Philosophy of education in South Africa: A Re-vision"

In this article an attempt is made to provide a re-vision of philosophy of education that will redress the legacy of the past in South Africa, and contribute to laying the foundations of a critical civil society with a culture of tolerance, public debate and accommodation of differences and competing interests. This re-vision of philosophy of education, which finds its roots in developments in philosophy in the twentieth century, and especially in the discourse of postmodernism, directs attention to a pluralistic problem-centred approach to philosophy of education.     

Normativity and Interpersonal Reasons

What is one who takes normativity seriously to do if normativity can neither be discovered lurking out there in the world independently of us nor can it be sufficiently grasped from a merely explanatory perspective? One option is to accept that the normative challenge cannot be met and to retreat to some form of moral skepticism. Another possibility has recently been proposed by Christine Korsgaard in The Sources of Normativity where she aims to develop an account of normativity which is grounded in autonomy. Furthermore, she argues that on her account reasons are "essentially public" and that this captures how it is that we can obligate one another. In this paper I argue that there is a serious tension between her account of normativity and the publicity of reasons-namely, that if reasons are essentially public, then it is not possible for individuals to legislate laws for themselves. However, I then argue that if we revise her conception of normativity such that it is understood to involve collective rather than individual legislation that it may then be possible to account for interpersonal reasons.     

WHAT EPISTEMIC VALUES SHOULD WE RECLAIM FOR RELIGION AND SCIENCE? A RESPONSE TO J. WESLEY ROBBINS

Abstract. Postmodernism in science rejects and deconstructs the cultural dominance of especially the natural sciences in our time. Although it presents the debate between religion and science with a promising epistemological holism, it also seriously challenges attempts to develop a meaningful relationship between science and religion. A neopragmatist perspective on religion and science is part of this important challenge and eminently reveals the problems and reduction that arise when pragmatist criteria alone are used to construct a holism that renounces any demarcation between different areas of rationality. In this pragmatist vision for a holist culture, the cognitive resources of rationality are bypassed in such a way that a meaningful interaction between theology and science becomes impossible.     

自我损耗降低决策理性:心理机制与边界条件

处于自我损耗状态时, 个体在意愿上偏好即时利益和目标, 并且会做出许多非理性决策行为。在梳理自我损耗对行为决策的影响基础上, 指出自我损耗降低决策理性的注意机制和执行机制:一方面, 损耗使个体注意力更容易为即时利益所捕获, 进而重视短期利益而忽视长远利益, 即降低个体关注未来的能力; 另一方面, 损耗导致个体缺少计划性和行为实施的执行力, 即降低个体坚守未来的能力。此外, 损耗对决策理性的影响存在个体和情境两个方面的重要边界。未来可结合眼动技术验证损耗降低决策理性的注意机制, 进一步探究潜在边界条件以及寻找助推理性决策的方法。     

Pettit on Consequentialism and Universalizability

Philip Pettit has argued that universalizability entails consequentialism. I criticise the argument for relying on a question-begging reading of the impartiality of universalization. A revised form of the argument can be constructed by relying on preference-satisfaction rationality, rather than on impartiality. But this revised argument succumbs to an ambiguity in the notion of a preference (or desire). I compare the revised argument to an earlier argument of Pettit’s for consequentialism that appealed to the theoretical virtue of simplicity, and I raise questions about the force of appeal to notions like simplicity and rationality in moral argument.     

Cultural Diversity and Patients with Reduced Capacity: The Use of Ethics Consultation to Advocate for Mentally Handicapped Persons in Living Organ Donation

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics - Living organ donation will soon become the source of the majority of organs donations for transplant. Should mentally handicapped people be allowed to donate,...     

决策渐进调整过程的个案研究

许多以全面理性为基础的决策理论都倾向于把决策者对事物的认识作为决策的前提,认为一项好的决策只有在充分认识了事物的情况下才是可能的.许多心理学的研究发现,这种假设并不符合实际的情况.本研究以"行动理性"为出发点,运用个案分析技术,深入剖析了某电子原件厂历时半年的生产经营决策过程,揭示了决策在执行的过程中逐步调整和发展的特征.研究发现,作为决策的前提的认识,实际上是在该决策的执行过程中不断发展和完善的.决策者是在决策执行结果的评价基础之上,逐步深入地认识决策的关键问题,包括(1)决策所要解决的问题,(2)决策方案会产生什么样的结果,(3)决策执行方法是否适当,(4)决策应采取什么样的程序和方法,(5)决策的形势和条件如何.正是这些"后见",使决策者能够逐步调整决策,实现决策的"渐进发展".这种行动决策的思想,把决策者的认识、决策和决策执行三者的关系看做一种循环发展的过程.     

The same but different: an empirical investigation of the reducibility principle

According to classical utility theory the valuation of any lottery should depend only on its outcomes and their respective probabilities, and should not be affected by the nature, complexity and structure of the chance mechanism. Previous research has documented systematic violations of this principle. For example, most subjects prefer lotteries in which the payoffs are contingent on the joint occurrence of multiple (high probability) events to simple lotteries, and lotteries in which the earlier stages offer higher probabilities than the later stages. We review the various violations of this principle and suggest a classification into two major types associated with misunderstanding of chance mechanisms and attitude towards the chance mechanism and process. In the present study 40 subjects were presented with 30 pairs of binary gambles. In any given pair the lotteries had identical outcomes and equal ‘reduced’ probabilities (and thus equal expected values). However, the chance mechanisms varied along a variety of factors such as the size of the sample space, the number of stages, temporal ordering, order of probabilities, their transparency and time constraints. Half the subjects saw lotteries involving gains and the other half considered only losses. After choosing one lottery in each pair, the subjects were asked to explain and justify their choices. The findings revealed systematic violations of the reducibility principle: subjects displayed a preference for lotteries with larger sample spaces, and for lotteries that allow quicker resolutions in the earlier stages. A clear distinction between some patterns of preferences in the gains and loss domains was revealed. In gambles involving gains subjects preferred to have the highest probability on the first stage (and the lowest probability on the last stage), but displayed the opposite preferences for losses. A content analysis of the subjects' stated reasons for their choices identified eight major categories. The most frequently invoked were hope, fun, simplicity, stress and time. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Ethics of NIMBY Conflicts

NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) refers to an oppositional attitude from local residents against some risk generating facility that they have been chosen to host either by government or industry. The attitude is claimed to be characteristic of someone who is positive to a facility but who wants someone else to be its host. Since siting cannot be provided if everyone has this attitude, society ends up in a worse situation. The attitude is claimed to be egoistic and irrational. Here it is argued that the NIMBY critique rests on questionable assumptions about the rightness of weighing total benefit against total cost. This weighing-principle will sometimes have to yield so that the rights of individuals can be acknowledged.