Secondary self‐deception

According to doxastic accounts of self‐deception, self‐deception that P yields belief that P. For doxastic accounts, the self‐deceiver really believes what he, in self‐deception, professes to believe. I argue that doxastic accounts are contradicted by a phenomenon that often accompanies self‐deception. This phenomenon – which I term ‘secondary deception’ – consists in the self‐deceiver's defending his professed (deceit‐induced) belief to an audience by lying to that audience. I proceed to sketch an alternative, non‐doxastic account of how we should understand self‐deception in terms of the self‐deceiver's misrepresentation of himself as believing that P.     

Hope as an irreducible concept

I argue for a novel answer to the question “What is hope?”. On my view, rather than aiming for a compound account, i.e. analysing hope in terms of desire and belief, we should understand hope as an irreducible concept. After criticizing influential compound accounts of hope, I discuss Segal and Textor's alternative of describing hope as a primitive mental state. While Segal and Textor argue that available developments of the standard definition do not offer sufficient conditions for hope, I question the deep‐seated idea that desire and belief are even necessary conditions for hope. My suggestion is that we should take seriously the fact that we hope in a great variety of ways and should question the search for elements that are common to all cases. A promising alternative follows the Wittgensteinian idea that cases of hope are related in terms of family resemblance, i.e. are multiply realizable on the ontological level while falling under the non‐definable concept of hope.     

When ignorance excuses

An ingenious argument – we may call it the Argument from Excuse – purports to show that the Standard View of Ignorance is false and the New View of Ignorance is true. On the former, ignorance is lack of knowledge; on the latter, ignorance is lack of true belief. I defend the Standard View by arguing that the Argument from Excuse is unsound. I also argue that an implication of my case is that Factual Ignorance Thesis (FIT) is false. According to FIT, whenever an agent A acts from factual ignorance, A is morally blameworthy (culpable) for the act only if A is morally blameworthy (culpable) for the ignorance from which A acts.     

The test taker's fallacy: How students guess answers on multiple‐choice tests

Many students and applicants take multiple‐choice tests to demonstrate their competence and achievement. When they are unsure, they guess the most likely answer to maximize their score. Despite the impact of guessing on test reliability and individual performance, studies have not examined how patterns of answer sequences in multiple‐choice tests affect guessing. This research presents the test taker's fallacy, which refers to an individual's tendency to expect a different answer to appear for the next question given a run of the same answer choices. The test taker's fallacy exhibits negative recency, similar to the gambler's fallacy. However, extending the sequential judgment literature, the test taker's fallacy shows that negative recency arises even when sequences may or may not be randomly generated. In three studies, including a survey and experiments, the test taker's fallacy is robustly observed. The test taker's fallacy is consistent with the operation of the representativeness heuristic. This research explains what and how test takers guess given a streak of answers and extends judgment under uncertainty to the test‐taking context.     

镜像呈现方式对青年人和老年人汉语阅读过程的影响:眼动研究

拼音文字文本阅读研究发现,同青年人相比,老年人在阅读过程中有更多的跳读发生、向前眼跳幅度更长、回视次数更多。基于这些研究结果,研究者提出了老年人阅读的“风险阅读”策略。为探究在中文阅读过程中老年人的加工特点以及与拼音文字阅读的策略异同,实验采用镜像和正常两种方式呈现文本进行了考察。结果发现,在中文阅读过程中,相较于青年人,老年人的跳读率更低,向前眼跳幅度更小,采用的是一种更为谨慎的阅读策略。在镜像呈现的条件下,老年人与青年人之间的跳读率没有显著差异,在正常呈现的条件下,老年人的跳读率显著低于青年,表明在汉语阅读中老年人采取更加谨慎的阅读策略与其副中央凹加工能力下降,以及汉语与拼音文字两种不同书写系统的基本属性有关。     

汉语儿童语素意识对阅读理解的影响:默读流畅性的中介效应

通过对149名小学一年级学生两年的追踪研究,在控制了一般认知能力、语音意识以及所关注变量自回归效应的情况下,探讨默读流畅性在语素意识与阅读理解关系中的作用。结果发现：（1）儿童语素意识、默读流畅性及阅读理解随时间均有显著发展;（2）一年级下学期儿童的默读流畅性在一年级上学期语素意识影响二年级上学期阅读理解过程中的中介作用显著,而二年级上学期的默读流畅性在一年级下学期语素意识影响二年级下学期阅读理解过程中的中介作用不显著。结果表明,在小学低年级阶段,默读流畅性在早期语素意识与之后的阅读理解中发挥跨时间点的中介作用,且该中介效应随儿童认知技能的发展会发生一定的变化。     

Examining how people reason about controversial scientific topics

Improving scientific literacy requires examining both what people believe about scientific issues and why they hold those beliefs. We examined how people justified their agreement with statements regarding evolution, climate change, genetically modified foods, and vaccinations. Participants rated their level of agreement with statements reflecting the scientific consensus on these topics, then responded to open-ended questions asking them to justify their position and to generate challenges to their belief. Responses to individual difference measures allowed us to assess the relationship between participants’ positions on these scientific issues and cognitive style, conspiracy ideation, religious service attendance, and political ideology. Qualitative analyses revealed inconsistent and topic-specific patterns of reasoning. Additionally, greater agreement with scientific conclusions was related to a greater predisposition towards analytical thinking and stronger self-reported political liberalism. These findings provide a next step for better understanding why some individuals reject science and for developing more effective means of improving science acceptance.     

Interactions of reading and semantics along the ventral visual processing stream

Converging evidence supports a distributed-plus-hub view of semantic processing, in which there are distributed modular semantic sub-systems (e.g., for shape, colour, and action) connected to an amodal semantic hub. Furthermore, object semantic processing of colour and shape, and lexical reading and identification, are processed mainly along the ventral stream, while action semantic processing occurs mainly along the dorsal stream. In Experiment 1, participants read a prime word that required imagining either the object or action referent, and then named a lexical word target. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants performed a lexical decision task (LDT) with the same targets as in Experiment 1, in the presence of foils that were legal nonwords (NW; Experiment 2) or pseudohomophones (PH; Experiment 3). Semantic priming was similar in effect size regardless of prime type for naming, but was greater for object primes than action primes for the LDT with PH foils, suggesting a shared-stream advantage when the task demands focus on orthographic lexical processing. These experiments extend the distributed-plus-hub model, and provide a novel paradigm for further research.     

Learning to read in Chinese: Evidence for reciprocal relationships between word reading and oral language skills

This study investigates the longitudinal predictors of the development of Chinese word reading skills and potential bidirectional relationships between Chinese word reading and oral language skills. We examine, in a 2‐year longitudinal study, a wide range of theoretically important predictors (phonological awareness, tone awareness, morphological awareness, visual skills, rapid automatized naming, Pinyin knowledge, and vocabulary knowledge) of reading in 143 primary‐school children living in mainland China. Initial levels of reading were predicted by vocabulary knowledge, phonological awareness, and visual discrimination skills. Only initial reading levels predicted growth in reading. Initial reading also predicted growth in vocabulary knowledge and morphological construction. This pattern demonstrates that the early stages of learning to read in Chinese places demands on semantic (vocabulary) and visual skills in addition to phonological skills. Furthermore, early levels of word reading predict the growth of vocabulary knowledge and morphological awareness suggesting that the development of these oral language skills is facilitated by learning to read.     

Reasoning and normative beliefs: not too sophisticated

Does reasoning to a certain conclusion necessarily involve a normative belief in support of that conclusion? In many recent discussions of the nature of reasoning, such a normative belief condition is rejected. One main objection is that it requires too much conceptual sophistication and thereby excludes certain reasoners, such as small children. I argue that this objection is mistaken. Its advocates overestimate what is necessary for grasping the normative concepts required by the condition, while seriously underestimating the importance of such concepts for our most fundamental agential capacities. Underlying the objection is the observation that normative thoughts do not necessarily cross our minds during reasoning. I show that proponents of the normative belief condition can accommodate this observation by taking the required normative belief to guide the reasoning process and offer a novel account of what such guidance consists in.