but also develops a pointed critique of his contemporary society and its prejudices.     

Actuality, Necessity, and Logical Truth

The traditional view that all logical truths are metaphysically necessary has come under attack in recent years. The contrary claim is prominent in David Kaplan’s work on demonstratives, and Edward Zalta has argued that logical truths that are not necessary appear in modal languages supplemented only with some device for making reference to the actual world (and thus independently of whether demonstratives like ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’ are present). If this latter claim can be sustained, it strikes close to the heart of the traditional view. I begin this paper by discussing and refuting Zalta’s argument in the context of a language for propositional modal logic with an actuality connective (section 1). This involves showing that his argument in favor of real world validity his preferred explication of logical truth, is fallacious. Next (section 2) I argue for an alternative explication of logical truth called general validity. Since the rule of necessitation preserves general validity, the argument of section 2 provides a reason for affirming the traditional view. Finally (section 3) I show that the intuitive idea behind the discredited notion of real world validity finds legitimate expression in an object language connective for deep necessity. Earlier versions of this paper were read at the universities of Graz, Maribor, and Salzburg, and at a workshop on the philosophy of logic at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) in Mexico City. My thanks to those present at these events for many helpful suggestions. Thanks are also due to an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies.