Peer Disagreement and Two Principles of Rational Belief

This paper presents a new solution to the problem of peer disagreement that distinguishes two principles of rational belief, here called probability and autonomy. When we discover that we disagree with peers, there is one sense in which we rationally ought to suspend belief, and another in which we rationally ought to retain our original belief. In the first sense, we aim to believe what is most probably true according to our total evidence, including testimony from peers and authorities. In the second, we aim to base our beliefs only on objective evidence and argumentation, even if that lowers the probability of their being true. The first principle of rational belief tends to serve the short-term epistemic interests of individuals, while the second tends to serve the long-term epistemic interests of both individuals and groups. The best way to reconcile these principles in cases of peer disagreement is to associate them with two corresponding species of belief, here called perception and opinion.     

Is science like a crossword puzzle? Foundherentist conceptions of scientific warrant

This paper argues that the crossword puzzle analogy is great for scientific rationality, but not scientific warrant. It provides a critical analysis of foundherentist conceptions of scientific warrant, especially that of Susan Haack, and closely related positions, such as non-doxastic coherentism. Foundherentism takes the middle ground between foundationalism and coherentism. The main idea is that warrant, including that of scientific theories, is like warrant of crossword entries: the degree to which a theory is warranted depends on one’s observations, the extent to which it coheres with one’s other scientific theories and whether one’s evidence includes a sufficiently large portion of the relevant evidence. I identify three problems for a foundherentist conception of scientific warrant, two of which are also problems for the image of science as a crossword puzzle. First, Haack’s conceptions of personal and social warrant of scientific theories are incompatible. Second, the notion of warrant defeaters is crucial to any account of warrant, but foundherentism cannot accommodate certain warrant defeaters. Third, Haack’s treatment of inconsistent evidence renders her account of social warrant for scientific theories implausible. Finally, I suggest that switching from the objective notion of warrant to the subjective notion of rationality might save foundherentism about scientific theories and the image of science as a crossword puzzle. I also draw lessons for social epistemology generally by applying the distinction between warrant and rationality to non-doxastic coherentism and Paul Faulkner’s hybrid theory of testimonial warrant.     

Kant's Neoplatonism: Kant and Plato on Mathematical and Philosophical Method

Both Plato and Kant devote much attention and care to deliberating about their method of philosophizing. And, interestingly, both seek to expand and explain their view of philosophical method by one selfsame strategy: explaining the contrast between rational procedure in mathematics and in philosophy. Plato and Kant agree on a fundamental point of philosophical method that is at odds with the mathematico‐demonstrative methodology of philosophy found in Spinoza and present in Christian Wolff. Both reject the axiomatic approach with its insistence on fundamental truths postulated from the outset. Both alike insist that philosophizing—unlike mathematics—is an exercise in theorizing where the questions of basicness and foundations come into view only after the inquiry has gone on for a long, long time—and certainly not at its start.     

Think of the Children

Often, the deepest disagreements are about starting points, and which considerations are relevant.     

最优化与满意型决策风格孰优孰劣?

最优化决策者追求决策的最优解,满意型决策者寻求决策的满意解.已有研究以理性模型和有限理性模型为基础,提出了两类决策风格的概念并且从两类决策者的决策特征和心理指标这两个角度详细对比了两类决策风格的差异.就纯粹的经济学效益、主观的心理学意义和现实的决策选择这三方面而言,“两类决策风格孰优孰劣”是一个因人而异,因决策目标而异的问题.未来研究可以在清晰界定两类决策风格概念的基础上进一步完善测量工具,从而深入探讨两类决策风格的领域特异性、与正性情绪的关系及其心理悖论的根源.     

RIGHT‐WING POSTMODERNISM AND THE RATIONALITY OF TRADITIONS

Modern thought typically opposes the authority of tradition in the name of universal reason. Postmodernism begins with the insight that the sociohistorical context of tradition and its authority is inevitable, even in modernity. Modernity can no longer take itself for granted when it recognizes itself as a tradition that is opposed to traditions. The left‐wing postmodernist response to this insight (represented, e.g., by Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault) is to conclude that because tradition is inevitable, irrationality is inevitable. The right‐wing postmodernist response (represented, e.g., by Hans‐Georg Gadamer and Alasdair MacIntyre) is to see traditions as the home of diverse forms of rationality. This requires an understanding of the Socratic, self‐critical aspect of intellectual traditions, which include both modern sciences and the great world religions.     

The verdictive organization of desire

Deliberation often begins with the question ‘What do I want to do?’ rather than a question about what one ought to do. This paper takes that question at face value, as a question about which of one’s desires is strongest, which sometimes guides action. The paper aims to explain which properties of a desire make that desire strong, in the sense of ‘strength’ relevant to this deliberative question. The paper argues that one’s judgment about one wants most will sometimes play a verdictive role, partially determining what the agent most wants, and so making itself true.     

SCIENCE AND SERIOUS THEOLOGY: TWO PATHS FOR SCIENCE AND RELIGION'S FUTURE?

Although they take different approaches, both Taede A. Smedes and Kevin Sharpe have challenged the theology-and-science enterprise and raised important questions about theological and scientific assumptions behind this work. Smedes argues that theology should be taken more seriously, and Sharpe believes that theology should be more scientific. A proposed middle way involves engaging in the dialogue itself and exploring the questions and methodological implications that arise in the context of problem-focused interactions.