Inexact Knowledge with Introspection

Standard Kripke models are inadequate to model situations of inexact knowledge with introspection, since positive and negative introspection force the relation of epistemic indiscernibility to be transitive and euclidean. Correlatively, Williamson’s margin for error semantics for inexact knowledge invalidates axioms 4 and 5. We present a new semantics for modal logic which is shown to be complete for K45, without constraining the accessibility relation to be transitive or euclidean. The semantics corresponds to a system of modular knowledge, in which iterated modalities and simple modalities are not on a par. We show how the semantics helps to solve Williamson’s luminosity paradox, and argue that it corresponds to an integrated model of perceptual and introspective knowledge that is psychologically more plausible than the one defended by Williamson. We formulate a generalized version of the semantics, called token semantics, in which modalities are iteration-sensitive up to degree n and insensitive beyond n. The multi-agent version of the semantics yields a resource-sensitive logic with implications for the representation of common knowledge in situations of bounded rationality.     

Detecting Design: Fast and Frugal or All Things Considered?

Within the Cognitive Science of Religion, Justin Barrett has proposed that humans possess a hyperactive agency detection device that was selected for in our evolutionary past because ‘over detecting’ (as opposed to ‘under detecting’) the existence of a predator conferred a survival advantage. Within the Intelligent Design debate, William Dembski has proposed the law of small probability, which states that specified events of small probability do not occur by chance. Within the Fine-Tuning debate, John Leslie has asserted a tidiness principle such that, if we can think of a good explanation for some state of affairs, then an explanation is needed for that state of affairs. In this paper I examine similarities between these three proposals and suggest that they can all be explained with reference to the existence of an explanation attribution module in the human mind. The forgoing analysis is considered with reference to a contrast between classical rationality and what Gerd Gigerenzer and others have called ecological rationality.

Freedom and Practical Reason

Practical reasons, roughly, are reasons to have our desires and goals, and to do what might secure these goals. I argue for the view that lack of freedom to do otherwise undermines the truth of judgments of practical reason. Thus, assuming that determinism expunges alternative possibilities, determinism undercuts the truth of such judgments. I propose, in addition, that if practical reason is associated with various values in a specified way, then determinism precludes such values owing to determinism's imperiling practical reason.

犯罪行为决策的理论与研究方法

犯罪行为是犯罪人决策的结果。犯罪行为决策研究旨在通过运用认知心理学的有关原理,说明犯罪行为实施之前的行为决策过程及影响因素,其成果能为国家制定刑事政策与犯罪预防政策等提供理论依据。犯罪行为决策的理论模型主要可分为犯罪理性模型、犯罪期望效用模型和犯罪前景理论模型。犯罪行为决策的研究方法主要采用心理物理法、过程追踪法、访谈法、投射测验法和犯罪统计法等。展望未来,应进一步探讨犯罪行为决策的理性与非理性问题,并加强对犯罪行为决策的验证性研究。     

The Value of Knowledge/Rationality or the Knowledge/Rationality of Value?: Implications for Education

This paper reviews and augments important work in philosophy of education on intrinsic aims for education, of knowledge, of knowledge of values, and of rationality. A contemporary conception of knowledge as ``rationality's `data-base' is proposed and an in-depth section on the intrinsic value of rationality is incorporated.     

Mindsets,rationality and emotion in Multi‐criteria Decision Analysis

This paper discusses the paradigm of multi‐criteria decision analysis (MCDA), and relates it to other disciplines. It concludes that MCDA needs a larger, not smaller, emphasis on values and subjectivity to increase rationality in decision‐making. The paper bases the argument on a conciliation of ethics, philosophy, neuro‐psychology and management paradigms. It observes that the MCDA ‘mindset’ relates to consequentialism, as opposed to virtue ethics and rule based ethics. Virtues and rules play an important role in practical decision‐making, however. Findings in neuro‐psychology show that reliable decision‐making requires emotions. Elicitation of emotions is therefore required in MCDA value trade‐off processes. This leads to a concept of emotional rationality, which defines rationality as a four‐dimensional concept that includes well‐founded values and breaks radically with common notions of rationality. Virtues do not easily lend themselves to value trade‐off, but questions of virtue usually creates strong social emotions, as opposed to the feebler global emotions that may arise in connection conventional trade‐off of end values. The conclusion is that MCDA should not be shy of subjectivity and emotion, but instead put more emphasis on it to increase rationality. A part of this challenge is how to deal with questions of virtue in decision‐making. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

重型肝炎治疗方案的理性选择

针对我国重型肝炎治疗现状,对重型肝炎常用的以及部分有争议的治疗药物和方法进行分析和讨论,就如何选择治疗方案提出医疗原则,认为应采取内科治疗-人工肝-肝移植的综合治疗模式,结合患者的治疗愿望及经济承受力,理性地选择治疗方案,以期达到合理、有效和经济的目的。     

Moral and religious issues in education

Difficulties in liberal secularism are considered in relation to the views of ethnic minorities and in terms of the misleading nature of its supposed neutrality and objectivity. Cultural liberalism is seen in contrast to be committed to the preservation of other cultures and to celebrating diversity. This might avoid relativism and, within the Wisdom Tradition, offer a mutual enrichment and better access to truth. The practice of religious education can be seen as implicating the general behaviour of the teacher and the ethos of the school. A postmodernist pedagogy, involving dialogue with text and teacher, might both respect diversity and recover a sense of mystery. Reassessment of the relationship between knowledge and morality might lead to new practice in moral education, with relevant activities leading beyond the facts towards reflection on values. Moral education might also go beyond the intellect to encourage appropriate emotional dispositions in a communicative ethics. The dominance of certain metaphors in the language of cultural identity and authenticity channels thinking: this needs to be questioned.     

Why Logic Doesn‘t Matter in the (Philosophical) Study of Argumentation

Philosophically, the study of argumentation is important because it holds out the prospect of an interpretation of rationality. For this we need to identify a transcendent perspective on the argumentative interaction. We need a normative theory of argumentation that provides an answer to the question: should the hearer accept the argument of the speaker. In this article I argue that formal logic implies a notion of transcendence that is not suitable for the study of argumentation, because, from a logical point of view, argumentation disappears from sight. We should therefore not expect formal logic to provide an interesting interpretation of the rationality intrinsic in argument and discussion.     

Rational or uncommitted? Depression and indecisiveness in interpersonal decision making

Two studies were run which tested the prediction that clinically depressed persons, known for difficulties in making a decision, would process predecisional information relevant to an interpersonal choice in a more impartial, less biased way than non-depressed persons. Both studies provided confirmation for this hypothesis. In each case, the depressed group focused less on specific alternatives, asked more criterion-based questions, and made decisions on the basis of information which was more evenly distributed over alternatives, thus conforming less to biasing, dominance structuring processes, than non-depressed participants. The depressed and non-depressed participants did not differ, however, in evaluative aspects of their decisions, suggesting a relative independence of affective and informational aspects of predecisional processes. The question arises: are depressed patients less biased and hence more rational when making decisions or are they just indifferent and uncommitted? The data have been discussed with reference to research on effortful versus automatic information processing in depression.