Young children discriminate improbable from impossible events in fiction

Can young children discriminate impossible events, which cannot happen in reality, from improbable events, which are unfamiliar but could possibly happen in reality? When asked explicitly to categorize these types of events, 4-year-olds (N = 54) tended to report that improbable events were impossible, consistent with prior results (Shtulman & Carey, 2007). But when presented with stories made up of improbable events, children preferred to continue these stories with additional improbable events rather than with impossible events, demonstrating their sensitivity to the difference between the two types of events. Children were indifferent between continuing these stories with additional improbable events or with ordinary, possible events. Children's differential performance on the story and categorization tasks suggests that they possess some knowledge of the distinction between improbable and impossible but find it difficult to express this knowledge without a supportive context.     

大学生工作记忆容量对图形推理影响的眼动研究

采用眼动技术,选取瑞文图形推理测验作为实验材料,探讨工作记忆对于图形推理过程的影响。实验为2(工作记忆容量:高、低)×2(性别:男、女)×3(题目难度:高、中、低)的混合实验设计。以扫视时间、眼跳幅度、注视次数、扫视次数、瞳孔直径为因变量指标。实验结果表明:第一,不同性别大学生进行图形推理过程的眼动模式有一定差异,但这种差异并非由工作记忆差异所导致,而是图形推理策略不同所引起;第二,工作记忆容量高低影响图形推理过程,由于工作记忆影响注意资源分配,从而工作记忆容量高低不同会导致采用不同的策略进行图形推理,不仅影响工作记忆推理过程,也导致推理成绩的差异。这些结果能为学生选择适合自己的学习策略、因材施教以及考试测评提供依据。     

Into the brain: where philosophy should go from here

The maturation of the cognitive neurosciences will throw light on many central philosophical issues. Among them: semantic theory, perception, learning, social and moral knowledge, and practical reasoning and decision making. As contemporary medicine cannot do without the achievements of modern biology, philosophy would be pitiful if it disregarded the achievements of brain research.     

Lakatos’s Challenge? Auxiliary Hypotheses and Non-Monotonous Inference

Summary  Gerhard Schurz [2001, Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 32, 65–107] has proposed to reconstruct auxiliary hypothesis addition, e.g., postulation of Neptune to immunize Newtonian mechanics, with concepts from non-monotonous inference to avoid the retention of false predictions that are among the consequence-set of the deductive model. However, the non-monotonous reconstruction retains the observational premise that is indeed rejected in the deductive model. Hence, his proposal fails to do justice to Lakatos’ core-belt model, therefore fails to meet what Schurz coined “Lakatos’ challenge”. It is argued that Lakatos’s distinction between core and belt of a research program is not mapable onto premise-set and consequence-set and that Schurz’s understanding of a ceteris paribus clause as a transfinite list of (absent) interfering factors is problematic. I propose a simple reading of Lakatos’s use of the term ceteris paribus clause and motivate why the term hypothesis addition, despite not being interpretable literally, came to be entrenched.

It is not that we propose a theory and Nature may shout NO; rather we propose a maze of theories and Nature may shout INCONSISTENT. Lakatos (1978, p. 45)

     

Beyond the Information Given: Causal Models in Learning and Reasoning

ABSTRACT— The philosopher David Hume's conclusion that causal induction is solely based on observed associations still presents a puzzle to psychology. If we only acquired knowledge about statistical covariations between observed events without accessing deeper information about causality, we would be unable to understand the differences between causal and spurious relations, between prediction and diagnosis, and between observational and interventional inferences. All these distinctions require a deep understanding of causality that goes beyond the information given. We report a number of recent studies that demonstrate that people and rats do not stick to the superficial level of event covariations but reason and learn on the basis of deeper causal representations. Causal-model theory provides a unified account of this remarkable competence.     

SAD as a mathematical assistant—how should we go from here to there?

The System for Automated Deduction (SAD) is developed in the framework of the Evidence Algorithm research project and is intended for automated processing of mathematical texts. The SAD system works on three levels of reasoning: (a) the level of text presentation where proofs are written in a formal natural-like language for subsequent verification; (b) the level of foreground reasoning where a particular theorem proving problem is simplified and decomposed; (c) the level of background deduction where exhaustive combinatorial inference search in classical first-order logic is applied to prove end subgoals.

We present an overview of SAD describing the ideas behind the project, the system's design, and the process of problem formalization in the fashion of SAD. We show that the choice of classical first-order logic as the background logic of SAD is not too restrictive. For example, we can handle binders like Σ or lim without resort to second order or to a full-powered set theory. We illustrate our approach with a series of examples, in particular, with the classical problem .     

合理情绪行为疗法在士兵情绪疏导中的应用

合理情绪行为疗法强调认知对人的行为的决定作用,它提供了一种帮助战胜不合理信念、改变不良情绪的有效方式。把合理情绪行为疗法应用于士兵的情绪疏导工作中,对部队的稳定和发展具有积极的现实意义。     

Thought experiments and conceptual revision

The idea that claims about the physical world might be arrived through a priori reasoning has a long history in physics. But it is clear that empiricist notions of the nature of science, and in particular the empirical nature of physics, have held sway in this century. Yet, in the idea of thought experiments in science, we might find the survival of earlier a priori reasoning to the truth of claims about the physical world. This paper challenges the notion that science can be understood as a purely empirical endeavor and points out what reforms would be necessary for teaching the image of science to our young.     

The blaze of her splendors: Suggestions about revitalizing fallacy theory

Criticisms of fallacy theory have been lodged from many different directions. In this paper, I consider the classic criticism of incompleteness by DeMorgan, Finocchiaro's claim that fallacies probably exist only in the mind of the interpreter, McPeck's claim that fallacies are at best context-dependent and Paul's complaints about the teaching of fallacies. I seek not merely to defend fallacy theory against unfair criticisms but also to learn from the criticisms what can be done in order to make fallacy theory a viable theory of criticism. I argue that this will involve several changes: rethinking of the nature of fallacy; addressing some theoretical issues; and presenting fallacy theory in a more rigorous fashion. The paper concludes with reflections on how Quine's ontological advice about the resolution of ontological disputes might be applied to the issue of whether or not there are fallacies.     

Freedom,determinism and circular reasoning

This paper uses a short dialogue between a determinist and a free-will advocate as a basis for exploring some of the elements of circular reasoning which have for centuries kept alive one of the classical debates of philosophy, the freedom-versus-determinism debate. The chronic circularity which infests both sides of the debate arises from a procedural asymmetry in the argument, which in turn is produced by the different metaphysical commitments of the debaters.