Bad is freer than good: Positive–negative asymmetry in attributions of free will

Recent findings support the idea that the belief in free will serves as the basis for moral responsibility, thus promoting the punishment of immoral agents. We theorized that free will extends beyond morality to serve as the basis for accountability and the capacity for change more broadly, not only for others but also for the self. Five experiments showed that people attributed higher freedom of will to negative than to positive valence, regardless of morality or intent, for both self and others. In recalling everyday life situations and in classical decision making paradigms, negative actions, negatives outcomes, and negative framing were attributed higher free will than positive ones. Free will attributions were mainly driven by action or outcome valence, but not intent. These findings show consistent support for the idea that free will underlies laypersons’ sense-making for accountability and change under negative circumstances.     

Personality traits of high-risk sport participants: A meta-analysis

The purpose of this meta-analysis was to examine the relationships between personality traits and participation in high-risk sport. A total of 149 effect sizes from 39 eligible articles were obtained wherein the personality traits of high-risk sport participants were compared with either low-risk sport participants or individuals not engaged in any sport. Results revealed significant effect sizes in favor of the high-risk participants for sensation seeking, extraversion, and impulsivity. Significant effect sizes in favor of the comparator groups were found for neuroticism, telic dominance, and sensitivity to punishment. No significant differences were observed in psychoticism, sensitivity to reward, socialization, agreeableness, conscientiousness, or openness. The implications of these results and potential avenues of future research are highlighted.     

Is imagery better than reality? Performance in imagined dart throwing

We investigated whether deviations from optimal performance are predicted in motor imagery. In Experiment 1, novices and experts imagined and executed dart throws. In imagination, they reported the final position of the dart. Experts performed better than novices in execution and imagination. Distance to the target and bias were smaller in imagination than in execution. In Experiment 2, we dissociated the roles of feedback from proximal and distal action elements for predictions. Three groups of novices estimated the dart’s final position in imagination, in execution without visual feedback, or in execution with delayed visual feedback. Estimates did not differ significantly between groups, indicating that (the lack of) feedback did not influence predictions. Deviations from optimal performance were lower in estimated than in actual performance. In conclusion, although predictive mechanisms may be similar in imagination and execution, the full extent of deviation from optimal performance is not predicted.     

Infants’ perception of goal-directed actions: A multi-lab replication reveals that infants anticipate paths and not goals

Influential developmental theories claim that infants rely on goals when visually anticipating actions. A widely noticed study suggested that 11-month-olds anticipate that a hand continues to grasp the same object even when it swapped position with another object (Cannon, E., & Woodward, A. L. (2012). Infants generate goal-based action predictions. Developmental Science, 15, 292–298.). Yet, other studies found such flexible goal-directed anticipations only from later ages on. Given the theoretical relevance of this phenomenon and given these contradicting findings, the current work investigated in two different studies and labs, whether infants indeed flexibly anticipate an action goal. Study 1 (N = 144) investigated by means of five experiments, under which circumstances (e.g., animated agent, human agent) 12-month-olds show flexible goal anticipation abilities. Study 2 (N = 104) presented 11-, 32-month-olds and adults both a human grasping action as well as a non-human action. In none of the experiments did infants flexibly anticipate the action based on the goal, but rather on the movement path, irrespective of the type of agent. Although one experiment contained a direct replication of Cannon and Woodward (2012), we were not able to replicate their findings. Overall our work challenges the view that infants are able to flexibly anticipate action goals from early on, but rather rely on movement patterns when processing other’s actions.     

Intentional binding coincides with explicit sense of agency

Sense of agency, a feeling of generating actions and events by oneself, stems from action–outcome congruence. An implicit marker of sense of agency is intentional binding, which is compression of subjective temporal interval between action and outcome. We investigated relationships between intentional binding and explicit sense of agency. Participants pressed a key triggering auditory (Experiment 1) or visual outcome (Experiment 2) that occurred after variable delays. In each trial, participants rated their agency over the outcome and estimated the keypress–outcome temporal interval. Results showed that delays decreased agency ratings and intentional binding. There was inter-individual correlation between sensitivities to outcome delay (i.e., regression slope) of agency rating and intentional binding in the auditory but not visual domain. Importantly, we found intra-individual correlations between agency rating and intentional binding on a trial-by-trial basis in both outcome modalities. These results suggest that intentional binding coincides with explicit sense of agency.     

Action co-representation and the sense of agency during a joint Simon task: Comparing human and machine co-agents

Recent studies have suggested that individuals are not able to develop a sense of joint agency during joint actions with artificial systems. We sought to examine whether this lack of joint agency is linked to individuals’ inability to co-represent the machine-generated actions. Fifteen participants observed or performed a Simon response time task either individually, or jointly with another human or a computer. Participants reported the time interval between their response (or the co-actor response) and a subsequent auditory stimulus, which served as an implicit measure of participants’ sense of agency. Participants’ reaction times showed a classical Simon effect when they were partnered with another human, but not when they collaborated with a computer. Furthermore, participants showed a vicarious sense of agency when co-acting with another human agent but not with a computer. This absence of vicarious sense of agency during human-computer interactions and the relation with action co-representation are discussed.     

个体特征因素对师徒之间选择倾向的影响

师徒的相互选择过程是师徒关系研究中的一个重要问题。本文采用三个实验探讨了影响师徒相互选择倾向的个体特征因素。实验一和实验二探讨了徒弟选师傅时,师傅的外向性、成就动机水平、管理职务和性别一致性对徒弟选择师傅倾向的影响。实验三探讨了师傅选择徒弟时,徒弟的外向性、成就动机水平和性别一致性对师傅选择徒弟倾向的影响。实验结果表明在徒弟选择师傅时,师傅的外向性、成就动机、管理职务,是影响因素;在师傅选择徒弟时,徒弟的外向性、成就动机水平是影响因素。