Choice with delayed and probabilistic reinforcers: effects of prereinforcer and postreinforcer stimuli.

In Experiment 1, pigeons' pecks on a green key led to a 5-s delay with green houselights, and then food was delivered on 20% (or, in other conditions, 50%) of the trials. Pecks on a red key led to an adjusting delay with red houselights, and then food was delivered on every trial. The adjusting delay was used to estimate indifference points: delays at which the two alternatives were chosen about equally often. Varying the presence or absence of green houselights during the delays that preceded possible food deliveries had large effects on choice. In contrast, varying the presence of the green or red houselights in the intertrial intervals had no effects on choice. In Experiment 2, pecks on the green key led to delays of either 5 s or 30 s with green houselights, and then food was delivered on 20% of the trials. Varying the duration of the green houselights on nonreinforced trials had no effect on choice. The results suggest that the green houselights served as a conditioned reinforcer at some times but not at others, depending on whether or not there was a possibility that a primary reinforcer might be delivered. Given this interpretation of what constitutes a conditioned reinforcer, most of the results were consistent with the view that the strength of a conditioned reinforcer is inversely related to its duration.     

Second-order schedules of token reinforcement: effects of varying the schedule of food presentation

In the initial link of a complex schedule, one discriminative stimulus was presented and lever pressing produced tokens on fixed-ratio schedules. In the terminal link, signalled by a second discriminative stimulus, deposits of the tokens produced food. With two rats, the terminal link was presented after each sixth component schedule of token reinforcement was completed. With the other two rats, the terminal link was presented following the first component schedule completed after a fixed interval. During the terminal link, each token deposit initially produced food. The schedule of food presentation was subsequently increased such that an increasing number of token deposits in the terminal link was required for each food presentation. Rates of lever pressing in the initial link were inversely related to the schedule of food presentation in the terminal link. These results are similar to those of experiments that have varied schedules of food presentation in chained schedules. Rates and patterns of responding controlled throughout the initial link were more similar to those ordinarily controlled by second-order brief-stimulus schedules than to those controlled by comparable extended chained schedules.     

Rewording the Rules on Disjunctive Probability

Logic is a central and highly useful part of philosophy. Its value is particularly evident when it comes to keeping our thinking about disjunctive probabilities clear. Because of the two meanings of “or” (“just one of these statements is true,” “at least one of these statements is true”), logic can show how the likelihood of a disjunction being true can be determined quite easily. To gauge the chance that one of two or more exclusive alternatives is true, one need only sum up their respective likelihoods. And to know the chance that at least one of two or more compatible alternatives is true, one simply has to figure the chance that it is false that all of them are false!     

Verbalization of Decision Strategies in Multiple‐Cue Probabilistic Inference

In multiple‐cue probabilistic inference, people choose between alternatives based on several cues, each of which is differentially associated with an alternative's overall value. Various strategies have been proposed for probabilistic inference (e.g., weighted additive, tally, and take‐the‐best). These strategies differ in how many cue values they require to enact and in how they weight each cue. Do decision makers actually use any of these strategies? Ways to investigate this question include analyzing people's choices and the cues that they reveal. However, different strategies often predict the same decisions, and search behavior says nothing about whether or how people use the information that they acquire. In this research, we attempt to elucidate which strategies participants use in a multiple‐cue probabilistic inference task by examining verbal protocols, a high‐density source of process data. The promise of verbal data is in their utility for testing detailed information processing models. To that end, we apply protocol analysis in conjunction with computational simulations. We find converging evidence across outcome measures, search measures, and verbal reports that most participants use simplifying heuristics, namely take‐the‐best. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Probability of reciprocation in repeated prisoner's dilemma games

Both social cooperation and self‐control require reciprocation. In social cooperation situations a single person's cooperative act, if not reciprocated by others, would be unreinforced both immediately and in the long term. Similarly, a single act of self‐control (refusing a single cigarette, for example), if not followed up by other such acts, would also be unreinforced immediately and in the long term. The present experiments varied probability of reciprocation in a prisoner's dilemma‐like game that could resemble a social cooperation or a self‐control situation. Participants earned points by playing against a computer. The computer offered the participant a choice between 5 or 6 points (‘cooperation’ by the computer) or between 1 or 2 points (‘defection’ by the computer). The participant's choice of the lesser alternative (‘cooperation’) or the greater alternative (‘defection’) on the current trial led, respectively, to cooperation or defection by the computer on the next trial with a probability (probability of reciprocation, PR) which could vary. When PR was greater than 63%, consistent cooperation maximized the participant's earnings. When PR was less than 63%, defection maximized earnings. Three conditions were studied: PR signaled by spinners; PR unsignaled; PR unsignaled with participants believing that they were playing with another person, not the computer. With PR = 100% (‘tit‐for‐tat’) and PR = 50%, the modal participant maximized earnings under all three conditions. With PR = 75%, participants maximized earnings only when PR was signaled. These results indicate that differences between people's tendency to cooperate with other people (social cooperation) and their tendency to cooperate with their own future interests (self‐control) may lie in differences in subjective PR. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The ‘conjunction fallacy’ revisited: how intelligent inferences look like reasoning errors

Findings in recent research on the ‘conjunction fallacy’ have been taken as evidence that our minds are not designed to work by the rules of probability. This conclusion springs from the idea that norms should be content‐blind—in the present case, the assumption that sound reasoning requires following the conjunction rule of probability theory. But content‐blind norms overlook some of the intelligent ways in which humans deal with uncertainty, for instance, when drawing semantic and pragmatic inferences. In a series of studies, we first show that people infer nonmathematical meanings of the polysemous term ‘probability’ in the classic Linda conjunction problem. We then demonstrate that one can design contexts in which people infer mathematical meanings of the term and are therefore more likely to conform to the conjunction rule. Finally, we report evidence that the term ‘frequency’ narrows the spectrum of possible interpretations of ‘probability’ down to its mathematical meanings, and that this fact—rather than the presence or absence of ‘extensional cues’—accounts for the low proportion of violations of the conjunction rule when people are asked for frequency judgments. We conclude that a failure to recognize the human capacity for semantic and pragmatic inference can lead rational responses to be misclassified as fallacies. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Patterns of Preference for Numerical and Verbal Probabilities

We report results of an experiment designed to test a principle formulated by Budescu and Wallsten (1995), that, when communicating uncertainty information, mode choices are sensitive to sources and degrees of vagueness. In addition, we examined subjects’ efficacy in using such uncertainty information as a function of communication mode, source, and vagueness. In phase one of the experiment, subjects in a dyad used precise (numerical) or imprecise (verbal) expressions to communicate to a remote partner precise or vague uncertainty about the likelihoods of events. Spinner outcomes were used to generate precise uncertainty while answers to almanac questions were used to elicit vague uncertainty. In phase two, subjects saw the events paired with their partners’ estimates of similar events, and were asked to gamble on one event from each pair. Communication mode preferences were measured as the relative frequency that subjects chose the numerical mode to either express or receive uncertainty information regarding the events. Efficacy was measured as the relative frequency that subjects choose from the pair the event associated with the objectively more probable uncertainty expression. Underlying uncertainty interacted with direction of communication to affect preferences for modes of expression of the probabilities. Subjects preferred precise (numerical) information, especially for precise events (spinners). For vague events (questions), their preference for precise (numerical) information was stronger when receiving than when communicating information. Similar preferences were reflected in the efficiency of subsequent gamble decisions based on the probability estimates. Specifically, decisions were more efficacious (i.e. consistent with Expected Utility) when degrees of precision in events and estimates matched. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Power Relations and Group Aggregation in the Multiplicative AHP and SMART

The relative power of the members in a group of decision makers can be incorporated in the multiplicative AHP via power coefficients in the logarithmic least squares whereby we analyse the pairwise comparison matrices. When each decision maker judges every pair of alternatives under each of the criteria, aggregation over the criteria and over the decision makers proceeds via a sequence of geometric-mean calculations which can be carried out in any order, at least with predetermined criterion weights and power coefficients. Hence, since we preserve the rank order of the alternatives, we avoid a deficiency of the original AHP. We also consider SMART, an additive method which is logarithmically related to the multiplicative AHP so that power relations can easily be incorporated in it. Finally, in order to illustrate the proposed model, we analyse a generalized version of the well-known example of Belton and Gear as well as the power relations between member countries of the European Community. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. 6 : 155–165 (1997) No. of Figures: 0. No. of Tables: 6. No. of References: 23.     

THE epistemologies of parsimony: A review of Ockham's razors: A user's manual by Elliott Sober

Sober analyzes two paradigms of parsimony that have been used successfully in science. These are associated with two interpretations of probability: Bayesian and frequentist. Sober applies these paradigms to problems in biology, psychology, and philosophy. In the chapter on psychology, he argues that objective data consisting of environmental input and two or more concurrent responses could be used to refute empirically the radical behaviorist thesis that probability of learned responses can be accounted for solely on the basis of environmental variables. Sober believes that such data are readily available and offers a thought experiment to illustrate his point. Behavior analysts, however, would want actual experimental data, undoubtedly with animals, before accepting any such refutation. Nonetheless, Sober's philosophical point about the type of experiment that would be capable of refuting this thesis is valid. The behavior analytic program, however, does not depend upon the truth of this thesis.     

Do Politicians Take Risks Like the Rest of Us? An Experimental Test of Prospect Theory Under MPs

Political psychologists have been quick to use prospect theory in their work, realizing its potential for explaining decisions under risk. Applying prospect theory to political decision‐making is not without problems, though, and here we address two of these: (1) Does prospect theory actually apply to political decision‐makers, or are politicians unlike the rest of us? (2) Which dimension do politicians use as their reference point when there are multiple dimensions (e.g., votes and policy)? We address both problems in an experiment with a unique sample of Dutch members of parliament as participants. We use well‐known (incentivized) decision situations and newly developed hypothetical political decision‐making scenarios. Our results indicate that politicians’ deviate from expected utility theory in the direction predicted by prospect theory but that these deviations are somewhat smaller than those of other people. Votes appear to be a more important determinant of politicians’ reference point than is policy.