Think of the Children

Often, the deepest disagreements are about starting points, and which considerations are relevant.     

最优化与满意型决策风格孰优孰劣?

最优化决策者追求决策的最优解,满意型决策者寻求决策的满意解.已有研究以理性模型和有限理性模型为基础,提出了两类决策风格的概念并且从两类决策者的决策特征和心理指标这两个角度详细对比了两类决策风格的差异.就纯粹的经济学效益、主观的心理学意义和现实的决策选择这三方面而言,“两类决策风格孰优孰劣”是一个因人而异,因决策目标而异的问题.未来研究可以在清晰界定两类决策风格概念的基础上进一步完善测量工具,从而深入探讨两类决策风格的领域特异性、与正性情绪的关系及其心理悖论的根源.     

RIGHT‐WING POSTMODERNISM AND THE RATIONALITY OF TRADITIONS

Modern thought typically opposes the authority of tradition in the name of universal reason. Postmodernism begins with the insight that the sociohistorical context of tradition and its authority is inevitable, even in modernity. Modernity can no longer take itself for granted when it recognizes itself as a tradition that is opposed to traditions. The left‐wing postmodernist response to this insight (represented, e.g., by Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault) is to conclude that because tradition is inevitable, irrationality is inevitable. The right‐wing postmodernist response (represented, e.g., by Hans‐Georg Gadamer and Alasdair MacIntyre) is to see traditions as the home of diverse forms of rationality. This requires an understanding of the Socratic, self‐critical aspect of intellectual traditions, which include both modern sciences and the great world religions.     

The verdictive organization of desire

Deliberation often begins with the question ‘What do I want to do?’ rather than a question about what one ought to do. This paper takes that question at face value, as a question about which of one’s desires is strongest, which sometimes guides action. The paper aims to explain which properties of a desire make that desire strong, in the sense of ‘strength’ relevant to this deliberative question. The paper argues that one’s judgment about one wants most will sometimes play a verdictive role, partially determining what the agent most wants, and so making itself true.     

SCIENCE AND SERIOUS THEOLOGY: TWO PATHS FOR SCIENCE AND RELIGION'S FUTURE?

Although they take different approaches, both Taede A. Smedes and Kevin Sharpe have challenged the theology-and-science enterprise and raised important questions about theological and scientific assumptions behind this work. Smedes argues that theology should be taken more seriously, and Sharpe believes that theology should be more scientific. A proposed middle way involves engaging in the dialogue itself and exploring the questions and methodological implications that arise in the context of problem-focused interactions.     

Selfless Self-Love

This paper challenges the idea that there is a natural opposition between self-interest and morality. It does by developing an account of self-love according to which we can have self-regarding reasons that (1) differ substantially from the standard conception of self-interest and that (2) share enough crucial features with moral reasons to count as morally respectable.The argument involves three steps. The first step concentrates on the idea of a moral point of view as a means to distinguish between reasons that could be morally respectable and those we have reason to distrust as not morally respectable. The second step discusses Harry Frankfurt's work on love, in order to develop an attitude of selfless love as a source of morally respectable reasons. The third step introduces the idea of an alternative of oneself to show that selfless self-love is a coherent conception of an attitude that provides one with self-regarding and self-grounded reasons that are also morally respectable.     

MORE ABOUT JUDGMENT AND REASON

Abstract: This paper is a response to Siegel 2004 . I take Siegel's remarks as a basis for clarifying, defending, and further developing my account of the role of judgment in a theory of rationality.     

人类非逻辑思维辨析

按照皮亚杰的观点,成人的思维发展已达到“形式运算”的阶段,能够依据形式逻辑规则进行抽象的合乎逻辑的判断和推理。从此以后,根据逻辑的标准判断人类的推理是否是理性的就自然而然被接受了。然而最近的一些研究发现,人类在现实生活中并不完全遵照形式逻辑的规则来思维,在许多时候都表现出非逻辑的一面,似乎有另一种大家公认的“心理逻辑”。但是,非逻辑并不意味着非理性,从生态学的角度说,很多时候心理逻辑具有理性的一面。     

Dangerous liaisons

In this paper I take side on externalist incompatibilism. However, I intend to radicalize the position. First, based on my criticism of Burge's anaphoric proposal, I argue that there is no reasoning‐transparency: the reasoner is blind to the reasoning he is performing. Second, assuming a global form of content‐externalism, I argue that “in the head” are only logical and formal abilities. That is what I call “bite the bullet and swallow it too.”     

Do people make decisions under risk based on ignorance? An empirical test of the priority heuristic against cumulative prospect theory

Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig [Brandstätter, E., Gigerenzer, G., & Hertwig, R. (2006). The Priority Heuristic: Making choices without trade-offs. Psychological Review, 113(2), 409–432] put forward the priority heuristic (PH) as a fast and frugal heuristic for decisions under risk. According to the PH, individuals do not make trade-offs between gains and probabilities, as proposed by expected utility models such as cumulative prospect theory (CPT), but use information in a non-compensatory manner and ignore information. We conducted three studies to test the PH empirically by analyzing individual choice patterns, decision times and information search parameters in diagnostic decision tasks. Results on all three dependent variables conflict with the predictions of the PH and can be better explained by the CPT. The predictive accuracy of the PH was high for decision tasks in which the predictions align with the predictions of the CPT but very low for decision tasks in which this was not the case. The findings indicate that earlier results supporting the PH might have been caused by the selection of decision tasks that were not diagnostic for the PH as compared to CPT.