我国古代智能观的现代诠释

本文根据“现代诠释”的方法论要求,把我国古代的智能观划分为五个方面,即智能先天基础论、智能后天发展论、智能天人结合论、智能相对独立论、智力与非智力因素相互制约论。并对之进行了系统的分析。     

高中生认知方式特点及其与学绩关系的研究

采用认知方式图形测验,对94名普通高中生进行实验研究,探讨了当前普通高中生认知方式特点及其与学绩的关系。结果表明：随着年级的增高,高中生的场独立性增强。高中生的认知方式场依存性、场独立性与学习成绩的相关不显著。在初中毕业刚进入高中,学生的认知方式存在显著的性别差异,但随着年级增长、个体成熟,这种差异逐渐缩小。文理分科对高中生的认知方式发展没有明显的影响。     

Women are not less field independent than men—the role of stereotype threat

Prior research has shown that females are less field independent (FI) than males. However, when gender identity is salient, performance on tests assessing constructs similar to FI may be hindered, because of stereotype threat. This study examined the impact of stereotype threat on gender differences in FI. We expected that (a) reporting one's own gender prior to FI testing and (b) having an opposite‐gender experimenter would activate stereotype threat, and in turn result in lower performance on a test of FI among females. Overall, 170 participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions in a between‐participants design varying the participant's gender, experimenter's gender and timing of the gender question (before vs. after test). Results showed that reporting one's gender before the FI test led to lower FI performance among females. Furthermore, females achieved higher FI when experimenters were females and gender questions were administered after the FI test.     

Dummett and Frege on sense and Selbständigkeit

As part of his attack on Frege’s ‘myth’ that senses reside in the third realm, Dummett alleges that Frege’s view that all objects are selbständig (‘self-subsistent’, ‘independent’) is an underlying mistake, since some objects depend upon others. Whatever the merits of Dummett’s other arguments against Frege’s conception of sense, this objection fails. First, Frege’s view that senses are third-realm entities is not traceable to his view that all objects are selbständig. Second, while Frege recognizes that there are objects that are dependent upon other objects, he does not take this to compromise the Selbständigkeit of any objects. Thus, Frege’s doctrine that objects are selbständig does not make the claim of absolute independence that Dummett appears to have taken it to make. Nevertheless, in order to make a good case against Frege based on the dependency of senses, Dummett need only establish his claim that senses depend upon expressions: appeal to an absolute conception of independence is unnecessary. However, Dummett’s arguments for the dependency of senses upon expressions are unsuccessful and they show that Dummett’s conception of what it is to be an expression also differs significantly from Frege’s.     

The best teacher is like a famous mage everyone knows – Just not any of your favorites

This essay draws out the useful parallels between the best kind of teacher and the Good Witch of the North, Glinda, from The Wizard of Oz. Unappealing to many viewers or readers of the classic children's story, Glinda offers an inspiring reminder of four important pedagogical points: (1) the master teacher always treats her student as a peer; (2) the master teacher acknowledges and encourages her student's abilities but lets her learn how to exercise them on her own; (3) the master teacher is often not equivalent or even similar to anyone the student has encountered before; and (4) the master teacher is not a surrogate parent but a more distant figure.     

使用题组反应模型缓解局部题目依赖性对多阶段测验的危害

尽管多阶段测验(MST)在保持自适应测验优点的同时允许测验编制者按照一定的约束条件去建构每一个模块和题板,但建构测验时若因忽视某些潜在的因素而导致题目之间出现局部题目依赖性(LID)时,也会对MST测验结果带来一定的危害。为探究"LID对MST的危害"这一问题,本研究首先介绍了MST和LID等相关概念;然后通过模拟研究比较探讨该问题,结果表明LID的存在会影响被试能力估计的精度但仍为估计偏差较小,且该危害不限于某一特定的路由规则;之后为消除该危害,使用了题组反应模型作为MST施测过程中的分析模型,结果表明尽管该方法能够消除部分危害但效果有限。这一方面表明LID对MST中被试能力估计精度所带来的危害确实值得关注,另一方面也表明在今后关于如何消除MST中由LID造成危害的方法仍值得进一步探究的。     

儿童绘图作业内隐学习智力独立性研究

实验采用中性参数程序和绘图作业,让正常智力、轻度智力落后、中度智力落后3组8～12岁右利手儿童接受符合、不符合或与“起始-旋转法则”无关的绘图练习,考察练习对原初行为方式的影响。结果发现,违反“起始-旋转法则”的练习使智力落后组被试的绘图行为发生了明显改变,证明内隐学习具有智力独立性;“意识污染”对内隐学习结果的影响可能是复杂的而非单向的;中性参数实验程序能够更好地隐蔽规则学习的实验目的,但不能有效消除意识污染的影响。     

Utility independence of multiattribute utility theory is equivalent to standard sequence invariance of conjoint measurement

Utility independence is a central condition in multiattribute utility theory, where attributes of outcomes are aggregated in the context of risk. The aggregation of attributes in the absence of risk is studied in conjoint measurement. In conjoint measurement, standard sequences have been widely used to empirically measure and test utility functions, and to theoretically analyze them. This paper shows that utility independence and standard sequences are closely related: utility independence is equivalent to a standard sequence invariance condition when applied to risk. This simple relation between two widely used conditions in adjacent fields of research is surprising and useful. It facilitates the testing of utility independence because standard sequences are flexible and can avoid cancelation biases that affect direct tests of utility independence. Extensions of our results to nonexpected utility models can now be provided easily. We discuss applications to the measurement of quality-adjusted life-years (QALY) in the health domain.     

TOUCH,SOUND, AND THINGS WITHOUT THE MIND

Abstract: Two notable thought experiments are discussed in this article: Reid's thought experiment about whether a being supplied with tactile sensations alone could acquire the conception of extension and Strawson's thought experiment about whether a being supplied with auditory sensations alone could acquire the conception of mind‐independent objects. The experiments are considered alongside Campbell's argument that only on the so‐called relational view of experience is it possible for experiences to make available to their subjects the concept of mind‐independent objects. I consider how the three issues ought to be construed as raising questions about woulds, coulds, or shoulds—and argue that only on the normative construal of them are they resolvable as intended by the a priori methods of the philosophers who pose them.     

Hintikka’s Logical Revolution

Hintikka thinks that second-order logic is not pure logic, and because of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, he suggests that we should liberate ourselves from the mistaken idea that first-order logic is the foundational logic of mathematics. With this background he introduces his independence friendly logic (IFL). In this paper, I argue that approaches taking Hintikka’s IFL as a foundational logic of mathematics face serious challenges. First, the quantifiers in Hintikka’s IFL are not distinguishable from Linström’s general quantifiers, which means that the quantifiers in IFL involve higher order entities. Second, if we take Wright’s interpretation of quantifiers or if we take Hale’s criterion for the identity of concepts, Quine’s thesis that second-order logic is set theory will be rejected. Third, Hintikka’s definition of truth itself cannot be expressed in the extension of language of IFL. Since second-order logic can do what IFL does, the significance of IFL for the foundations of mathematics is weakened.