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321.
Charles P. Webel 《World Futures: Journal of General Evolution》2013,69(7):526-557
In this article, I limn the remarkable ascent of Albert Einstein and Wassily Kandinsky into our cultural pantheon. I depict how both figures mastered and transcended their respective fields, and how they called into question long-established disciplinary assumptions and practices. I also demonstrate how the creative works of Einstein and Kandinsky constructed, and were constructed by, the reality we now call “modern.” 相似文献
322.
The aim of this study is to examine both coherence and correspondence criteria for rationality in experts' judgments of risk. We investigated biases in risk estimation for sexually transmitted infections (STIs) predicted by fuzzy‐trace theory, i.e., that specific errors would occur despite experts' knowledge of correct responses. One hundred twenty professionals with specific knowledge of STI risks in adolescents were administered a survey questionnaire to test predictions concerning: knowledge deficits (producing underestimation of risks); gist‐based representation of risk categories (producing overestimation of condom effectiveness); retrieval failure for risk knowledge (producing lower risk estimates); and processing interference in combining risk estimates (producing biases in post‐test diagnosis of infection). Retrieval was manipulated by asking estimation questions that “unpacked” the STI category into infection types or did not specify infection types. Other questions differentiated processing biases from knowledge deficits or retrieval failure by directly providing requisite knowledge. Experts' knowledge of STI transmission and infection risks was verified empirically. Nevertheless, under predictable conditions, they misestimated risk, overestimated the effectiveness of condoms, and also suffered from processing biases. When questions provided better retrieval supports (unpacked format), risk estimates improved. Biases were linked to gist representations, retrieval failures, and processing errors, as opposed to knowledge about STIs. Results support fuzzy‐trace theory's dual‐process assumptions that different types of errors are dissociated from one another, and separate failures of coherence and correspondence among the same sample of experts. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
323.
Mostafa Taqavi 《World Futures: Journal of General Evolution》2020,76(1):1-16
abstractIn this article Pitt’s and Sharif’s models of technology are discussed. These models are based on two different conceptions of technology, which are technology as “instrument” and as “making use of instrument.” Sharif considers technology as a collection of empowering tools, including technoware, humanware, infoware and orgaware. On the other hand, Pitt sees technology as “humanity at work.” Based on his definition, Pitt proposes a model of technology with three components; first-order transformation, second-order transformation, and the assessment of feedback mechanism. In this article this model will be explained and criticized. After that, Sharif’s model is criticized in the light of Pitt’s theory and it will be shown that Pitt’s model provides a better understanding of different aspects of technology. For example, it will be argued how Pitt’s model is efficient in explaining dynamicity, transfer and control of technology along with its soft dimensions, while Sharif’s model is incapable of doing so. In the next part, Pitt’s model is criticized and it is shown that the mechanism of knowledge progress suggested by this model is controversial and Pitt’s framework cannot support the idea of indigenous technology. Furthermore, the ability of Pitt’s model in describing different technological phenomena is called into question, since this model provides a superficial view of the complexity of an assessment of technology’s consequences. Finally, a list is proposed that contains minimal requirements that every model of technology is expected to explain. It is incumbent on technology theoreticians to consider this list. 相似文献
324.
Karl Schafer 《Philosophical explorations》2019,22(2):177-193
Over the last two decades, Kant’s name has become closely associated with the “constitutivist” program within metaethics.1 But is Kant best read as pursuing a constitutivist approach to meta-normative questions? And if so, in what sense?2 In this essay, I argue that we can best answer these questions by considering them in the context of how Kant understands the proper methodology for philosophy in general. The result of this investigation will be that, while Kant can indeed be read as a sort of constitutivist, his constitutivism is ultimately one instance of a more general approach to philosophy, which treats as fundamental our basic, self-conscious rational capacities. Thus, to truly understand why and how Kant is a constitutivist, we need to consider this question within the context of his more fundamental commitment to “capacities-first philosophy”. 相似文献
325.
Carla Bagnoli 《Philosophical explorations》2019,22(2):130-145
Humean constructivists object to Kantian constructivism that by endorsing the constitutivist strategy, which grounds moral obligations in rational agency, this position discounts the impact of contingency in moral life. In response to these charges, I argue that Humeans misrepresent the challenge of contingency and fail to provide adequate resources to cope with it. In its formalist variety, Humean constructivism fails to make sense of an important category of ethical judgments, which claim universal authority. The substantive varieties of Humean constructivism recognize that some ethical judgments aspire to universality, but fail to fully justify such an aspiration. These versions of constructivism represent a setback in regard to the achievements of Kantian constructivism. In conclusion, I briefly resume the advantages of advocating a Kantian conception of rational authority as a response to contingency. 相似文献
326.
Micah Lott 《The Journal of religious ethics》2002,30(3):315-339
Alasdair MacIntyre's account of tradition–based rationality has been the subject of much discussion, as well as the object of some recent charges of inconsistency. The author considers arguments by Jennifer Herdt, Peter Mehl, and John Haldane which attempt to show that MacIntyre's account of rationality is, in some way, inconsistent. It is argued that the various charges of inconsistency brought against MacIntyre by these critics can be understood as variations on two general types of criticism: (1) that MacIntyre's account of tradition–based rationality presents a picture of rationality with inconsistent internal elements, and (2) that MacIntyre, in the act of presenting his picture of rationality, makes the sort of claims to which his own account of rationality denies legitimacy, and thus MacIntyre's account is self–referentially incoherent. In response to criticisms of the first sort, it is argued that MacIntyre can further clarify or develop his position to take the current criticisms into account without altering the fundamental aspects of his picture of rationality. In response to the charge of self–referential incoherence, it is argued that the charge rests on a mistaken understanding of MacIntyre's position and of the nature of justification. In dealing with these arguments, the author hopes to not only vindicate MacIntyre's account of rationality against the charges of some of its recent critics, but also to shed some light on the nature of arguments both for and against relativism and historicism. 相似文献
327.
Norman Lillegard 《The Journal of religious ethics》2002,30(2):251-273
Both Aristotle and Kierkegaard show that virtues result, in part, from training which produces distinctive patterns of salience. The "frame problem" in AI shows that rationality requires salience. Salience is a function of cares and desires (passions) and thus governs choice in much the way Aristotle supposes when he describes choice as deliberative desire. Since rationality requires salience it follows that rationality requires passion. Thus Kierkegaard is no more an irrationalist in ethics than is Aristotle, though he continues to be charged with irrationalism. The compatibility of an Aristotelian reading of Kierkegaard with the "suspension of the ethical" and general problems with aretaic ethical theories are treated briefly. The author argues that it is possible to preserve a realist ethics in the face of the "tradition relativism" which threatens the version of virtue ethics here attributed to Kierkegaard. 相似文献