How might degrees of belief shift? On action conflicting with professed beliefs

People often act in ways that appear incompatible with their sincere assertions (such as trembling in fear when their death becomes an imminent possibility, despite earlier professing that “Death is not bad!”). But how might we explain such cases? On the shifting view, subjects’ degrees of belief (or degrees of confidence) may be highly sensitive to changes in context. This paper articulates and refines this view, after defending it against recent criticisms. It details two mechanisms by which degrees of beliefs may shift.     

Stimulus–response correspondence effect as a function of temporal overlap between relevant and irrelevant information processing

The stimulus–response correspondence (SRC) effect refers to advantages in performance when stimulus and response correspond in dimensions or features, even if the common features are irrelevant to the task. Previous research indicated that the SRC effect depends on the temporal course of stimulus information processing. The current study investigated how the temporal overlap between relevant and irrelevant stimulus processing influences the SRC effect. In this experiment, the irrelevant stimulus (a previously associated tone) preceded the relevant stimulus (a coloured rectangle). The irrelevant and relevant stimuli onset asynchrony was varied to manipulate the temporal overlap between the irrelevant and relevant stimuli processing. Results indicated that the SRC effect size varied as a quadratic function of the temporal overlap between the relevant stimulus and irrelevant stimulus. This finding extends previous experimental observations that the SRC effect size varies in an increasing or decreasing function with reaction time. The current study demonstrated a quadratic function between effect size and the temporal overlap.     

Cognitive costs of encoding novel natural activities: Can “learning by doing” be distracting and deceptive?

Findings from action memory research suggest that the enactment of simple actions and naturalistic activities results in similar memory performance to that from their observation. However, little is known about potential differences between the conditions during the encoding of the to-be-studied actions and activities. We analysed the cognitive costs of encoding two novel naturalistic activities studied via enactment or via observation in four experiments. In addition to memory performance, we measured objective cognitive costs with a secondary task and subjective cognitive costs with repeated ratings of mental effort and estimates of general activity difficulty. Memory performance was comparable across study conditions throughout all experiments. The enactment of activities repeatedly resulted in slower reaction times in the secondary task than did observation, suggesting higher objective costs. In contrast, subjective costs were rated lower after enactment than after observation. Findings from a pantomimic enactment condition suggested that the low ratings of subjective costs after enactment represent a misinterpretation of task demands. Our findings imply that the widespread belief about “learning by doing” as an easy way of learning does not stem from an actual advantage in memory performance, but rather from continuous feedback about one's performance resulting from enactment.     

Personality traits of high-risk sport participants: A meta-analysis

The purpose of this meta-analysis was to examine the relationships between personality traits and participation in high-risk sport. A total of 149 effect sizes from 39 eligible articles were obtained wherein the personality traits of high-risk sport participants were compared with either low-risk sport participants or individuals not engaged in any sport. Results revealed significant effect sizes in favor of the high-risk participants for sensation seeking, extraversion, and impulsivity. Significant effect sizes in favor of the comparator groups were found for neuroticism, telic dominance, and sensitivity to punishment. No significant differences were observed in psychoticism, sensitivity to reward, socialization, agreeableness, conscientiousness, or openness. The implications of these results and potential avenues of future research are highlighted.     

Is imagery better than reality? Performance in imagined dart throwing

We investigated whether deviations from optimal performance are predicted in motor imagery. In Experiment 1, novices and experts imagined and executed dart throws. In imagination, they reported the final position of the dart. Experts performed better than novices in execution and imagination. Distance to the target and bias were smaller in imagination than in execution. In Experiment 2, we dissociated the roles of feedback from proximal and distal action elements for predictions. Three groups of novices estimated the dart’s final position in imagination, in execution without visual feedback, or in execution with delayed visual feedback. Estimates did not differ significantly between groups, indicating that (the lack of) feedback did not influence predictions. Deviations from optimal performance were lower in estimated than in actual performance. In conclusion, although predictive mechanisms may be similar in imagination and execution, the full extent of deviation from optimal performance is not predicted.     

Infants’ perception of goal-directed actions: A multi-lab replication reveals that infants anticipate paths and not goals

Influential developmental theories claim that infants rely on goals when visually anticipating actions. A widely noticed study suggested that 11-month-olds anticipate that a hand continues to grasp the same object even when it swapped position with another object (Cannon, E., & Woodward, A. L. (2012). Infants generate goal-based action predictions. Developmental Science, 15, 292–298.). Yet, other studies found such flexible goal-directed anticipations only from later ages on. Given the theoretical relevance of this phenomenon and given these contradicting findings, the current work investigated in two different studies and labs, whether infants indeed flexibly anticipate an action goal. Study 1 (N = 144) investigated by means of five experiments, under which circumstances (e.g., animated agent, human agent) 12-month-olds show flexible goal anticipation abilities. Study 2 (N = 104) presented 11-, 32-month-olds and adults both a human grasping action as well as a non-human action. In none of the experiments did infants flexibly anticipate the action based on the goal, but rather on the movement path, irrespective of the type of agent. Although one experiment contained a direct replication of Cannon and Woodward (2012), we were not able to replicate their findings. Overall our work challenges the view that infants are able to flexibly anticipate action goals from early on, but rather rely on movement patterns when processing other’s actions.     

Intentional binding coincides with explicit sense of agency

Sense of agency, a feeling of generating actions and events by oneself, stems from action–outcome congruence. An implicit marker of sense of agency is intentional binding, which is compression of subjective temporal interval between action and outcome. We investigated relationships between intentional binding and explicit sense of agency. Participants pressed a key triggering auditory (Experiment 1) or visual outcome (Experiment 2) that occurred after variable delays. In each trial, participants rated their agency over the outcome and estimated the keypress–outcome temporal interval. Results showed that delays decreased agency ratings and intentional binding. There was inter-individual correlation between sensitivities to outcome delay (i.e., regression slope) of agency rating and intentional binding in the auditory but not visual domain. Importantly, we found intra-individual correlations between agency rating and intentional binding on a trial-by-trial basis in both outcome modalities. These results suggest that intentional binding coincides with explicit sense of agency.     

Action co-representation and the sense of agency during a joint Simon task: Comparing human and machine co-agents

Recent studies have suggested that individuals are not able to develop a sense of joint agency during joint actions with artificial systems. We sought to examine whether this lack of joint agency is linked to individuals’ inability to co-represent the machine-generated actions. Fifteen participants observed or performed a Simon response time task either individually, or jointly with another human or a computer. Participants reported the time interval between their response (or the co-actor response) and a subsequent auditory stimulus, which served as an implicit measure of participants’ sense of agency. Participants’ reaction times showed a classical Simon effect when they were partnered with another human, but not when they collaborated with a computer. Furthermore, participants showed a vicarious sense of agency when co-acting with another human agent but not with a computer. This absence of vicarious sense of agency during human-computer interactions and the relation with action co-representation are discussed.