Adaptive constructive processes: evidence from priming verbal reasoning with false memories

Previous research has demonstrated that false memories produced by the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm serve adaptive functions both in related memory tasks and in various cognitive processes. The present study investigated whether memory errors induced by associated words could influence performance on verbal reasoning tasks. Participants were asked to solve sentence-based verbal reasoning problems, half of which had been primed by the presentation of word lists where the critical lures were also the solutions to the problems. The results showed that when false memories were generated, problems were solved more often and significantly faster than those that were primed without false memories or those that were unprimed, and that there was no evidence that the effect of priming with false memories observed in experiments was due to testing effects. The findings extend false memory priming effects to verbal reasoning processes, providing evidence with adaptive constructive processes.     

A Study of Volunteer Clients Who Experienced Live Sessions of Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy in Front of a Public Audience

This is a study of the responses of 100 selected subjects who gave their reactions to experiencing a live session of Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) with Albert Ellis in front of a public audience. Ninety-seven of the respondents found their session helpful; only 13 felt uncomfortable discussing their problems in public; 99 of them felt that Dr. Ellis focused on their main problem; 94 of them reported that they somewhat or very much used Dr. Ellis's suggestions; 90 of them felt that the members of the audience suggestions were helpful; and 93 of them said that they would like to work with Dr. Ellis again at a public therapy session. Limitations of this study are discussed.     

How do 8‐month‐old infants recognize causality in object motion and that in human action?1

Abstract: In Experiment 1, 8‐month‐old infants were first habituated to the event in which a moving object collided with another behind an occluder, then they were shown the two test events with no occluder: the contact event, in which the two objects actually collided, and the non‐contact event, in which the second object started to move without contact with the first. The infants looked at both events for an equal amount of time. In Experiment 2, in which the first object was a human actor, however, infants looked at the non‐contact event reliably longer than the contact event. In Experiment 3, in which both objects were human actors stood face‐to‐back, infants looked at the non‐contact event longer, whereas in Experiment 4, in which human actors faced toward each other, infants looked at both events equally. In Experiment 5, in which the first actor told the second to go, 10‐month‐old infants looked at both events for an equal amount of time. These results suggest that 8‐ and 10‐month‐old infants appreciate different causal principles between objects and humans, and that, in doing this, they may acknowledge the possibility of communication between humans.     

东西方儿童对友谊关系中的道德推理发展的跨文化研究

该研究以友谊许诺为主题的两难故事分别对冰岛(雷克雅未克市)和中国(北京市)7～15岁的儿童做个别访谈,比较研究了东西方文化儿童在友谊矛盾冲突情景中是如何做出行动决定选择和道德评价的。研究结果揭示了不同文化及与年龄相联系的社会认知能力对有关发展的影响。     

Replicability and randomization test logic in behavior analysis

Randomization tests are a class of nonparametric statistics that determine the significance of treatment effects. Unlike parametric statistics, randomization tests do not assume a random sample, or make any of the distributional assumptions that often preclude statistical inferences about single‐case data. A feature that randomization tests share with parametric statistics, however, is the derivation of a p‐value. P‐values are notoriously misinterpreted and are partly responsible for the putative “replication crisis.” Behavior analysts might question the utility of adding such a controversial index of statistical significance to their methods, so it is the aim of this paper to describe the randomization test logic and its potentially beneficial consequences. In doing so, this paper will: (1) address the replication crisis as a behavior analyst views it, (2) differentiate the problematic p‐values of parametric statistics from the, arguably, more useful p‐values of randomization tests, and (3) review the logic of randomization tests and their unique fit within the behavior analytic tradition of studying behavioral processes that cut across species.     

A visualization technique for Bayesian reasoning

We tested a method for solving Bayesian reasoning problems in terms of spatial relations as opposed to mathematical equations. Participants completed Bayesian problems in which they were given a prior probability and two conditional probabilities and were asked to report the posterior odds. After a pretraining phase in which participants completed problems with no instruction or external support, participants watched a video describing a visualization technique that used the length of bars to represent the probabilities provided in the problem. Participants then completed more problems with a chance to implement the technique by clicking interactive bars on the computer screen. Performance improved dramatically from the pretraining phase to the interactive‐bar phase. Participants maintained improved performance in transfer phases in which they were required to implement the visualization technique with either pencil‐and‐paper or no external medium. Accuracy levels for participants using the visualization technique were very similar to participants trained to solve the Bayes theorem equation. The results showed no evidence of learning across problems in the pretraining phase or for control participants who did not receive training, so the improved performance of participants using the visualization method could be uniquely attributed to the method itself. A classroom sample demonstrated that these benefits extend to instructional settings. The results show that people can quickly learn to perform Bayesian reasoning without using mathematical equations. We discuss ways that a spatial solution method can enhance classroom instruction on Bayesian inference and help students apply Bayesian reasoning in everyday settings.     

Biased belief in the Bayesian brain: A deeper look at the evidence

A recent critique of hierarchical Bayesian models of delusion argues that, contrary to a key assumption of these models, belief formation in the healthy (i.e., neurotypical) mind is manifestly non-Bayesian. Here we provide a deeper examination of the empirical evidence underlying this critique. We argue that this evidence does not convincingly refute the assumption that belief formation in the neurotypical mind approximates Bayesian inference. Our argument rests on two key points. First, evidence that purports to reveal the most damning violation of Bayesian updating in human belief formation is counterweighted by substantial evidence that indicates such violations are the rare exception—not a common occurrence. Second, the remaining evidence does not demonstrate convincing violations of Bayesian inference in human belief updating; primarily because this evidence derives from study designs that produce results that are not obviously inconsistent with Bayesian principles.     

Luck,Control, and Contrastive Explanation

This paper is aimed to show how the libertarian conception of free choice is mistaken or misleading by focusing on Robert Kane’s attempt to solve the problem of luck, which arguably constitutes the most serious challenge to libertarianism about free will. I will argue that either Kane’s solution to the problem of luck falls into some inconsistency or he must introduce the requirement of contrastive explanation into his account of plural voluntary control. Either way, Kane fails to show how his emphasis on the requirement of plural voluntary control is made consistent with his unswerving commitment to the requirement of the libertarian free will for a metaphysical indeterminism.     

Logic,Pragmatics, and Types of Conditionals

Johnson-Laird and Byrne distinguished ten kinds of conditionals. Their framework was the mental models theory and they attributed different combinations of semantic possibilities to those ten types of conditionals. Based on such combinations, the mental models theory has clear predictions for reasoning tasks, including those kinds of conditionals and involving reasoning schemata such as Modus Ponens, Modus Tollens, the affirming the consequent fallacy, and the denying the antecedent fallacy. My aim in this paper is to show that the predictions of the mental logic theory for those reasoning tasks are exactly the same as those of the mental models theory, and that, therefore, such tasks are not useful to decide which of the two theories is correct.