When will is not the same as should: The role of modals in reasoning with legal conditionals

Naïve reasoners reject logically valid conclusions from conditional rules if they can think of exceptions in which the antecedent is true, but the consequent is not. However, when reasoning with legal conditionals (e.g., “If a person kills another human, then this person should be punished for manslaughter”) people hardly consider exceptions but evaluate conclusions depending on their own sense of justice. We show that participants’ reluctance to consider exceptions in legal reasoning depends on the modal auxiliary used. In two experiments we phrased legal conditionals either with the modal “should” (i.e., “ . . . then this person should be punished”), or with “will” (i.e., “ . . . then this person will be punished”) and presented them as modus ponens or modus tollens inferences. Participants had to decide whether the offender should or will be punished (modus ponens) or whether the offender indeed committed the offence (modus tollens). For modus ponens inferences phrased with “should” we replicate previous findings showing that participants select conclusions on the basis of their own sense of justice (Experiments 1 and 2). Yet, when the legal conditional is phrased with the modal “will” this effect is attenuated (Experiments 1 and 2), and exceptions are considered (Experiment 1). The modal auxiliary did not affect modus tollens inferences.     

Considering too few alternatives: The mental model theory of extensional reasoning

When solving a simple probabilistic problem, people tend to build an incomplete mental representation. We observe this pattern in responses to probabilistic problems over a set of premises using the conjunction, disjunction, and conditional propositional connectives. The mental model theory of extensional reasoning explains this bias towards underestimating the number of possibilities: In reckoning with different interpretations of the premises (logical rules, mental model theoretical, and, specific to conditional premises, conjunction and biconditional interpretation) the mental model theory accounts for the majority of observations. Different interpretations of a premise result in a build-up of mental models that are often incomplete. These mental models are processed using either an extensional strategy relying on proportions amongst models, or a conflict monitoring strategy. The consequence of considering too few possibilities is an erroneous probability estimate akin to that faced by decision makers who fail to generate and consider all alternatives, a characteristic of bounded rationality. We compare our results to the results published by Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Legrenzi, and Caverni [Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 62 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]–88 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. doi:10 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].1037 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]/0033 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]-295X Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].106 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].1 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].62 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]], and we observe lower performance levels than those in the original article.     

Explanation,updating, and accuracy

There is evidence that people update their credences partly on the basis of explanatory considerations. Philosophers have recently argued that to minimise the inaccuracy of their credences, people's updates also ought to be partly based on such considerations. However, there are many ways in which explanatory considerations can factor into updating, not all of which minimise inaccuracy. It is an open question whether in their updating, people take explanatory considerations into account in a way that philosophers would deem recommendable. To address this question, we re-analyse data from an experiment reported in Douven and Schupbach, “The role of explanatory considerations in updating” (Cognition, 2015).     

材料模式与认知负荷对小学生类比学习的影响

探讨学习材料不同模式和学习过程不同的认知负荷对小学生类比推理学习迁移的影响.包括两个分实验.实验1探讨学习材料的不同组织模式对小学生类比推理学习迁移的影响,两组小学生分别学习模式化与非模式化的材料,然后完成迁移程度远近不同的四类测题.结果表明,非模式化条件下完成远迁移题目的成绩显著优于模式化条件下的成绩.实验2探讨小学生在不同认知负荷条件下类比推理学习的迁移效果,两组小学生分别在高认知负荷与低认知负荷情况下学习类比推理的材料,然后完成上述四类测题.结果表明,高认知负荷条件下完成远迁移题目的成绩显著优于低认知负荷条件下的成绩.本实验结果表明,对于小学生类比推理的学习来说,非模式化、高负荷的学习更有利于促进迁移,支持了积极反应理论.     

Mass Response to the Lewinsky Scandal: Motivated Reasoning or BayesianUpdating?

This study attempts to account for the vastly different trajectories taken by mass andelite opinion in the wake of the Lewinsky affair. Data from a panel study, collected before andjust after the scandal broke, suggest that Clinton's prior popularity indelibly colored massresponse to the scandal, thereby constraining citizens' reactions. As would be predicted bytheories of "motivated reasoning," the influence of various considerations (like thecredibility and importance of the allegations) on reactions to the scandal was conditional uponprior affect for the president. Such findings are difficult to accommodate within the more rational"Bayesian updating" perspective. These data shed light on mass response to theLewinsky scandal in particular and citizen reaction to presidential behavior more generally, aswell as on the cognitive mechanisms that facilitate motivated reasoning in candidate evaluation.     

How do investors make predictions? Insights from analogical reasoning research

Previous work on investor decision making has focused almost exclusively on information specific to the company being judged. Consequently, every decision is viewed as a novel event, disconnected from the investor's existing knowledge. In this study, the analogical reasoning literature provides the theoretical support for arguing that investors frequently utilize existing knowledge as a basis for generating predictions about a company's future. The specific proposal is that investors transfer their existing knowledge via two different forms of analogical reasoning. The first, relational reasoning, is based primarily on structural correspondence between a novel company and an existing schema. The second, literal similarity reasoning, is based primarily on surface correspondence of a novel company and a previously encountered company. Our theoretical framework is tested in a study in which experienced investors predict the outcome of a novel company's strategy after reading about the experiences of other companies who implemented a similar strategy. The results are consistent with the occurrence of both relational and literal similarity reasoning, with relational reasoning emerging as the dominant approach to generating investors' predictions. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Political Attitudes and the Processing of Misinformation Corrections

Misinformation often continues to influence people’s memory and inferential reasoning after it has been retracted; this is known as the continued influence effect (CIE). Previous research investigating the role of attitude‐based motivated reasoning in this context has found conflicting results: Some studies have found that worldview can have a strong impact on the magnitude of the CIE, such that retractions are less effective if the misinformation is congruent with a person’s relevant attitudes, in which case the retractions can even backfire. Other studies have failed to find evidence for an effect of attitudes on the processing of misinformation corrections. The present study used political misinformation—specifically fictional scenarios involving misconduct by politicians from left‐wing and right‐wing parties—and tested participants identifying with those political parties. Results showed that in this type of scenario, partisan attitudes have an impact on the processing of retractions, in particular (1) if the misinformation relates to a general assertion rather than just a specific singular event and (2) if the misinformation is congruent with a conservative partisanship.     

移动购物更快吗?决策场景与思维模式的相容性

既有文献对消费者延迟选择影响因素的研究, 主要集中于决策复杂度、决策者特质或情绪, 少有对决策场景进行深入探讨。互联网购物时代, PC端与手机端已成为重要的消费场景。针对手机端是否会加快消费者决策过程的问题目前也存在不一致的结论。本文引入决策双系统理论, 力图解释以往看似冲突的结论。消费者的购买决策模式, 不仅会受到决策任务(产品价格)的影响, 还会受到决策场景(购买终端)影响。当场景与决策任务使消费者启动的思维模式相一致时, 会提升决策流畅度, 降低延迟选择。本文发现, 移动端(PC端)与低(高)价格产品更容易激发相容的经验性(理性)思维, 降低延迟选择倾向。反之, 则会同时启动两种相左的决策思维, 增加延迟选择倾向。本文从场景启动与价格启动视角, 将以往消费者单一的决策思维模式, 拓展到多因素启动的思维模式相容性问题; 同时本文通过探究延迟选择问题, 对价格策略与场景化营销带来启示。     

The effect of decision timing on the willingness to costly reward cooperation and punish noncooperation: Sanctioning the past,the present,or the future

Numerous studies have demonstrated that sanctions can promote cooperation. However, it is important to know not only that sanctions can work but also under what conditions people are actually willing to sanction cooperation positively (i.e., reward) or noncooperation negatively (i.e., punish). In this article, we demonstrate that people use sanctions less often and sanction more mildly when they decide about sanctioning before (instead of after) the occurrence of others' (non)cooperation (Experiments 1 and 2), regardless of whether they decide directly afterwards or after a time delay (Experiment 2). Moreover, we reveal that beforehand (as compared with afterwards) people have not yet formed clear sanctioning preferences (Experiment 3). These findings corroborate our reasoning that the decision environment beforehand induces nonconsequential reasoning and thereby hampers people's willingness to sanction. We discuss the theoretical, methodological, and practical implications of our work.     

How does discourse among like-minded individuals affect their thinking about a complex issue?

Is there reason to be concerned about what has been seen as an increasing trend for discourse on complex issues to be confined to an “echo chamber” of like-minded individuals? To investigate how thinking regarding an issue changes in form following concentrated discourse with like-minded peers, we undertook a qualitative examination of changes in the reasoning that 34 older adults used to justify their positions prior to and following such discourse. They showed a divergence of patterns. A minority abandoned mention of previously expressed ideas at odds with their own positions or otherwise narrowed the reasoning used to justify their positions. Consistent with findings from previous studies, only a minority showed increased certainty and/or extremity (polarisation) on quantitative scales. Countering this minority were a larger proportion whose thinking appeared to benefit from such engagement in several respects that we describe. A follow-up study compares results for a sample of young adults.