Dynamic multi-criteria decision making

Most medium-and long-term decision making in industry and government can be viewed as dynamic multi-criteria decision making (MCDM), in which the decision makers are free to alter the emphasis placed on each objective in the light of developing circumstances. In this paper the problem of time-dependent weights in MCDM is discussed and an analysis of empirical data associated with dynamic decision making is presented.     

Information Processing and Decision-Making in Pathological Worriers and their Potential Role in Mechanisms of Generalized Anxiety Disorder

Systematic information processing and decision-making under uncertainty are key constructs of new conceptions explaining the severity of pathological worry. The current study attempted to analyze their usefulness in subclinical and clinical groups. In the first phase of the study (N = 251) participants were examined with the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ), a GP consultationrelated survey, and a screening survey for generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). In the second phase (N = 220), the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, the PSWQ, and tasks measuring systematic information processing (SIP) versus heuristic reasoning (HR) were applied. In the third phase (N = 60), GAD (n = 30) and healthy control (n = 30) groups were examined with the above methods and the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). In the low risk group, a relationship between mood and the representativeness heuristic (ρ = 0.50), as well as anchoring and adjustment heuristic (anxiety-related stimuli) was found (ρ = −0.53). In the GAD group, significant correlations between the PSWQ score, the IGT loss avoidance score (ρ = 0.40), and total IGT score (ρ = 0.48) were found. The results did not confirm a particular usefulness of the systematic/heuristic information processing construct in subclinical and clinical groups. Theory-consistent results were rather found in the nonclinical groups. Nevertheless, the data revealed some interesting findings supporting potential explanatory power of some theoretical models.     

未意识到错误影响错误后调整的电生理证据

现有研究一致认为意识到错误可引起错误后调整, 但是未意识到错误能否促使个体进行错误后调整尚存争议。本实验采用基于go/no-go范式的错误意识任务考察上述问题, 并根据被试对自己按键反应正误主观报告将no-go错误反应分为意识到错误和未意识到错误。行为结果发现, 意识到错误和未意识到错误后正确率均显著高于正确击中试次(正确go试次)后正确率; 但是, 意识到错误后试次反应时显著快于正确击中后反应时, 未意识到错误后反应时显著慢于正确击中后反应时。该结果表明两类错误均优化了错误后行为表现, 但是意识到错误后被试调整速度加快, 未意识到错误后被试调整速度减慢。进而, 时频分析发现意识到错误相较于未意识到错误诱发显著更强的alpha波能量。并且, 前者在错误意识主观报告前已诱发alpha波, 后者在错误意识主观报告反应后诱发alpha波。该结果表明意识到错误一直处于持续的注意监控中, 而未意识到错误是任务引起的暂时注意控制。因此, 本实验说明错误意识影响错误后调整, 意识到错误可能采用类似主动性控制的策略调节错误后行为, 而未意识到错误可能采用类似反应性控制的策略调节错误后行为。     

Pictures and repeated exposure increase perceived accuracy of news headlines

Fake news, deliberately inaccurate and often biased information that is presented as accurate reporting, is perceived as a serious threat. Recent research on fake news has documented a high general susceptibility to the phenomenon and has focused on investigating potential explanatory factors. The present study examined how features of news headlines affected their perceived accuracy. Across four experiments (total N = 659), we examined the effects of pictures, perceptual clarity, and repeated exposure on the perceived accuracy of news headlines. In all experiments, participants received a set of true and false news headlines and rated their accuracy. The presence of pictures and repeated exposure increased perceived accuracy, whereas manipulations of perceptual clarity did not show the predicted effects. The effects of pictures and repeated exposure were similar for true and false headlines. These results demonstrate that accompanying pictures and repeated exposure can affect evaluations of truth of news headlines.     

The association between risky decision making and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder symptoms: A preregistered assessment of need for cognition as underlying mechanism

Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is related to suboptimal decision making in experimental tasks and to real-life risk-taking behavior (RTB) such as substance abuse and unsafe traffic conduct. In this preregistered study, we tested whether these associations are mediated by need for cognition—the extent to which one tends towards, and enjoys, analytical thought. In a large sample of young adults (N = 463, M_age = 19.7 years), we tested whether need for cognition mediated the association between self-reported ADHD symptoms on the one hand and decision-making strategy complexity on an experimental gambling task and self-reported real-life RTB on the other hand. Preregistered confirmatory analyses indicated first that ADHD symptoms were positively associated with real-life RTB, but the association was not mediated by need for cognition. Second, ADHD symptoms were not related to decision-making strategy complexity, and need for cognition was not a significant mediator. Explorative analyses revealed that (a) need for cognition was associated with higher decision-making accuracy and slower reaction time; (b) need for cognition was related to inattentive but not to hyperactive/impulsive ADHD symptoms; (c) need for cognition was associated with health-related RTB but not interpersonal RTB; and (4) only the association between inattention and health-related RTB was mediated by need for cognition. We conclude that need for cognition is not a mediator in the association between ADHD symptoms and RTB. Additionally, we conclude that neither ADHD symptoms nor need for cognition predict decision-making strategy complexity. Implications for both future research and clinical practice are discussed.     

Decision-makers use social information to update their preferences but choose for others as they do for themselves

People's risky decisions are susceptible to the social context in which they take place. Across three experiments using different paradigms, we investigated the influence of three social factors upon participants' decisions: the recipient of the decision-making outcome (self, other, or joint), the nature of the relationship with the other agent (friend, stranger, or teammate), and the type of information that participants received about others' preferences: none at all, general information about how previous participants had decided, or information about a specific partner's preference. We found that participants' decisions about risk did not differ according to whether the outcome at stake was their own, another agent's, or a joint outcome, nor according to the type of information available. Participants did, however, adjust their preferences for risky options in light of social information.     

The influence of biased exposure to forgone outcomes

After making decisions, we often get feedback concerning forgone outcomes (what would have happened had we chosen differently). Yet, many times, our exposure to such feedback is systematically biased. For example, your friends are more likely to tell you about a party you missed if it was fun than if it was boring. Despite its prevalence, the effects of biased exposure to forgone outcomes on future choice have not been directly studied. In three studies (five experiments) using a simplified learning task, we study the basic influence of biased exposure to forgone outcomes in the extreme case in which decision makers can easily infer the missing information such that the biased exposure carries almost no informational value. The results in all studies suggest that nevertheless, the biased exposure to forgone outcomes affected choice. Exposure to forgone outcomes only when they were better than the obtained outcomes (Only-Better-Forgone) increased selections of the forgone option compared with exposure to forgone outcomes only when they were worse than the obtained outcome (Only-Worse-Forgone). Moreover, relative to an unbiased exposure to all forgone outcomes, the effect of exposure to Only-Worse-Forgone was larger than the effect of exposure to Only-Better-Forgone feedback. However, these effects were not universal: In environments that include rare negative events (“disasters”), biased exposure to forgone outcomes had very little effect. We raise potential explanations and further discuss implications for marketing and risk awareness.     

Adding versus averaging: Evaluability theory applied to job choice decisions

While the unique roles of individual job attributes (e.g., salary and benefits) in job and organizational attraction have received extensive research attention, research examining the mechanisms through which an overall evaluation of a job option is made by combining evaluations of individual attributes is scarce. The current study examined the process through which job choice decisions are made under three conditions: when evaluating a single job offer, when comparing two job offers, and when evaluating more than two job offers. In Study 1, it was found that when a single job offer is evaluated, the average of perceived values of attributes in an offer (e.g., the perceived attractiveness of a salary) drives the choice, whereas the difference between jobs is what matters when two jobs are evaluated simultaneously, potentially leading to a preference reversal between conditions when the same two jobs are evaluated. In Study 2, it was found that average values of attributes across options (e.g., average salary in all job offers received) influence job choice when more than two job offers are evaluated simultaneously. These findings indicate that in all three conditions, job choice decisions are influenced by the evaluability of the choice set, which becomes low when a single job offer is evaluated without any context, or when more than two job offers are evaluated simultaneously, and becomes high when two jobs are compared with each other. When evaluability is low, candidates resort to averaging as the decision rule, whereas adding is used when evaluability is high.     

Providing more or less detailed information in job advertisements—Does it matter?

Job advertising is a common and useful recruitment marketing method that is available to a wide range of candidates and offers a practical way to widen the applicant pool. Frequently, retail advertisements only briefly introduce job requirements, but others provide more detailed information. Existing message studies, however, are inconclusive about the effectiveness of message specificity. A scenario‐based experiment that included 164 participants revealed that the type of decision maker (maximizer or satisficer) moderates the specificity effects in recruitment messages. After receiving a detailed job message, more satisficers stop their search process, but only maximizers perceive the company as more attractive and increase intentions toward the advertised job. A follow‐up qualitative study involving 30 participants provided further insights.     

Cognitive complexity of social images revealed by Jewish Israeli adolescents relating to drawings of Jews and Arabs

The present study examined age‐related differences among Israeli youth regarding the complexity of their mental images of Jews and Arabs, two groups that are adversaries in the Middle East conflict. The participants, 494 Jewish children and adolescents ranging from 8–16 years old each, drew two human figures, one Jewish and one Arab, and then attributed a forename and a profession to each drawn image. Four complexity variables were scored as follows: image complexity (number of items included in the figure), embellishments (number of items added to the drawing and in the space around the figure), image name, and image profession. Overall, participants depicted members of their in‐group as more complex. However, early adolescence was found to be a critical age at which differences emerged. The findings suggest that introducing complexity to social representations in early adolescence may facilitate prevention of negative associations related to outgroups and enhance intervention to reduce stereotypes, prejudice, and racism.